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LIST OF EXHIBITS

HEARING TRANSCRIPT
taken on JANUARY 5, 2011, will be lodged with the Supreme Court.

EXHIBITS ADMITTED into record before IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

1. IDOL Order to Deny Re-Open mailed 1/14/10 (5pgs)
2. Employer Request to Reopen HearinglRequest for Rehearing filed 1/13/10 (4pgs)
3. Notice of Telephone Hearing mailed 12/22/09 (3pgs)
4. Important Information About Your Hearing Read Carefully (2pgs)
5. Employer Exhibits 3-10 (172pgs)
6. Exhibit 10F audio CD
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IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
APPEALS BUREAU
317 WEST MAIN STREET
BOISE, IDAHO 83735-0720
(208) 332-3572/ (800) 621-4938
FAJ(: (208)334-6440

HABIB SADID,

)
)
)
)
)

SSN:
Claimant
vs.

~

IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY,

DOCKET NUMBER 1777-2010

)
DECISION OF APPEALS EXAMINER
)
)
)
)

Employer
and

)

IDAHODEPARTMENTOFUillOR

----------------------------------)
DECISION
Benefits are ALLOWED effective November 8, 2009. The claimant was not discharged for
misconduct in connection with employment, as defmed by §72-1366 (5) of the Idaho
Employment Security Law.
The Eligibility Determination dated December 3, 2009, is hereby REVERSED.

mSTORY OF THE CASE
The above-entitled matter was heard by Janet C. Hardy, Appeals Examiner for the Idaho
Department of Labor, on January 5, 2010, by telephone in the City of Boise, in accordance with
§72-1368 (6) of the Idaho Employment Security Law.
The claimant was represented by John Lynn, attorney at law. The claimant testified on his own
behalf.
The employer was neither present nor represented.
Exhibits #1 through #10 were entered into.and made a part of the record.

ISSUE
The issue before the Appeals Examiner is whether unemployment is due to the claimant quitting
voluntarily and, if so, whether with good cause connected with the employment -OR- being
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discharged and, if so, whether for misconduct in connection with the employment, according to
§72-1366 (5) of the Idaho Employment Security Law..
FINDINGS OF FACT
Additional facts or testimony may exist in this case. However, the Appeals Examiner
outlines only those that are relevant to the decision and those based upon reliable evidence.
Based on the exhibits and testimony in the record, the following facts are found:

1.

The claimant worked for this employer on two occasions - from August 1987 until he
quit to go to work for Boeing. His most recent date of hire was August 1991 as a full
professor. His contract for the school term ended on May 15, 2009, however a new
contract was signed shortly after May 15, 2009 for the new school term. He was
suspended on August 4,2009, and discharged on October 23, 2009.

2.

On May 6, 2009, the claimant was served with a Notice of Contemplated Action from
Dean Jacobsen based on the claimant's "continued pattern of behavior." Dean Jacobsen
did not appear at the hearing.

3.

On August 4, 2009, the claimant was placed on administrative leave with pay by Dr.
Vailas, president of the university. On August 19, 2009, the claimant filed a grievance
with the Faculty Appeals Board.

4.

The Faculty Appeals Board found that sufficient evidence had not been presented to
justify the claimant's termination. President Vailas was so notified on October 23, 2009.

5.

The claimant was discharged on October 27, 2009 by Dr. Vailas. Dr. Vailas did not
appear at the hearing.

AUTHORITY
Section 72-1366 (5) of the Idaho Employment Security Law provides that a claimant shall be
eligible for benefits provided unemployment is not due to the fact that the claimant left
employment voluntarily without good cause, or was discharged for misconduct in connection
with employment.

An employer may discharge an employee for any reason. However, only a discharge that is found
to constitute misconduct for unemployment insurance purposes makes an employee ineligible for
benefits.
The employer must carry the burden of proving that the employee was discharged for
employment-related misconduct Parker vs. St. Maries Plywood, 101 Idaho 415, 614 P 2d 955
(1980).
Misconduct within the meaning of an unemployment compensation act excluding from its benefit
an employee discharged for misconduct must be an act of wanton or willful disregard of the
employer's interest, a deliberate violation of the employer's rules, a disregard of standards of
behavior which the employer has the right to expect of his employee, or negligence in such degree
or recurrence as to manifest culpability, wrongful intent, or evil design, or show an intentional and
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substantial disregard of the employer's interest or of the employee's duties and obligations to the
employer. Rasmussen vs. Employment Security Agencv. 83 Idaho 198,360 P.2d 90 (1961).

In Application of Citizen Utilities Company, 82 Idaho 208, 351 P 2d 487 (1960), the Idaho Supreme
Court held that while the Commission is a fact-finding, administrative agency, and as such, is not
bound by the strict rules of hearsay evidence governing courts oflaw, its findings must be supported
by substantial and competent evidence. Id. at 213,351 P.2d at 492. In an administrative proceeding
hearsay evidence-standing alone-is not sufficient to support findings. Id. at 214,351 P.2d at 493.
Hearsay is "[aJ term applied to that species of testimony given by a witness who relates, not what he
[or she] knows personally, but what others have told him [or her], or what he [or she] has heard said
by others." BLACK' S LAW DICTIONARY 722 (6th ed. 1990). The testimony is "offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted." Id.
The positive, uncontradicted testimony of a credible witness must be accepted as true even if the
witness is an interested party. Testimony may not be arbitrarily or capriciously disregarded, but
may be disregarded if it exceeds probability or is impeached. Testimony which is inherently
improbable, or rendered so by facts and circumstances disclosed at the hearing, may be disregarded,
but this is warranted only when it is physically impossible for the evidence to be true, or its falsity is
apparent, without any resort to inference or deduction. Dinneen vs. Finch. 100 Idaho 620, 603 P.2d
575 (1979).

CONCLUSIONS
The employer asserts the claimant was discharged for inappropriate conduct described in several
documents in the record. The entire documentary record, however, is considered as hearsay and
the Idaho Snpreme Court has ruled that hearsay evidence, standing alone, is not sufficient to
support a finding.
The employer failed to appear and testify as to the truth and veracity of the allegations of
misconduct contained in the documents. As the claimant testified, and denied the employer's
allegations, it cannot be found that a preponderance of the evidence supports the employer's
allegations. The claimant's swom testimony must be given greater weight and consideration.
The burden of proving misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence falls strictly on the
employer. Where that burden is not met, benefits must be awarded to the claimant. Roll v. City
of Middleton, 105 Idaho 22,25,665 P.2d 721, 724 (1983); Parker v. St. Maries Plywood, 101
Idaho 415,614 P.2d 955, 959 (1980).
The Appeals Examiner concludes that the employer has not met this burden. The claimant is
eligible for benefits.

~~
Appeals Examiner

Date of Mailing

January 6, 2010
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Last Day To Appeal

January 20, 2010

APPEAL RIGHTS
You have FOURTEEN fH.l DAYS FROM THE DATE OF MAILING to file a Written appeal with
the Idaho Industrial Commission. The appeal must be mailed to:
Idaho Industrial Commission
Judicial Division, IDOL Appeals
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0041
Or delivered in person to:
Idaho Industrial Commission
700 S Clearwater Lane
Boise, ID 83712
Or transmitted by facsimile to:
(208) 332-7558.
If the appeal is mailed, it must be postmarked no later than the last day to appeal. An appeal filed
by facsimile transmission must be received by the Commission by 5:00 p.m., Mountain Time, on
the last day to appeal. A facsimile transmission received after 5:00 p.m will be deemed received by
the Commission on the next business day. A late ~ will be dismissed. Appeals fIled by any
means with the Appeals Bureau Of a Department of Labor local office will not be accepted by the
Commission. TO EMPWYERS WHO ARE INCORPORATED: If you file an appeal with the
Idaho Industrial COl1vnission., the appeal must be signed by a corporate officer or legal counsel
licensed to practice in the State of Idaho and the signature must includ.e the individual's title. The
Convnission will not consider appeals submitted by employer representatives who are not attorneys.
If you request a hearing before the COirunission or pennission to file a legal brief, you must make
these requests through legal counsel licensed to practice in the State of Idaho. Questions should be
directed to the Idaho Industrial Commission, Unemployment Appeals, (208) 334-6024.

If no appeal is fIled, this decision will become final and cannot be changed. TO CLAIMANT: If
this decision is changed, any benefits paid will be subject to repayment If an appeal is fIled, you
should continue to report on your claim as long as you are unemployed.
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IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF lABOR
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317 WEST MAIN STREET
BOISE, IDAHO 83735-0720
(208) 332-35721 (800) 621-4938
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on
January 6. 2010
. a true and correct copy of Decision of Appeals
Examiner was served by regular United States mail upon each of the following:
HABIB SADID
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POCATELLO ID 83209
JOHN LYNN
ATTORNEY AT LAW

~~i~~; DR, STE 200

"~t-, j~:N',

.

';

ref' [i} ~L\fdJA)£/.

JOHNSON & MONTELEONE LLP
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Participant Name
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Get Docket Info·
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Must have both Docket No and Year to enter notes.
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Docket

Claimant
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Update

I

Office FileDate
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1777 -201 0 ~IH~AB::-:I-::-B~S-:-AD~I-::-D-.-.
Issues:

Hearing Schedule:
r:O-=-2':"'O--D"'"':i-s-ch:-a-r-g-e-;---------,."'1. [Jan 52010 11 :30 AMHardy
Appellant:!gaimant

.m..:.J Updated:112118/2009 BY:ls~chter
Idaho State University / Johnson & Monteleone Llpattourneys And
Counslers At Law / John Lynn, esq

.

.... ..::1

Notes:
2010-01-25 13:19:17-(sr) - Got hard copy from scanning and emailed IC and Legal decision.
Will be mailing an audio cd today, file is to large to email;
2010-01-25 13:19:16-(sr) - Got hard copy from scanning and emailed IC and Legal decision.
Will be mailing an audio cd today, file is to large to email;
2010-01-22 1O:53:50-(sr) - problems getting decision to email from AX, waiting to hear back
from IT before I can send to IC and Legal;
2010~OL-2208:5.4:17-'sr}"Rec'd IC protest; processed as needed;
2010-01-21 12:31:24-Gh) - Received yet another request to RJO from ERs attorney (Claim
for Review and Affidavit in support of motion for rehearing). DENIED. Advised ER via
letter they must protest to the IC.;
2010-01-15 14:21 :24-(tg) - David Alexander from Racine Law Ofcs, ER rep, called from
855-9080 to ask about the time frame for appealing to IC. I told him he has 14 days from the
date of the mailing of the denial to re-open. ;
2010-01-15 08:50:57-(ms) - recv'd in mail from attny reqt to reopen.it's been denied. sent reqt
to scanning;
2010-01-14 15:51 :32-(ms) - Attny for ER called told him the reqt to reopen was denied.he
can appeal to I C ;
2010-01-13 16:30:29-Gh) - Employer's request for RJO DENIED.;
2010-01-13 09:47:59-(ms) - printed off file from application extender gave to AE;
2010-01-13 09:32:39-(ms) - recv'd fax from Attny for ER .reqt to reopen gave to AE;
2010-01-13 09:32:22-Gh) - Employer requested RJO. Gave to AE.;
2010-01-05 12:26:48-(tc) - ckd with ae and the mailing date was 12/22, so cUd emplyr and
1m on phone of the mailing date;
2010-01-05 12:16:25-(tc) - emplyr clld (Shannon) said they didn't receive the nth, told her
both addrs it was mailed to and that was the correct addr, wanted to know date of mailing,
will ask ae aft hearing;
2010-01-05 12:00:26-Gh) - Employer did not appear.;
2010-01-04 14:36:08-(sr) - Rcvd additional docs, hand delivered, from the CL;
2010-01-04 12:40:12-(ms) - recv'd fax notice of association of counsel for CL .added to
Earticiapnts put in file;
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John A. Bailey, Jr. (ISB No. 2619)
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE
& BAILEY, CHARTERED
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391
Telephone: (208) 232-6101
Fax: (208) 232-6109

Attorney jar Employer
APPEALS BUREAU
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

HABIB SADID, an individual,
SSN:
Claimant,
vs.
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY,
Employer,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Docket No. 1777-2010

CLAIM FOR REVIEW

and .....
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.

)
)
)

COMES NOW, the Employer, IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, by and through counsel of
record, John A. Bailey, Jr. of Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge & Bailey, Chartered, and hereby gives
notice pursuant to Idaho Code Section 72-1368(7) and IDAP A Section 09.01.06.066.01 of its claim
for review of the decision of the appeals examiner in the above captioned case dated January 6,2010,
and the denial of Request for Rehearing dated on or about January 14,2010 .. The Employer further
requests that it be permitted to present additional evidence, on the grounds and for the reasons that
it was denied an opportunity to present evidence at the hearing before the Appeal Examiner. As set
forth in the Request to Reopen Hearing or for Rehearing filed herein on January 13,2010, and the
CLAIM FOR REVIEW - 1

Affidavit of David J. Miller filed therewith (a copy of which is filed herewith), the Employer was
closed over the Christmas holiday, from the day after the Notice of Appeal Hearing was mailed until
the day before the hearing. The relevant officers ofldaho State University did not receive the notice
until after the hearing. The ISU Human Resources Office called the Department of Labor during the
hearing and was denied an opportunity to participate or present evidence. In the interests of justice,
the Employer requests that the Commission hold a hearing to receive evidence from the Employer,
or that the matter be remanded backA:o the Appeals Examiner for an additional hearing and decision.
DATED this

CLAIM FOR REVIEW - 2

rl1~ay of January, 2010.

.;)

i

CERTIFICATKOF SERVICE
r'

jt)

Il:!'</"
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day of January, 2010, I served a true and correct

copy of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows:
Sam Johnson
JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, L.L.P.
405 South Eighth Street, Suite 250
Boise, Idaho 83702

[~U. S. Mail
[
[
[

]
]
]

Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 947-2424

L'\:r- u. S. Mail
John Lynn
Attorney at Law
776 E. Riverside Dr., Ste 200
Eagle, ID 83616

[
[
[

:1
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]
]
]

Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 685-2355

John A. Bailey, Jr. (ISB No. 2619)
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE
& BAILEY, CHARTERED
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391
Telephone: (208) 232-6101
Fax: (208) 232-6109
Attorney for Employer
APPEALS BUREAU
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

HABIB SADID, an individual,
SSN:

Docket No. 1777-2010

Claimant,
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID MILLER
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
REHEARING

vs.
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY,
Employer,
and
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.

STATE OF IDAHO )
: ss.
County of Bannock )
COMES NOW DAVID MILLER, Director of Human Resources for the Employer
herein, IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, and on his oath deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am the Director of the Human Resources Office for Idaho State University. The

AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID J. MILLER - 1
~--".

\)

\

Human Resources Department has responsibility for matters involving unemployment benefits
for former ISU employees, including the responsibility for responding to appeals pending before
the Appeals Bureau of the Department of Labor.
2.

My office, as is true of all administrative offices ofIdaho State University, was

closed from December 24,2009 through January 3, 2010 by order of the President of the
University as a cost-saving measure.
3.

As of our last working hours on December 23, my office had not received notice

of the scheduling of Dr. Sadid's appeal hearing.
4.

My office reopened on January 4, 2010, and later that day we received almost two

weeks worth of mail. Our copy of the Notice of Appeal Hearing shows that it was stamped by
the Human Resources Department on-January 4,2010. It was not addressed specifically to the
attention of any person, and was placed in the inbox of a person not associated with the
unemployment process. It was not found until the afternoon of January 5.
5.

In the afternoon of January 4, we received an email from Dr. Sadid's attorney

with attached exhibits, but the email did not state a date or a time for a hearing. The same day, a
person dropped off at our office a CD with no information except that it pertained to Dr. Sadid.
On January 5, my staff called the local Department of Labor office to ask about the date and time
for the hearing of Dr. Sadid' s appeal, but the local staff was unaware of any scheduled hearing.
They referred us to the Department of Labor offices in Boise.
6.

At about 12:15 p.m. on January 5, my stafflearned in a phone call to the Boise

office that a hearing was scheduled forI 1:30 that morning and that there was no option for ISU
to participate. I was not in the office at that time, and by the time I returned, the hearing was
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID J. MILLER - 2

over.
7.

Had we been aware of the time and date of the hearing, we would have made

arrangements to attend with counsel and with witnesses in support of ISU' s claim that Dr. Sadid
was terminated for misconduct.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT.

DATED this

~Lday of January, 2010.
--12

-.H....

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

(SEAL)
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fa,

day of January, 2010.

NOTARY P~IC FOR IDAHO
Residing at:~ocl- COO"-~ .
My Commission Expires:
3 ::20//

1t1.a;

I

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1'3 tt;ay of January, 2010, I served a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows:
Sam Johnson
JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, L.L.P.
405 South Eighth Street, Suite 250
Boise, Idaho 83702

U. S. Mail
Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 947-2424

John Lynn
Attorney at Law
776 E. Riverside Dr., Ste 200
Eagle,ID 83616

U. S. Mail
Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 429-1925
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

HABIB SADID,
SSN:
Claimant,
vs.
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY,
Employer,
and
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

IDOL # 1777-2010

NOTICE OF
FILING OF APPEAL

FILE D

JAN 2 8 2010
iNDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: The Industrial Commission has received an appeal from a
decision of an Appeals Examiner of the Idaho Department of Labor. A copy of the appeal is
enclosed. Documents that are already part of the record or file will not be copied.

Further action will be taken by the Industrial Commission in accordance with its Rules of
Appellate Practice and Procedure, a copy of which is enclosed.
PLEASE READ ALL THE RULES CAREFULLY

The Commission will make its decision in this appeal based on the record of the proceedings
before the Appeals Examiner of the Idaho Department of Labor. To request a briefing schedule or
hearing, refer to Rule 5(A) and 7(A,B) of the Rules of Appellate Practice and Procedure.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS DIVISION
POST OFFICE BOX 83720
BOISE IDAHO 83720-0041
(208) 334-6024

NOTICE OF FILING OF APPEAL - 1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 28 day of January, 2010 a true and correct copy of the Notice of
Filing of Appeal and compact disc of the Hearing was served by regular United States mail upon
the following:

HABIB SADID
1420 ASPEN DR
POCA TELLO ID 83209
JOHN A BAILEY JR
RACINE OLSON NYE BUDGE &
BAILYCHTRD
PO BOX 1391
POCATELLO 83204-1391
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
STATE HOUSE MAIL
317 W MAIN STREET
BOISE ID 83735
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NOTICE OF FILING OF APPEAL - 2

\'0

LAW OFFICES OF

W. MARCUS W. NYE
RANDALL C. BUDGE
JOHN A. BAILEY. JR.
JOHN R. GOODELL
JOHN B. INGELSTROM
DANIEL C. GREEN
BRENT Cl. ROCHE
KIRK 9. HADLEY
FRED J. LEWIS
ERIC 1... OLSEN
CONRAD J. AIKEN
RICHARD A. HEARN. M.D.
LANE V. ERICKSON
FREDERICK J. HAHN, III
DAVID E. ALEXANDER
PATRICK N. GEORGE
SCOTT J. SMITH
JOSHUA D. JOHNSON
STEPHEN J. MUHONEN
CANDICE M. MCHUGH
CAROL TIPPI YOLYN
BRENT 1... WHITING
JONATHON S. BYINGTON
DAVE BAGL.EY
THOMAS J. BUDGE

RACINE OLSON NYE BUDGE Be BAILEY
CHARTERED
201 EAST CENTER STREET
POST OFFICE BOX 1391
POCATELLO. IDAHO 63204-1391

TELEPHONE (206) 232-6101
FACSIMILE (206) 232-6109

www.racinelaw.net

BOISE OFFICE
tOt SOUTH CAPITOL
BOULEVARD, SUITE 208
BOISE, IDAHO 83702
TELEPHONE: (208) 395-00 t 1
FACSIMILE; (208) 433-0167

IDAHO FALLS OFFICE
477 SHOUP AVENUE
SUITE t07
POST OFFICE BOX 50698
IDAHO FALLS, 1083405
TELEPHONE: (208) 528-6101
FACSIMJLE: (208) 52a~6109

ALl.. OFFICES TOLL FREE
(677) 232-6101
SENDER'S E-MAIL ADDRESS:dea@racinelaw.net

LOUIS F. RACINE (f 917-2005)

WILLIAM D. OLSON, OF COUNSEL

MARK A. SHAFFER
JASON E. FLAIG

January 29,2010

Idaho Industrial Commission
Judicial Division, IDOL Appeals
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0041
Re:

IDOL Docket No.:
Claimant:
Employer:

1777-2010
Habib Sadid
Idaho State University

To Whom it May Concern:
Attached is the Employer's Reply to Memorandum in Opposition to Employer's Claim of
Review, for filing with respect to the above Claim for Review.

DEAcc
Attachments
c:
Sam Johnson (w/attachments)
John Lynn (w/attachments)

John A. Bailey, Jr. (ISB No. 2619)
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE
& BAILEY, CHARTERED
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391
Telephone: (208) 232-6101
Fax: (208) 232-6109

Attorney for Employer Idaho State University

IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMlSSION
JUDICTAI DIVISION, IDOL APPEALS
HABIB SADID,
SSN:
Claimant,
vs.
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY,
, Employer,
and
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

IDOL Docket No. 1777-2010

REPLY TO MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO CLAIM FOR
REVIEW

COMES NOW, the employer, IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY (hereinafter "ISU'), by and
through its counsel of record, and replies to the Brief in Opposition to Employer's Claim for Review
as follows:
In its claim for review, ISU is asking the Industrial Commission for an opportunity to present
evidence regarding Dr. Sadid' s claim that he was fired without cause. This is a claim that was
rejected by the Department of Labor in the first instance. Dr. Sadid managed to succeed before the
Appeals Examiner only because of a scheduling quirk which left ISU without sufficient notice of the
REPLY BRIEF - Page 1

hearing, and because of the Department of Labor' s refusal to permit ISU to participate in the hearing
when representatives from the University called while the hearing was still in progress.
The Appeals Examiner correctly noted that notice of the hearing was mailed in a timely
fashion, which is all that is required by the law. However, it is within the discretion of the Industrial
Commission to hear additional evidence or remanded to the Appeals Examiner for a rehearing. Idaho
code § 72-1368(7). The interests of justice require that the state ofIdaho, as the employer of Dr.
Sadid, be given an opportunity to demonstrate that Dr. Sadid was fired for cause before state funds
are paid to him in contravention of public policy.
The affidavit of David Miller, which is part of the record, establishes that Idaho State
University was closed from the day after the mailing of the notice until the day before the hearing.
It was therefore impossible for anyone at Idaho State University to have had actual notice of the
hearing before the fourth day of January, fewer than 24 hours before the start of the hearing. In
reality, it was necessary for the notice to make its way through the mail system, and it did not make
its way into the hands of a responsible person in the Human Resources Office until January 5.
Likewise, although counsel for the employee sent an email to the ISU Human Resources Office in
the afternoon of January 4 (Employees' Exhibit C), it did not on its face state the date and time of
the hearing.

Such information was only contained within an attachment.

The exhibit which

Employees' counsel had delivered to the Human Resources Department, the same day was an audio
CD and likewise did not state the date and time of the hearing.
As was also established by the affidavit of David Miller, the ISU Human Resources
Department made a reasonable attempt to determine what hearing was being held on January 5, and
actually reached the appropriate persons at the Department of Labor office while the hearing was in

REPLY BRIEF - Page 2

progress, only to be told they could not participate.
Under these facts, the failure of ISU to participate in the hearing was reasonable and
excusable. Where ISU was closed for two weeks over the holidays, it was not possible during that
period for responsible persons at ISU to be notified of the pending hearing. To suggest, as the
claimant does in his Brief in Opposition, that ISU should have made "the proper arrangements for
someone to check his mail and call to his attention an important date of hearing," is to deny the reality
of how a government office operates. It would defeat the purpose of an order to close the University
over the holidays (as a money saving measure) for the Department of Labor or another state agency
to require that ISU keep its offices staffed to respond to hearing notices. It is quite likely that the
Commission would look unfavorably on a claimant who filed an appeal and then failed to watch his
mailbox for the notice of hearing. But that is not what happened here. ISU did not initiate the appeal
and was not aware that a hearing was due to be scheduled.
The people of the State of Idaho deserve an opportunity for their representatives to present
to the Commission the facts regarding Dr. Sadid's termination. It is public policy that people who
are terminated for cause not receive unemployment insurance benefits. Public policy therefore
strongly favors giving an employer an opportunity to demonstrate that cause, ifit exists. Where such
cause exists, as here, and the employer's failure to participate in the hearing is reasonable and
excusable, as it is here, it offends justice to deny the employer an opportunity to present the evidence
showing cause, especially when the public purse is doubly implicated because the employer is itself
a state agency.
F or these reasons, the employer respectfully requests that the Commission review the
decisions of the Appeals Examiner and conduct a hearing or remand this matter to the Department

REPLY BRIEF - Page 3

of Labor for a further hearing before an Appeals EX'V1.iner.

RESPECTFUllY SUBMITTED this

REPLY BRIEF - Page 4

t fI

day of

~

J/IItII~r

2010.

CERTIFICA TE OF SERVICE

£lUI:

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day ofJanuary, 2010, I served a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows:
Sam Johnson
JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, L.L.P.
405 South Eighth Street, Suite 250
Boise, Idaho 83702

[xl u. S. Mail
[
[
[

]
]
]

Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 947-2424

~.S.Mail
John Lynn
Attorney at Law
776 E. Riverside Dr., Ste 200
Eagle, ID 83616
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Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
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JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, L.L.P.
"ATIORNEYSAND COUNSELORS AT LAW

405 South Eighth Street, Suite 250
Boise, Idaho 83702
~V6ice: (208) 33 I -21 00
Fax: (208) 947-2424
http://www.tr~asurevalleyl(Jl1lyers.com

FACSIMILE TRANSMITTAL SHEET
To: Mary

From: Sam Johnson/Cara Rice

,Company: Idaho Industrial
Commission

Date: February 3, 2010

Fax number: (208) 332-7558

Total no. of pages including cover: 17

Phone number:

Sender's reference number:

Re: Habib Sadid

Your reference number:

o Urgent

o For Review

o Please Comment

o Please Reply

o Please Recycle

Notes/Comments:

See attached Claimant's Opposition to Employer's Claimjor Review.

CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE
The information contained in this facsimile message is legally privileged work product,
and confidential information intended only for the use of the individual or entity names
below. lfthe reader of this message is not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified
that any dissemination, distribution or copy of this telecopy is strictly prohibited. If you
have received this telecopy in error, please immediately notify us by telephone and return
the original message or work product to us at the address shown above, via the U.S.P.S.

... _ ,

....... ,

_ "' ... v

""! .... _
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I.".n.c.

, S~m Johnson, ISB No. 4777
'JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, LLP.
405 South Eighth Street, Ste. 250
. Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 331-2100
Facsimile: (208) 947-2424

sam@treasurevalleylawyers.com
John C. Lynn, ISB No. 1548
.776 E. Riverside Drive, Ste. 200
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 685-2333
"Facsimile: (208) 429-1925
Attorneys for Claimant

APPEALS BUREAU
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

HABIB SADID,
BSN:
Claimant,
'v.

DOCKET NUMBER: 1777-2010

IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY,
Employer

CLAIMANT'S
OPPOSITION
TO
EMPLOYER'S CLAIM FOR REVIEW

and
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

COMES NOW Claimant, by and through his attorneys of record, and hereby
submits his opposition to the Employer's Claim for Review.
Wherefore, we respectfully submit the Employer's Claim for Review should be
q,enied based upon the following grounds and reasons:

~I'

.

CLAIMANT'S OPPOSITION TO EMPLOYER'S CLAIM FOR REVIEW - 1

/

Y

fdI0031017

1.

The Decision of the Appeals Examiner, Janet C. Hardy, denying the
Employer's request to re-open the hearing was based upon a sound application
of law to the facts and therefore should not be disturbed. (A true and correct
copy of the Appeals Examiner's Order to Deny Re-Opening is appended
hereto as Exhibit "A ").

2.

The Affidavit of David J. Miller, refened to in the Employer's Claim for
Review, misstates the record. In his affidavit, Mr. Miller acknowledges in
paragraph five (5) that on "January 4, we received an email from Dr. Sadid's
atto~'l1ey

with attached exhibits, but the email did not state a date or a time for

a hearing. (See Affidavit ofDavid Miller in Support of Motion for Rehearing,
~

5, appended hereto as Exhibit "B")(Emphasis added).

statement is not accurate.

Mr. Miller's

Mr. Miller fails to disclose that the List of

Supplemental Exhibits attached to the January 4, 2010, email makes express
reference to the fact that Claimant plans to use the exhibits "at the telephonic
hearing scheduled for January 5, 2010." (A true and correct copy of the
January 4, 2010, email together with Claimant's Supplemental Exhibit List is
appended hereto as Exhibit "C")(Emphasis added).

This email and the

supplemental exhibit list, of course, supplied the factual basis for the Appeals
Examiner's conclusion that, "additional documents submitted by the claimant,
through his attorney, were emailed to the employer's human resource office
on'Monday, January 4, 2010, which specifically referenced the hearing
scheduled for January 5, 2010." (See Exhibit "A" appended hereto, p. 2 of 4).

~LAIMANT'S

OPPOSITION TO EMPLOYER'S CLAIM FOR REVIEW - 2

~004/017

3.

Worth noting as well is the fact that Mr. Steve Millward personally, handdelivered a copy of Claimant's Hearing Exhibit "F" to Ms. Shannon Carr, the
designated representative from the Employer's Human Resource Office, on
January 4, 2010, the day before the hearing scheduled for January 5, 2010. (A
true and correct copy of Mr. Millward's Certificate of Hand-Delivery is
appended hereto as Exhibit (lD ").

4.

Finally, the Claimant respectfully submits that if the tables were turned and
Claimant had gone on vacation for two (2) weeks without making the proper
arrangements for someone to check his mail and call to his attention an
important date of hearing, it is unlikely the Commission would look favorably
upon a request to reopen.
For these reasons and from the record as a whole, Claimant respectfully asks that

the Employer's Claim for Review be denied.
DATED: This ~ day of January, 2010.
JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, L.L.P.

CLAIMANT'S OPPOSITION TO EMPLOYER'S CLAIM FOR REVIEW - 3
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING, DELIVERY, OR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

I CERTIFY that on January 26, 2010, I caused a true and C011'ect copy of the
.. foregoing document to be:
Q mailed

a hand delivered
Q CMlECF Electronic Filing

A:l. transmitted fax machine
to: (208) 232-6109
Q mailed

,a hand delivered

Itt. transmitted via e-mail
to: carrshan@isu.edu

Jolm A. Bailey, Jr.
Racine Olson Nye Budge & Bailey, Chtd.
201 E. Center
P. O. Box 1391
Pocatello,ID 83204-1391
Idaho State University
921 S. 81h
STOP 8107
Pocatello, Idaho 83209

JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, L.L.P.

S~~~

Attomey for laimant

CLAIMANT'S
OPPOSITION
TO EMPLOYER'S CLAIM FOR REVIEW - 4
'
\
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IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
APPEAlS BUREAU
317 WEST MAIN STREET
BOISE, lDAHO 83735"()720
(208) 332~35721 (800) 6214938
FAJ(: (208)334-6440
HABIDSADID.

)
)

SSN:

)
)
)

Claim~t

vs.

) DOCKET NUMBER 1777-2010
)

IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY,

) -ORDER TO DENY RE-OPENING
)
)

Employer
~d

)

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.

--------------------------

»

DECISION

'I\,e. employer's request to re-open the hearing that was held on Tuesday, January 5, 2010 at
11:30 a.m., is DENIED.
mSTORY OF THE CASE
The above-entitled matter was scheduled to be heard by J~et C. Hardy, Appeals Examiner for
~)d~o Dep~ent of Labor, on Tuesday, J~uary 5, 2010, at 11:30 a.m., Mountain Time, by
telephone in th~ City of Boise, in accordance with §72-1368 (6) of the Idaho Employment
Security Law.

TIle claim~t appeared for the hearing and provided testimony.
The employer did not appear for the hearing.
ISSUE
The issue before the Appeals Examiner is whether the hearing should be re-opened in accordance
with §72-1368 (6) of the Idaho Employment SeclJ!ity Law.

FINDINGS OF FACT
B~~d on the exhibits and testimony in the record, the following facts are found:

,
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1. A Noti<;e of Telephone Hearing was mailed to the parties on December 22, 2009. setting

Tuesday, January 5, 2010 at 11:30 a,m., Mountain Time, as the date and time of hearing.
The employer did not appear for the hearing.

2. The Notice of Telephone Hearing and accompanying exhibits were mailed to two
separate addresses for the employer - one at 921 S. 8th, Stop 8107, Pocatello, Idaho
83209; and the other at P. O. Box 8219, Pocatello, Idaho 83209-0001.
3. The employer, through their attorney, filed a request to re-open the hearing stating they
did not appear because the employer's mailroom was closed from December 19, 2009
until January 4, 2010 and therefore did not receive sufficient notice to pennit it to be
present at the hearing.

AUTHORITY
Section 72-1368 (6), Idaho Code, states ill. part that the appeals examiner may, either upon
application for rehearing by an interested party or on his own motion, rehear, affmn, modify, set
aside or reverse any prior deCision on the basis of the evidence previously submitted or on the
basis of additional evidence; provided, that such application or motion be made within ten (10)
days after the date of service of the decision.

CONCLUSIONS
Service by mail is deemed complete on the date of mailing. Idaho Code §72-1368 (5) (2004). In
Striebeck v. Employment Security Agency, 83 Idaho 531, 366 P.2d 589, (1961), the Idaho
Supreme Court held "[i]t is clear that the legislature intended that for the purpose of perfecting
~,appeal as proyided in §72-1368, service of a notice of detepnination or redetermination shall
be regarded and adjudged complete when delivered to the person being served on the date of
mailing if mailed to such person at his last known address." The Idaho Supreme Court has
specifically interpreted the word "deemed" ill §72~1368 (5) as creating a "conclusive
presumption." Striebeck v.. Employment Security Agency, 83 Idaho 531, at 536, 366 P.2d 589,
591 (1961). ... absent a defect in the notice .. , the right to appeal does not extend beyond the
time period provided by the statute.
.-It,','

,

.~

The same presumptions and guidelines apply to the service of a notice of hearing. The employer
asserts the Notice of Telephone Hearln~ was not timely received, because their post office was
Closed. The employer has not· asserted a defect in the notice; has not asserted that the notice was .
improperly addressed to the employer; and has not asserted that the Notice was not timely
received due to an error by the US Postal Service.
In addition, the Appeals Examiner notes that additional documents submitted by the claimant,
through his attorney, were emailed to the employer's human resource officer on Monday,
Janriary 4, 2010~ which specifically referenced the hearing scheduled for January 5, 2010.
Due process requires that a party be provided with an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner. City of Boise v. Industrial Commission, 129 Idaho 906,910,
935 P.2d 169, 173, (1997). The employer was afforded that opportunity, but neglected to take
advantage of it As such, the employer has not provided sufficient facts to warrant a re-openi:Q.g.
The request to re.-open is depied.
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':date of Mailing

January 14, 2010

Last Day To Appeal

January 28, 2010

APPEAL RIGHTS

;¥ou have FOURTEEN (14) DAYS FROM THE DAlE OF MAILING to file a written appeal with
the Idaho Industrial Commission. The appeal must be mailed to:
Idaho Industrial Commission
Judicial Division, IDOL Appeals
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0041

or delivered in person to:
Idaho Industrial Commission
700 S Clearwater Lane
Boise, ID 83712
Or transmitted by facsimile to:
(208) 332-7558.
If the appeal is mailed, it must be postmarked no later than the last day to appeal. An appeal fIled
by facsimile tra,nsmission must be received by the Commission by 5:00 p.m., Mountain Time, on
tb~ last day to appeal. A facsimile transmission received after 5:00 p.m. will be deemed received by
the Commission on the next business day. A late appeal will be dismissed. Appeals filed by any
means with the Appeals Bureau or a Department of Labor local office will not be accepted by the
Cemmission. TO EMPWYERS WHO ARE INCORPORATED: if you file an appeal with the
Idaho bulustrial Commission, the appeal must be signed by a corporate officer or legal counsel
licensed to practice in the State of Idaho and the signature must include the individual's title. The
Gommission will not consider appeals submitted by employer representatives who are not attorneys.
If you request a hearing before the Commission or pennission to file a legal brief, you must make
these requests through legal cormsellicensed t()practice in the Stqte of Idaho. .Questions should be
djrected to the Idaho Industrial Commission,· Unemployment Appeals, (208) 334·6024.
If no appeal is fIled, this decision will become fmal and cannot be changed. TO CLAIMANT: If
qecision is changed, any benefits paid will be subject to repayment. If an appeal is fIled, you
should continue to'report on your claim as long as you are unemployed.

u.us
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IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

APPEAlS BUREAU
317 WEST MAIN STREET
BOISE, IDAHO 83735-0720
(208) 332-35721 (800) 621-4938
FAX: (208) 334-6440

CERTlJJ1CATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on

JanuarY 14, 2010

, a true and correct copy of Order to Deny Re-

Opening was served by regular United States mail upon each of the following:
"

HABIBSADID
1420 ASPEN DR
P,pCATEILO ID 83209
JOBNLYNN
ATTORNEY AT LAW
776 E RIVERSIDE DR, STE 200
EAGLE ID 83616
JOHNsON & MONfELEONE LLP ,
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
405 S 8TH ST, STE 250
~OISE ID 83702
IDAHO STAlE UNIVERSITY
921 S 8TH
STOP 8107
POCA1ElLO ID 83209
IPAHO STAlE VNIVERSITY
P'OBOX8219
POCATEILO ID 83209-0001

i6HN A BA1LEY JR
ATTORNEY AT LAW
POBOX 1391
POCATEILOID 83204-1391

OJIDER TO DENY RE-OPENING - 4 of 4
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·.John A. Bailey, Jr. (ISB No. 2619)
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE
& BAILEY, CHARTERED
·,P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391
Telephone: (208) 232-6101
.,Fax: (208) 232-6109

'JAN 2 r 2010

Attorney for Employer
APPEALS BUREAU
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
HABIB SADID, an individual,
"SSN:

Docket No. 1777-2010

Claimant,
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID MILLER
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR

vs.

REHEARING

IDAHO STATE UNNERSITY,
Employer,
and

.,IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.

STATEOFIDAHO )
: ss.
County of Bannock )

COMES NOW DAVID MILLER, Director of Human Resources for the Employer
herein, IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, and on his oath deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am the Director of the Human Resources Office for Idaho State University. The

AFFJDA VIT OF DAVID J. MILLER - I

Exhibil B
....

'

•

1dI011/017

Human Resources Department has responsibility for matters involving unemployment benefits
'for former ISUemployees, including the responsibility for responding to appeals pending before
the Appeals Bureau of the Department of Labor.
2.

My office, as is true of all administrative offices of Idaho State University, was

,closed from December 24,2009 through January 3,2010 by order of the President of the
University as a cost-saving measure.
3.

As of our last working hours on December 23, my office had not received notice

;"'ofthe scheduling of Dr. Sadid's appeal hearing.
4.

My office reopened on January 4,2010, and later that day we received almost two

weeks worth of maiL Our copy of the Notice of Appeal Hearing shows that it was stamped by
>.the Human Resources Department onJanuary 4, 2010. It was not addressed specifically to the
attention of any person, and was placed in the inbox of a person not associated with the
,.

unemployment process. It was not found until the afternoon of January 5.
5.

In the afternoon of January 4, we received an email from Dr. Sadid's attorney

with attached exhibits, but the email did not state a date or a time for a hearing. The same day, a
"'person dropped off at our office a CD with no information except that it pertained to Dr. Sadid.

On January 5, my staff called the local Department of Labor office to ask about the date and time
,

I

<

for the hearing of Dr. Sadid' s appeal, but the local staff was unaware of any scheduled hearing.
"They referred us to the Department of Labor offices in Boise.
6.

At about 12:15 p.m. on January 5, my staff learned in a phone call to the Boise

office that a hearing was scheduled forl1:30 that morning and that there was no option for ISU
, to participate. I was not in the office at that time, and by the time I returned, the hearing was
AFFJDA VIT OF DA VID J. MILLER - 2

idJ012/017

over.
7.

Had we been aware of the time and date of the hearing, we would have made

arrangements to attend with counsel and with witnesses in support ofISU's claim that Dr. Sadid
was terminated for misconduct.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT.

1--2,J-

DATED this ~ day ofJanuary, 2010.

~

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this fa day of January, 2010.

(SEAL)

/y

NO!~Y PA;ICFOR !DAHO
Resldmg at:
'(J....A..AoCtL CoOA...:
My Commission Expires: 2r7.~ 3 ::20 II
7

'AFFIDAVITOFDAVID J. MILLER-3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~ay

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1'3
of January, 2010, I served a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows:
Sam Johnson
JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, L.L.P.
'4"05 South Eighth StJ;eet, Suite 250
Boise, Idaho 83702

U. S. Mail
Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 947-2424

John Lynn
'Attorney at Law
776 E. Riverside Dr., Ste 200
Eagle, ID 83616

U. S. Mail
Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 429-1925
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Cara Rice
From:
Sent:

To:
Subject:
Attachments:

Cara Rice
-Monday, January 04, 2010 2:15 PM
'carrshan@isu.edu·
Habib Sadid v. ISU and Idaho Dept. of Labor/Docket#: 1777-2010
20100104144511.pdf; 201 001 04144632.pdf; 201 00104144739. pdf; 20100104144910.pdf

201001041'l4511.p 20100104144632.p 201001041'14739.p 2oiool041'1491O.p
df (1 MB)
df (3 MB)
df (1 MS)
df (1 MB)

Dear Ms. Carr,
Attached hereto is Claimant's Supplemental Exhibit List.
CAM

Cara D. Rice
Legal Assistant
Johnson & Monteleone, L.L.P.
405 South;"Elghth Street, Suite 250
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone:
(208) 331-2100
Facsimile:
(208) 947-2424
cara@treasurevalley1awyers.com
www.treasureva11eylawyers.com
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This e-mail is intended only for the personal and confidential use
of the indfvidua1(s) named as recipients and is covered by the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§25l0-252l. It may contain information that is privileged,
confidential, and/or protected from disclosure under applicable laws and/or privileges,
including,but not limited to, the attorney-client privilege and/or the attorney workproduct doctrine. If you are not the intended recipient of this transmission, please
notify the sender immediat'ely by telephone. Do not deliver, distribute, or copy this
transmission, disclose its contents, or take any action in reliance on the information it
contains'.
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APPEALS BUREAU
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

HABIB SADID,
SSN:
Claimant,
v.

DOCKET NUMBER: 1777-2010

IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY,
Employer

CLAIMANT'S
. EXHIBIT LIST

SUPPLEMENTAL

and
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

COMES NOW, Claimant, by and through his attorneys of record, Sam Johnson
and Joh11 Lynn, and hereby submits the following supplemental exhibits to be used at the
telephonic hearing scheduled for January 5, 2010.
LIST OF SUPPLEMENTAL EXHIBITS
C.

Claimant's notes and documents submitted to ISU Internal Grievance.

D.

Claimant's Amended Complaint against ISU filed 10115109 with

newspaper attictes.

d,,,

E.

Claimant's 2008 evaluation dated 4/22/09.

F.

Taped grievance hearing dated October and November 2009.

G.

Claimant> s 2112/06 response to 1119/06, reprimand.

H.

Claimant's 4/27/09 response to 4/6/09 reprimand.

I.

Claimant's 4/27/09) response to 4115/09 reprimand.

, CLAIMANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL EXHIBIT LIST • 1

v_. v_,

-V-'V

. .,. ........
,

,

_f.

\1;1
'

...· A A

DATED: This

121016/017

~ day of January, 2010.

JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, L.L.P.

,

~~

S
ohIlson
AttoOleys for Claimant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING, DELIVERY, OR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION
I CERTIFY that on January 4, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document to be:

o mailed
o hand delIvered
o transmitted via e-mail
to: caIl'shan@isu.edu

Idaho State University
921 S. gill
STOP &107

Pocatello, Idaho 83209

CLAIMANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL EXHIBIT LIST - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF MAaING, DELIVERY, OR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION
I CERTIFY that on January 4t 2010, I caused a true and correct copy of Claimant's Exhibit F to be.
served to ISU as fonows~

jtJjiiJi<;d"' ..:...

-.--~.

/tllhand delivered

,._.-...............

Pm:nsmitted fax machine

l to.

-State""tJIiivers'jtY "" ............-"" . . . . . .... .. . . . . . '. '!

""ldah~

921 S. gUt

j

~TOP 8107

I

t

/Human Resources - Office of Shannon Carr
!pocatello, Idaho 83209

!
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Steve Millward
CLAIMANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL EXHIBIT LIST - t
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LAWRENCEG. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRAIG G. BLEDSOE - ISB# 3431
KATHERINE TAKASUGI - ISB# 5208
TRACEY K. ROLFSEN - ISB# 4050
CHERYL GEORGE - ISB# 4213
Deputy Attorneys General
Idaho Department of Labor
317 W. Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83735
Telephone: (208) 332-3570 ext. 3148

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
HABIB SADID,
Claimant,
vs.
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY,
Employer,
and
STATE OF IDAHO,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

IDOL NO. 1777-2010

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE

F6 LED

FEB .., 4 2OfO
INDUSTRIAL COMMiSSiON

---------------------------)
TO THE ABOVE-NAMED PARTIES:
Please be advised that the undersigned Deputy Attorney General representing the
Idaho Department of Labor hereby enters the appearance of said attorneys as the
attorneys of record for the State of Idaho, Department of Labor, in the above-entitled
proceeding.

By statute, the Department of Labor is a party to all unemployment

insurance appeals in Idaho.

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - 1

DATED this ~ day of February, 2010.

Tracey K. Rolf n ~
Deputy Atto y eneral
Attorney for
tate of Idaho,
Department of Labor

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEARANCE,
was mailed, postage prepaid, this
HABIB SADID
1420 ASPEN DR
POCATELLO ID 83209
JOHN A BAILEY JR
PO BOX 1391
POCATELLO ID 83204-1391

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - 2

Orcl day of February, 2010, to:

Sam Johnson, ISB No. 4777
JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, L.L.P.
405 South Eighth Street, Ste. 250
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 331-2100
Facsimile: (208) 947-2424
sam(ii),treasurevallevlawvers. com

2fJJO FEB ... 5 P 4: 2b
IND/JS TRi~IEcl1lfD
""'

.. OMMtSSfON

John C. Lynn, ISB No. 1548
776 E. Riverside Drive, Ste. 200
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 685-2333
Facsimile: (208) 429-1925
Attorneys for Claimant

IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
JUDICIAL DIVISION, IDOL APPEALS

HABIB SADID,
SSN:
Claimant,
v.

DOCKET NUMBER: 1777-2010

IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY,
Employer

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

and
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

The undersigned certifies that one the 5th day of February, 2010, a true and
accurate copy of Claimant's Opposition to Employer's Claim for Review was served by
first class mail addressed to the Office of the Attorney General, Idaho Department of
Labor, 700 W. State Street, P. O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0010.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - 1

::~/

Attorney for Claimant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - 2

LAW OFFICES OF

W. MARCUS W. NYE
RANDALL C. BUDGE
JOHN A. BAILEY, JR.
JOHN R. GOODELL
JOHN B. INGELSTROM
DANIEL C. GREEN
BRENT O. ROCHE
KIRK B. HADLEY
FRED J. LEWIS
ERIC L. OLSEN
CONRAD J. AIKEN
RICHARD A. HEARN, M.D.
LANE V. ERICKSON
FREDERICK J. HAHN, III
DAVID E. ALEXANDER
PATRICK N. GEORGE
SCOTT J. SMITH
JOSHUA D. JOHNSON
STEPHENJ.MUHONEN
CANDICE M. MCHUGH
CAROL TIPPI VOLYN
BRENT L. WHITING
JONATHON S. BYINGTON
DAVE BAGLEY
THOMAS J. BUDGE
JONATHAN M. VOLYN
MARK A. SHAFFER
JASON E. FLAIG

RACINE OLSON NYE BUDGE & BAILEY
CHARTERED
BOISE OFFICE
201 EAST CENTER STREET
POST OFFICE BOX 1391
POCATELLO, IDAHO 83204-1391

101 SOUTH CAPITOL
BOULEVARD, SUITE 208
BOISE, IDAHO 83702
TELEPHONE: (208) 395~0011
FACSIMILE: (208) 433 0167
N

TELEPHONE (208) 232-8101
FACSIMILE (208) 232-6109

IDAHO FALLS OFFICE
477 SHOUP AVENUE
SUITE 107
POST OFFICE BOX 50698
IDAHO FALLS, ID 83405
TELEPHONE: (208) S2B~6101
FACSIMILE: (208) 528-6109

www.racinelaw.net

ALL OFFICES TOLL FREE
(877) 232-6101
SENDER'S E-MAIL ADDREss:c1c@racinelaw.net

LOUIS F. RACINE (1917-200S)

WILLIAM D. OLSON, OF COUNSEL

February 4,2010

Industrial Commission
Judicial Division, IDOL Appeals
PO Box 8370
Boise,ID 83720-0041
Re:

IDOL Docket No:
Claimant:
Employer:

1777-2010
Habib Sadid
Idaho State University

Dear Clerk:
Enclosed for filing please find a Certificate of Service in the above mentioned Docket No.
Thank you for your attention to this matter.
Very truly yours,
(

f,

.

G~f\'l

~(L\J'-l.~.
_llQJAJ~Q.)
CARRIE CASTILLO, Assistant to
David E. Alexander

Enclosure

John A. Bailey, Jr. (ISB No. 2619)
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE
& BAILEY, CHARTERED
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391
Telephone: (208) 232-6101
Fax: (208) 232-6109

Attorney for Employer Idaho State University

IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
JUDICIAL DIVISION, IDOL APPEALS
HABIB SADID,
SSN:
Claimant,
vs.
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY,
Employer,
and
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

IDOL Docket No. 1777-2010

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that on the 2, day of February, 2010, a true and accurate copy of
Idaho State University's Reply To Memorandum in Opposition to Claim For Review was served by
first dass mail addressed to the Office of the Attorney General, Idaho Department of Labor, 700 W.
State Street, P.O. Box 83720 Boise, Idaho 83720-0010.

j

DATED this -*-tAaay of February, 2010.
RA INE, OLSON, N
& B~ILEY, C . A ""'T'1rY'T'~'-,J

JOHN A. BAILEY, JR.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - Page 1
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

HABIB SADID,
Claimant,
vs.
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY,
Employer,
and
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

IDOL #1777-2010
ORDER DENYING NEW
HEARING AND SETTING
BRIEFING SCHEDULE

FILE 0

FEB - 9 2010
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

Employer, Idaho State University, appeals to the Industrial Commission a Decision
issued by an Appeals Examiner with Idaho Department of Labor ("IDOL" or "Department"). In
that Decision, the Appeals Examiner denied Employer's request to reopen a hearing on
Claimant's eligibility for unemployment benefits.

Employer did not appear at the original

hearing the Appeals Examiner held on January 5, 2010, and seeks a new hearing before the
Commission. In the alternative, Employer asks that the Commission remand the matter back to
the Appeals Examiner. Claimant opposes Employer's request for another hearing in this case.
NEW HEARING
Idaho Code § 72-1368(6), provides that the Department's Appeals

Examin~r

may, upon

written application from an interested party, rehear a case or admit additional evidence, provided
that the application is made within ten (10) days of the date of service of the original decision.
Although Employer filed a timely request to re-open the hearing, the Appeals Examiner issued
an Order denying Employer's request because Employer did not allege a sufficient supporting
basis. Therefore, the Decision ruling Claimant eligible for unemployment benefits became final
and appealable to the Commission.

ORDER DENYING NEW HEARING AND SETTING BRIEFING SCHEDULE - 1

Idaho Code § 72-1368(7) gives the Commission authority to "in its sole discretion,
conduct a hearing to receive additional evidence or may remand the matter back to the appeals
examiner for an additional hearing and decision."

Unemployment insurance appeals are

adjudicated under the principles and procedures of administrative law. Hearings at this level of
review are not a matter of right, as in some other forums. The Commission takes the position
that conducting a new hearing at this level of review is an extraordinary measure and should be
reserved for those cases when due process or other interests of justice demand no less.
Therefore, the threshold question underlying Employer's request for an additional hearing is
whether Employer has been afforded due process.
Due process of law as guaranteed by the United States Constitution and Idaho's
Constitution envision the opportunity, after reasonable notice, for a fair hearing. Prather v.
Loyd, 86 Idaho 45, 49-50, 382 P.2d 910, 912 (1963). "Procedural due process is an essential
requirement of the administrative process." City of Boise v. Industrial Commission, 129 Idaho
906, 910, 935 P.2d 169, 173 (1997). Under federal law, an appeals examiner as the hearing
officer must provide the "opportunity for a fair hearing, before an impartial tribunal, for all
individuals whose claims for unemployment compensation are denied." 42 U.S.c. 503(a)(3)
(2003).
The Appeals Bureau scheduled the hearing for 11 :30 a.m. Mountain Time on January 5,
2010. The Appeals Bureau mailed the Notice of Hearing to Employer on December 22, 2009,
informing interested parties of the date and time the hearing would take place. The Appeals
Bureau mailed the Notice to Employer at its address of record. (Exhibit 1). Idaho Code § 721368(5) provides, "A notice shall be deemed served if delivered to the person being served or if
mailed to his last known address; service by mail shall be deemed complete on the date of
mailing."

Once the Notice of Hearing was delivered to Employer's last known address,

ORDER DENYING NEW HEARING AND SETTING BRIEFING SCHEDULE - 2

Employer's entitlement to notice and an opportunity for a hearing was complete. See Streibeck
v. Employment Security Agency, 83 Idaho 589, 366 P.2d 589 (1961). Therefore, the Appeals
Examiner was clearly within her discretion in denying Employer's request to re-open the matter.
Employer asserts that its mailroom was closed for the Christmas holiday when IDOL
served the Notice of Hearing and mail processing did not begin again until January 4,2010. The
delivery of the Notice was further delayed because it was not addressed to a specific individual
and therefore did not find its way to a human resources representative familiar with the matter
until the afternoon of January 5, 2010. Nevertheless, counsel concedes that his office received
on January 4, 2010, an email from Claimant's counsel regarding the hearing. Likewise, on
January 4, 2010, Claimant's counsel delivered to Employer's counsel additional evidence for the
hearing. Counsel's staff contacted the Appeals Bureau on the afternoon of January 5, 2010, for
information, but learned that the hearing had already concluded.

(Employer's Claim for

Review).
Clearly, the Notice of Hearing was delivered to the address of record for Employer in a
timely manner.

The Idaho Supreme Court has consistently ruled that an interested party's

absence or other reasons that prevent that party from receiving and reading notices in a timely
manner that were properly to the address of record is not a defect in due process. Faust v.
Department of Employment, 97 Idaho 162, 540 P.2d 1341 (1975), Hacking v. Department of
Employment, 98 Idaho 839, 573 P.2d 158 (1978). The U.S. District Court for the District of
Idaho likewise arrived at the same conclusion in Gary v. Nichols, 447 F.Supp 320 (Idaho, 1978).
We have carefully reviewed the record and can find no evidence that Employer was
deprived of due process. The Notice of Hearing and documents were sent to Employer's address
of record. Employer failed to participate in the hearing because for reasons other than the error
on the part of the U.S. Postal Service or the Idaho Department of Labor.

ORDER DENYING NEW HEARING AND SETTING BRIEFING SCHEDULE - 3

The unemployment insurance program is intended to ease the economic burdens created
when a worker loses ajob due to no fault of his or her own. The process for adjudicating claims
for unemployment benefits is intended to provide the quickest possible disposition of these
claims. Therefore, there must be compelling reasons to delay the ultimate disposition and allow
an additional hearing after the Appeals Bureau initially noticed and attempted to conduct one.
McNeill v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Board of Review,
510 Pa. 574, 511 A.2d 167 (1986). We find no such circumstances in this case. Accordingly,
Employer's request for a new hearing is DENIED. Likewise, Employer's request that this matter
be remanded back to the Appeals Bureau for a new hearing is also DENIED.
However, Employer's timely appeal of the Appeals Examiner's Decision Denying
Employer's Request to Re-Open also constitutes a timely appeal of the Appeals Examiner's
Decision ruling Claimant eligible for unemployment benefits. Employer is clearly an interested
party to that Decision. Therefore, there is no basis on which to dismiss Employer's appeal on the
underlying merits of the case. The Commission will review de novo the evidentiary record
established during the Appeals Examiner's hearing and will issue a new decision upon the
completion of that review. In lieu of granting Employer another hearing, the parties may argue
their positions in written briefs.
BRIEFING SCHEDULE

As provided for under Rule 5 of the Rules of Appellate Practice and Procedure under the
Idaho Employment Security Law, effective, as amended, March 1, 2009, the Commission
establishes the following briefing schedule:
Employer's brief will be due ten (10) days from the date of this Order
Claimant and Idaho Department of Labor may reply within seven (7) days of the receipt
of Employer's brief, if they so choose.

ORDER DENYING NEW HEARING AND SETTING BRIEFING SCHEDULE - 4

DATED this

~ day
I

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
I

i

/

ATTEST:

/

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the
day of ~~ ft;/f\lJ~ /
/;2009, a true and correct
copy of Order Establishing Briefing Schedule was served by regtflar United States mail upon
each of the following:
l

Cl

I,

'

DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
STATE HOUSE MAIL
317 W MAIN STREET
BOISE ID 83735
JOHN A BAILEY JR
RACINE OLSON NYE BUDGE &
BAILYCHTRD
PO BOX 1391
POCATELLO 83204-1391
SAM JOHNSON
405 SOUTH EIGHT ST STE 250
BOISE ID 83702
JOHNCLYNN
776 E RIVERSIDE DRIVE STE 200
EAGLE, ID 83616

mcs

ORDER DENYING NEW HEARING AND SETTING BRIEFING SCHEDULE - 5

IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
ADJUDICATION DEPARTMENT
PO Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0041
(208) 334-6000 FAX (208) 332-7558
VITDD 1-800-950-2110

FAX COVER SHEET
DATE:
TO:
NAME:

February 9, 2010
DA VID ALEXANDER

FAX NUMBER:
FROM:
NAME:

208-232-6109

MARY SCHOELER

TOTAL PAGES, INCLUDING COVER SHEET: 6

DESCRIPTION:
ORDER DENYING NEW HEARING AND SETTING BRIEFING SCHEDULE

CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This communication and any attachments are intended
solely for the use of the designated recipients. It may contain confidential or privileged
information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution of this information is
prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender via email or telephone
and destroy all copies of this communication. Thank you.
If there are any problems with this transmission, please call (208) 334-6000 immediately.

Industrial Commission, 700 S. Clearwater Lane, Boise, Idaho
Equal Opportunity Employer
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Dear Clerk:
Enclosed for filing please find Employer's Brief On Claim For Review in the above
mentioned IDOL docket number. Thank you for your attention to this matter.
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JUDICIAL DIVISION. IDOL APPEALS
HABIB SADID,
SSN:
Claimant,
vs.
IDAHO STATE UNiVERSITY,

Employer,
and

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.

)

roOL Docker No. 1777-2010

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

EMPLOYER'S BRIEl? ON CLAIM l?OR
REVIEW

)

COMES NOW the Employer, Idaho State University, by and through counsel of record, and
submits the following brief in suppol1 of its claim for review of the detcmlination by the Appeals
Division of the Idaho Depmtment of Labor granting unemployment benefits to the claimant, Dr.
Habib Sadid.
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John A. Bailey, Jr. (ISB No. 2619)
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE
& BAILEY, CHARTERED
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391
Telephone: (208) 232-6101
Fax: (208) 232-6109

Attorney for Employer Idaho State University

IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
JUDICIAL DIVISION, IDOL APPEALS
HABIB SADID,
SSN:
Claimant,
vs.
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY,
Employer,
and
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

IDOL Docket No. 1777-2010

EMPLOYER'S BRIEF ON CLAIM FOR
REVIEW

COMES NOW the Employer, Idaho State University, by and through counsel of record, and
submits the following brief in support of its claim for review of the determination by the Appeals
Division of the Idaho Department of Labor granting unemployment benefits to the claimant, Dr.
Habib Sadid.

EMPLOYER'S BRIEF ON CLAIM FOR REVIEW - Page I

FACTS
Dr. Sadid was a tenured professor of engineering at Idaho State University. His employment
was terminated for cause last fall based on a recommendation by the Dean of Engineering and
approved by the university president. The university followed proper procedures leading to the
termination. The Dean of Engineering issued a notice of contemplated action to Dr. Sadid on May 6,
2009. (Ex. 5, p.22) The notice cited a specific instance of "unprofessional, non-collegial, disruptive
and insubordinate" behavior; a prior warning against such behavior; specific warnings at the time of
the behavior; a long history of disruptive and defamatory behavior; and a similarly long history of
refusing to comply with instructions and counseling from his superiors. The notice invited Dr. Sadid
to meet with the Dean to discuss any reason, evidence or information in opposition or mitigation to
the contemplated action. The requested meeting was held in July, 2009, but failed to reach any
satisfactory conclusion. In the meantime, Dr. Sadid continued to engage in inappropriate behavior.
In June, he informed College of Engineering staff members that the Dean had lied under oath in
proceedings related to a lawsuit filed by Dr. Sadid. He then distributed to the entire College of
Engineering faculty cartoons on the subject. (Ex. 3, pp. 12-15) He also engaged in unauthorized
purchases in violation of University procedures, which he had twice previously been warned against.
(Ex. 6, pp. 15-25) His response was to have his lawyers accuse the University of retaliating against
him for attempting to enforce its purchasing policies. (Ex. 6. p 17)
On August 4,2009, the ISU president accepted the recommendation of the dean and placed
Dr. Sadid on administrative leave with pay. (Ex. 5,p. 2) Pursuant to University policy, Dr. Sadid was
given a hearing in front of a panel of faculty members, which was authorized to give a nonbinding
advisory opinion to the president. That hearing was held over several days in October. The panel
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advised against termination. The president declined to accept the recommendation of the faculty
panel, and terminated Dr. Sadid on November 8,2009.
Dr. Sadid filed for unemployment benefits. The University submitted a response to his claim
for benefits. (Ex. 7) By decision dated December 3,2009, the Department of Labor determined that
Dr. Sadid was ineligible for benefits. (Ex. 8)

The department held. on the basis of the

documentation and written statement provided by ISU, that Dr. Sadid violated the University's
policies and was terminated for good cause. Dr. Sadid requested an appeal hearing, not disputing the
facts regarding his behavior, but, rather, asserting that the real reason he was fired was retaliation for
his exercise of his right to freedom of speech. (Ex. 9, p.2)
On December 18,2009, Sixth District Judge David Nye granted summary judgment in favor
of Idaho State University and the other defendants in the lawsuit filed by Dr. Sadid in September
2008. The court's opinion, a copy of which is attached, and of which the Industrial Commission is
entitled to take judicial notice (Rule of Procedure 9.20), dismissed Dr. Sadid's claim that his rights to
free speech were violated. The court found that it was necessary to determine whether the comments
for which Dr. Sadid claimed he suffered retaliation were protected speech, or merely the kind of
disruptive or insubordinate speech for which an employee may be punished or terminated. The court
held that there are five questions a court must answer before it could find a valid First Amendment
th

retaliation claim, citing Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9 Cir. 2009). The five questions are:

1.
2.
')

J.

4.

Whether the plaintiff spoke on a matter of public concern;
Whether the plaintiff spoke as a private citizen or a public employee;
Whether the plaintiffs protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the
adverse employment action;
Whether the state had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently
from other members of the general public; and

EMPLOYER'S BRIEF ON CLAIM FOR REVIEW - Page 3

5.

Whether the state would have taken the adverse employment action even absent the
protected speech.
Dr. Sadid claimed in his lawsuit against ISU that he was retaliated against for a series of

public statements and newspaper articles in opposition to various plans of the previous
administration. The Sixth District Court considered his factual allegations and held that, as a matter
of law, the issues in question were not matters of public concern, but rather matters of internal
administrative dispute. Having answered the first question in the negative, the court likewise
answered the second question in the negative, holding that Dr. Sadid, in making these public
pronouncements, presented himself not as a private citizen but as an ISU employee. There is no First
Amendment protection for University employees speaking on matters of purely internal interest.
Finally, the court determined that there was no evidence that Dr. Sadid's speech, even if it were
protected, was a motivating factor in the employment decision. The court did not find it necessary to
answer questions 4 and 5.
Accordingly, it has already been determined in a court of law that Dr. Sadid had no "right" to
make the statements for which he claims he has suffered retaliation. and that it was not a cause for
the adverse employment actions, including his termination.
On December 22, 2009, the Department Of Labor mailed out a notice of the appeals hearing
scheduled for January 4. As Idaho State University was closed from December 23 until January 4,
ISU did not receive notice of the hearing in time to participate.
At the hearing, consistent with his notice of appeal, Dr. Sadid did not challenge the facts
which ISU contends were cause for his termination. He asserted that the letters of reprimand and
other complaints about his behavior were simply an attempt by ISU to lay a paper trail to cover lSU's
retaliation against him. (Recorded hearing at approximately 22:00) In responding to the allegations
EMPLOYER'S BRIEF ON CLAIM FOR REVIEW - Page 4

of disruptive and insubordinate behavior, Dr. Sadid generally acknowledged that it had occurred - he
merely justified his behavior on various grounds, while continuing to assert that the real reason for
his termination was retaliation for his protected speech. Essentially the only testimony directly
addressing whether cause for termination existed came at the very end of his testimony, when the
appeals examiner asked Dr. Sadid if he had done anything to warrant termination. Dr. Sadid
answered, "no." (Recorded hearing at approximately 23 :45)
The appeals examiner held in favor of Dr. Sadid on the grounds that all of the documents
submitted by ISU were "hearsay," which could not support a factual finding, while Dr. Sadid's
uncontroverted oral testimony, that he did not do anything to warrant termination, was sufficient to
justifY a finding in his favor.
ISU's request for a rehearing was denied. ISU filed a claim for review before the Industrial
Commission and requested an evidentiary hearing, which was denied.

LA W AND ARGUMENT
The appeals examiner's decision was wrong for the following reasons:

1. The documentary evidence submitted by ISU is not hearsay.
2. The documentary evidence was sufficient to establish cause for tem1ination.
3. Dr. Sadid did not challenge or deny the facts on the basis of which ISU asserted cause.
4. Dr. Sadid claimed that lSD's cause was a sham to hide a constitutional violation, but this
claim has already been dismissed by the Sixth District Court in Dr. Sadid's lawsuit
against ISU.
5. Accordingly, the evidence in the record is more than sufficient to establish cause for
termination.
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1. Documentary Evidence Submitted by ISU is Not Hearsay.
The appeals examiner disregarded all of the documentary evidence submitted by ISU
(Exhibits 1 through 7) on the grounds that it was "hearsay" and, as hearsay, could not support
findings of fact. This is a clear error of law: documentary evidence is not necessarily hearsay.
Furthermore, the appeals examiner misstated the law when she said that hearsay could not support a
finding of fact. The case she cites, Application o.fCitizens Utilities Co., 82 Idaho 208,214 (1960),
does indeed hold that an agency's findings "must be supported by substantial and competent
evidence .... It cannot make a finding based upon hearsay." In context, the Court was saying that
findings may not be based on hearsay alone, and, in fact, the cases cited by the Supreme Court in
Citizens Utilities say exactly that: Carroll v. KnicMrbocker Ice Co., 218 N.Y. 435,440,113 NE
507,509 (NY 1916); Williapoint Oysters v. Ewing. 174 F.2d 676, 691 (9 th Cir. 1949); Can. Ed. Co. of
NY v. NL.R. B., 305 U.S. 197,217,59 S.Ct. 206, 230 (1938). Indeed, all of these cases clearly state
that hearsay documentary testimony is admissible into evidence in administrative proceedings ifit is
corroborated by non-hearsay testimony.
The documents submitted by ISU are not hearsay under a number of exceptions to the hearsay
rule. First, a large number of the documents contained in Exhibits 1 through 7 are letters, reports and
emails written by Dr. Sadid. Admissions by party opponents and prior statements by witnesses are
excluded from the definition of hearsay. Idaho Rule Of Evidence 801 (d). Accordingly, all of those
documents among the exhibits which were authored by Dr. Sadid are not hearsay.
Second, the rules of evidence contain a number of exceptions to the hearsay rule, and thus the
position of ISU is supported by competent evidence. First, a large number of the documents
contained in Exhibits 1 through 7 are letters, reports and emails written by Dr. Sadid. Admissions by
EMPLOYER'S BRIEF 0;'01 CLAIM FOR REVIEW - Page 6

party opponents and prior statements by witnesses are excluded from the definition of hearsay. Idaho
Rules of Evidence 80 1(d). Accordingly, all of those documents among the exhibits which were
authored by Dr. Sadid are not hearsay_
Second, the rules of evidence contain a number of exceptions to the hearsay rule. These
include an exception for public records and reports. (I.R.E. 803(8)) Many of the documents ignored
by the appeals examiner were official statements of ISU, a public agency, made pursuant to its
obligations under the governing regulations. These include:
Exhibit 3, page 2;
Exhibit 4, page 7;
Exhibit 5, page 2, which is the official notice to Dr. Sadid that he was placed on an
administrative leave;
Exhibit 5, page 15, which is the official memorandum from the dean of engineering
recommending Dr. Sadid's termination, and listing the grounds for cause;
Exhibit 5, page 22, the official notice of contemplated termination given to Dr. Sadid on May
6, 2009, which lists grounds for cause:
Exhibit 6, page 2 and attachments, which is official correspondence from ISU to the South
Dakota School of Mines apologizing for Dr. Sadid's personal attacks on the president of that school,
a former ISU administrator, which Dr. Sadid circulated widely by email to faculty and media in
South Dakota;
Exhibit 6, pages 15 to 25, which is documentation regarding Dr. Sadid's repeated violations
of University purchasing rules.
All of these documents are excepted from the hearsay rule as public records and reports, and
can be accepted by the Industrial Commission for such weight as they carry.

2. The evidence establishes cause for termination.
The evidence in the record establishes conclusively that Dr. Sadid was terminated for cause.
First, there is no dispute that, for official purposes, the termination was "for cause." A tenured
professor cannot be terminated except for cause, and there is simply no dispute that the documents in
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the record accurately state the causes relied on by ISU during its internal proceedings and in the
initial hearing before the Department of Labor (See Exhibit 7).
Further, substantial and competent evidence exists in the record that Dr. Sadid was
discharged for the causes stated by ISU in the record. The stated reasons are set forth in detail in the
Notice of Contemplated Action of May 6,2009 (Exhibit 5, page 22), and the Recommendation of
Dismissal of August 3, 2009 (Exhibit 5, page 15). There is no reason to go through them in detail in
this brief other than to say that these documents recite a long history of unprofessional, disruptive
and insubordinate behavior by Dr. Sadid. There is overwhelming evidence of this unprofessional
behavior in Dr. Sadid's own writings and emails which are part of the record, and which constitute
admissions by Dr. Sadid.

Thus, to whatever extent that ISU's official documents might be

considered merely hearsay evidence of Dr. Sadid's unprofessional behavior, they are corroborated by
Dr. Sadid's admissions in his own documents and are therefore substantial and competent evidence.

See Williapoint Oysters v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676, 691 (9 th Cir. 1949). A few examples:
o

Exhibit 3, page 10: Dr. Sadid's emails accusing the Dean of unethical behavior
because Dr. Sadid disagreed with an entry in the draft minutes of a faculty meeting.

o

Exhibit 3, page 12: his email distributing cartoons regarding perjury after accusing
the Dean of lying under oath.

o

Exhibit 3, page 18: accusation that various administration officials have engaged in
"misuse of authority, misjudgment ... cronyism, empire building ... "

o

Exhibit 3, page 26: an email from a colleague of Dr. Sadid's to the new Provost of
ISU apologizing for Dr. Sadid's embarrassing and "over-the-top offensive behavior"
at a College meeting,
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o

Exhibit 4, page 4: Dr. Sadid's letter to the Provost responding to a letter of
reprimand, in which he attempts unconvincingly to justify his unprofessional
behavior. For instance, his explanation ofthe minutes controversy is that the minutes
he reviewed were not marked "Draft," as if a 22-year veteran of faculty meetings
would be unaware that meeting minutes are always draft until reviewed and approved
at the subsequent meeting.

o

Exhibit 4, page 30: In Dr. Sadid's response to his April 15,2009 letter of reprimand
from Dean Jacobsen, he acknowledges that the incident complained of occurred and
goes on to repeat his accusations of "colTuption and wrong-doings of a group of
officials at Idaho State University. The individuals have been misusing their power,
wasting taxpayer money, and creating an oppressive atmosphere here a campus in the
United States of America."

o

Exhibit 6, page 4: Dr. Sadid's email to faculty members at the South Dakota School
of Mines and to members of the media in Rapid City, S.D., accusing the school's new
president of unethical, unprofessional and inappropriate behavior, for which ISU's
Vice President for Academic Programming had to apologize. (See Exhibit 6, page 2)

o

Exhibit 6, page 12: An email Dr. Sadid sent to students in 2006 complaining
inappropriately about a colleague and the then-Dean of the College, and accusing
them publicly of unethical behavior.

o

Exhibit 6, page 17: The response by Dr. Sadid's lavy"yers to his letter of reprimand for
violating University purchasing procedures. The letter fails to acknowledge that the
University has any right to require that Dr. Sadid follow its purchasing rules.
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This evidence, consisting of prior statements and admissions by the claimant, provides ample
corroboration of a history of unprofessional, disruptive and insubordinate behavior, and is therefore
substantial and competent evidence of termination for cause.

3. Dr. Sadid Does Not Deny the Facts on Which Cause is Based.
The Commission should note that neither in his request for an appeal (Exhibit 9, page 2) nor
in his testimony did Dr. Sadid deny the facts of the various incidents which formed ISU's cause for
termination. Rather, Dr. Sadid has always asserted that ISU's real reason for his termination was
retaliation for his exercise of his First Amendment rights. Dr. Sadid does not deny that he has a long
history of publicly accusing administrators and colleagues of unethical or criminal behavior without
substantiation. He does not deny that he has repeatedly disrupted meetings with complaints about
matters and appropriately handled elsewhere. He does not deny that he violated purchasing and other
school policies and rules repeatedly after being warned not to do so.
Accordingly, the Commission should find that the facts which form the basis for ISU's stated
grounds for termination are established. There is significant evidence in the record, in the form of
ISO's documents corroborated by Dr. Sadid's own documents, and Dr. Sadid has never denied the the
underlying facts.

The Commission should further find that the disruptive, unprofessional and

insubordinate behavior shown by the evidence is adequate grounds for termination.

4. Dr. Sadid's Claim that He was Dismissed in Retaliation for Exercise of Constitutional
Rights Has Been Held Groundless.
Dr. Sadid filed suit against Idaho State university and several employees in September 2008,
alleging that the uni versity of retaliating against him for his exercise of his First Amendment rights.
In October 2009, he filed an amended complaint which added allegations that his ten11ination, which
EMPLOYER'S BRIEF ON CLAIM FOR REVIEW - Page 10

was then pending but was not complete, was also retaliation for exercise of his first amendment
rights.
On December 18, 2009, the sixth district court granted summary judgment in favor ofISU
and its employees. The court specifically held that Dr. Sadid had no claim for retaliation because the
statements for which ISU allegedly retaliated were not a protected exercise of his First Amendment
rights. The court also held that there was no evidence that Dr. Sadid's speech was a motivating
factor in his termination.
According to rule 9.20 Of the Rules of Practice and Procedure adopted by the Commission,
the Commission may take notice of official documents and decisions, such as court decisions.
Dr. Sadid's sole basis for claiming that he was not terminated for cause was that his
termination was unlawful retaliation for his protected speech. That basis has been expressly rejected
by a court of law of the state of Idaho, in litigation between the employer and the claimant. The
commission should not issue a determination that is contrary to a finding made by a competent forum
after a complete opportunity for both parties to discover and present facts and arguments.

5. The evidence in the record is more than sufficient to establish termination for cause.
The Commission must deny benefits if there is substantial and competent evidence in the
record to support a concl usion that the employee was terminated for cause. The documents provided
by ISU conclusively demonstrate that ISU terminated Dr. Sadid for cause after following all of the
procedures required for terminating a tenured professor for cause. Those documents establish
without dispute what the claimed cause was and that it was adequate under these rules. The evidence
of Dr. Sadid's own letters and emails corroborates ISU's evidence and proves that the complained-of
incidents in fact occurred.
EMPLOYER'S BRIEF ON CLAIM FOR REVIEW - Page I I

Dr. Sadid does not even attempt to deny his behavior; rather, he complains that his long
history of unprofessional and disruptive behavior is really insignificant, contrary to the findings of
the ISU administration, and that the true motivation for ISU's action was retaliation for a newspaper
article he wrote years ago. Ludicrous on its face, this claim has been dismissed by a court in a case
brought by Dr. Sadid, on the grounds that it has no basis in law or in fact. Neither in court nor in his
appeals hearing did Dr. Sadid offer any evidence to support a conclusion that his termination was a
result of anything other than his own unprofessional, disruptive and insubordinate behavior.
The Commission should hold that the evidence in the record shows the claimant was
terminated for cause.

CONCLUSION
Idaho State university respectfully requests that the Commission overturn the decision of the
appeals examiner below.
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IN THE DISTRIT COURT OF THE SIXTIf JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIlE COUNTY OF BANNOCKr{;Tl~mr~HABm SADID, an individual,
Plain~

. Case No.

v.

IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, ROBERT
WHARTON, JAY KUNZE, MICHAEL
JAY LINEBERRY, MANOOCHEHR
ZOGID, RICHARD JACOBSEN, GARY
OLSON, AUTHUR- VAILAS and
JOHN/JANE DOES I through X, whose
true identities are presently unknown,

CV-2008~3942~OC

DECISION ON MOTION FOR
Su:M1-v1ARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.
This matter came before this Court for hearing on Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment on November 2, 2009.

The Plaintiff was represented by Sam

Johnson. The Defendants were represented by John Bailey. Stephanie Morse was the
court reporter. The Court reviewed the documents submitted by the parties, heard oral
argument from counsel, and took the matter under advisement. Now, the Court issues its
decision granting the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL mSTORY
The Plaintiff, Habib Sadid, was an associate professor in the Department of Civil
Engineering at Idaho State University

("ISV~).

He began working for the University in
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1991. In 1993, Sadid was given full tenure and he became an associate professor. In
1999, he became a fun professor at ISD.

In 2001, Sadid published a letter to ISU faculty and administrators. The letter
criticized the ISU administration for its plan to merge the College of Technology with the
College of Engineering. The administration eventually decided not to follow through
with the merger for 2001 and the plan did not arise again until 2003.
In

2003~

Sadid spoke to the Idaho State Jownal about the merger again.

Sadid

argues that the plan was designed in secret, which is deceptive to the community and to
ISU faculty and staff. Some of Sadid's comments were published in the paper and some
were published internally by lSD. Sadid contends that ISU retaliated against him for the
comments made in 2001 and 2003.
Sadid claims that some of the acts of retaliation are that ISU rod not perfoon its
faculty evaluations of him from 2001 to 2006. Sadid alleges that m,ore acts of retaliation
came in 2006 when he was not appointed as the chair of the College of Engi.neering and
in 2008 when Michael Lineberry wrote an e-mail which referred to Sadid as a "nut case."
Sadid claimed that the Lineberry statement defamed him and that it is part of the
retaliation agai.nst him.

Sadid claims that the 2006 retaliation led to an economic loss

suffered by Sadid in the amount of $35,000 per year. On August 24,

2006~

Sadid was

offered an opportunity to apply for the chair position, however~ he declined. The position
was eventually given to a candidate outside of lSU. Additionally, Sadid alleges that ISU
has further retaliated against him by increasing his salary at the lowest percentage.
CV-2008-3942-0C
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On September 29, 2008, Sadid filed a

non~verified

PAGE

Complaint against ISU and

Lineberry that contains three counts: (1) violation of constitutional rights under 42
U.S.C. §1983; (2) Breach of Employment Contract and the implied Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing; and (3) Defamation of Character. The Prayer for Relief seeks
monetary damages, costs, and attorney fees. On August 27, 2009, Sadid filed a Motion to
Amend Complaint and attached a proposed amended complaint to the motion. The
motion states that it is based upon the grounds that Sadid needed to identify and include
additional Defendants and needed to include additional factual allegations based upon
discovery ensued to date. TIle Motion to Amend Complaint was set for hearing on
October 5, 2009. The

Defendants~

ISU and Lineberry, filed a motion for summary

judgment based on the original Com.plaint and set it for oral argument on October 13,
2009. In response to the motion for sUnlmary judgment, Sadid filed a motion for
additional time under Rule 56(f), which the Court granted. The Court also granted the
. motion to amend complaint and on October 15, 2009, Sadid filed his First Amended
Complaint, which added six more defendants: Robert Wharton; Jay Kunze; Manoochehr
Zoghi; Richard Jacobsen, Gary Olson; and Authur Vailas. I The amended complaint also
added new factual allegations but retained the same three counts: (1) count one - claim

under §1983; (2) count two - breach of employment contact and implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing; and (3) count three - defamation. Additionally, the Prayer
I Nothing in the record suggests that the added defendants were properly served with the
Amended Complaint. However; Defendants' Reply Memorandum rez Defendants; Motion for
Summary Judgment states that it is filed on behalf of all defendants. Therefore, it appears that
the added defendants have at least voluntarily appeared in this matter.
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for Relief in the amended complaint still sought monetary damages, costs, and attorney
fees. However, it also sought injunctive relief ordering ISU to instate Sadid as Chair of
the College of Civil Engineering. No other relief is sought.
After allowing Sadid the additional time he requested pursuant to IRCP 56(f), oral
argument on Defendants' motion for summary judgment occurred on November 2,2009.
The Court deems the summary judgment ,motion to be agaulst the Amended Complaint
and against all defendants.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure allows that summary judgment
"shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions and admissions 011 file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Smith v. Meridian
Joint School Dist. No.2, 128 Idaho 714, 718, 918 P.2d 583, 587 (1996) (quoting LRCP.
56(c)); see ,also Idaho Building Contractors Association v. City of CoeW'

d~lene,

126

Idaho 740,890 P.2d 326 (1995); Avila v. Wahlquist, 126 Idaho 745) 890 P.2d 331 (1995).
The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests at
all times with the party moving for summary judgment. Pinholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho
894, 896-97, 155 P.3d 695,697"98 (2007). Generally, the record is to be construed in the
light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, with all reasonable
inferences dra'Wll in that party's favor. Id. If reasonable persons could reach different
conclusions or inferences from the evidence, the motion must be denied. Id. However,
CV-2008-3942-0C
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the nonmoving party must submit more than just conclusory assertions that an issue of
m.aterial fact exists to withstand summary judgment, TIle nonmoving party's case must
be anchored in something more than speculation, and a mere scintilla of evidence is not
enough to create a genuine issue of fact. Jd.; Tuttle v. Sudenga industries, Inc., 125 Idaho

145,868 P.2d 473 (1994).
Summary judgment is properly granted in favor of the moving party, when the
nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's

case upon which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Thomson v. Idaho Ins.
Agency. Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 530-31! 887 P.2d

l034~ 1037~38

(1994); Badell v. Beeks,

115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126 (1988». The party opposing the summary judgment

motion "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but
the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.!! Id. (quoting IDAHO R. elV.
P. 56(e); Nelson v. Steer, 118 Idaho 409, 797 P.2d 117 (1990». If the nonmoving party
does not come forward as provided in the rule, then summary judgment should be entered
against that party. State v, Shama Resources Ltd Partnership, 127 Idaho 267, 270, 899
P.2d 977,980 (1995).

DISCUSSION
On or ahout September 14, 2007, Sadid filed a fonnal complaint with tbe Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC~') and claimed ISU discriminated against
him for his national origin and/or religion and also retaliated against bim since 2001..
CV~2008-3942-0C
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Sadid asserts that claim was filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
acknowledges that he received a "right to

sue~'

He

letter from the EEOC and he was

infonned that he must file a Title VII civil action for illegal discrhninatiOll within 90 days
of receiving the letter. Sadid admits he abandoned any claim under Title VII and is now
pursuing the claims under § 1983 and he claims that the only time barring for filing
Section 1983 claim is the statute of limitation as discussed below.

Therefore~

this matter

does not concern Title VII but concerns 42 U.S.C. § 1983, breach of contract Iaw~ and the
Idaho Tort Claims Act The Court will first address the § 1983 Claim.
1. Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim

Sadid claims that the Defendants have violated his right to freedom of speech
under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1 Sections 9 and
10 of the Idaho Constitution along with his property rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1 Section 13 of the Idaho
Constitution. Sadid seeks relief for these alleged violations under Title 42 Section 1983
of the United States Code.
Sadid alleges that in his capacity as a faculty member and full professor of ISD, he
has~

from time to time, openly and publicly expressed his views regarding matters of

public concern relating to ISU and its standing in the academic and local community.
See, First Amended Complain,. pg. 5, para. 13. Sadid further specifically identifies two

separate incidences in which he claims he exercised his protected right to free speech.
First, he alleges that in 2001 he published a letter to his fellow faculty members and to
CV..2008~3942~OC
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ISU administrators criticizing ISU's decision to merge the College of Technology with
the College of Engineering. Id" at para. 14. Secon.d, Sadid alleges that in 2003, he
publically spoke out against ISU's renewed plan, designed in sect.:et, to merge the two
colleges and that some ofms comments were published in the Idaho State Journal while
other of his comments were published intemally at ISU. [d., at para. 15. Sadid claims
that the University retaliated against him for the expression of protected speech.

There are five questions the court must answer to determine whether under § 1983
there is a valid First Amendment retaliation claim. Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1070
(9th Cir. 2009). The questions are:
1. whether the plaintiff spoke on a matter of public concern;

2. whether the plaintiff spoke as a private citizen or public employee;
3. whether the plaintifP s protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in
the adverse employment action;
4. whether the state had an adequate justification for treating the employee

differently from other members of the general public; and
5. whether the state would have taken the adverse employment action even absent the
protected speech.

ld. If the plaintiff did not speak as a citizen on a matter of public concern then the
plaintiff does not have a First Amendment cause of action based on his employer's
reaction to the speech. Brewster v. Bd Of Educ., 149 F.3d 971. (9th Cir. 1991). The
plaintiff has the burden of proof on the first three tests. That is, Plaintiff has the burden
CV-200B-3942-0C
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of showing that: (1) lithe speech addressed an issue of public concern"; (2) "the speech
was spoken in tbe capacity of a private citizen and not a public employee"; and (3) lithe
state took adverse employment action" and the speech "was a substantial or motivating
factor in the adverse action. II Jacobson v. Schwarzenegger, --- F .Supp.2d ----, 2009 WL
2633762 (C.D.Cal. 2009). Only if plaintiff passes these three tests does the burden shift
to the defendants to show that the government's interests outweigh the pla.intiffs First
Amendment rights, or that it would have taken the same action even in the absence of the
protected conduct. Id

1. Matter of Public Concern. A public employee's speech is protected under the
First Amendment only if it falls within the core of First Amendment protection..~speech
on matters of public concern. Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agr.,
2146,2152, 170 LEd.2d 975 (2008); Connick v.

Myers~

--~

u.s. ----,

128 S.Ct.

461 U.S. 138, 1.46-47; 103 S.Ct.

1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 108 (1983). The Supreme Court has made Clear that public employees
do not surrender all their First Amendment rights by reason of their employment

Rather~

the First Amendment protects a public employee's right, in certain circumstances, to
speak as a citizen addressing matters of public concern. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S.
410, 41.7, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006); see

Connick~

461 U.S. at 143, 103

S.Ct. 1684; Pickering v. Bd. ofEduc., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 173 t 20 L.Ed.2d 811
(1968).

The question of whether the matter was a public concern is a question of law.
Ben]! v. Dept. ofSoc. Sen-'s., 447 F 3d 642~ 648 (9 th Cir. 2006). If the speech in question
CV-2008-3942~OC
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does not address a matter of public concern then it is unprotected. Eng at 1071. 'When
the speech is a political, social or other concern to the community, then it is a matter of
public concern. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 128, 103 S.Ct 1684 (1983), Alternatively,
if the speech deals with '(individual personnel disputes and

grievances~'

and it is not

related to the "relevance to the pubJic's evaluation of the performance of governmental
agencies" then it is not a matter of public concern. McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705, F.2d
1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1983). Whether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public
concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as
revealed by the whole record. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-148. The plaintiff bears the
burden of showing the court that the speech is a matter of public concern. Eng citing
Connick.
Sadid claims that he was speaking of a matter of a public concern. In two of the
letters (Exhibit A, ","ritten February 9, 2003 and March 9, 2003) the Court infers that
Sadid is arguing that tills is a. matter of public concern because it is an issue of interest to
the tax paying public. However, "[tJo presume that all matters which transpire within a
government office are of public concern would mean virtually every remark and certainly
every criticism directed at a public official would plant the seed of a constitutional case."
Connick at 149, 103 S.Ct. 1684. Thel'efore, to simply claim that all matters relating to

lSU's plans of department mergers are matters of pub lie concern is overly broad.
The Defendant directed the Court to a case that is similar to this one, Hong v.
Grant, 516 F.Supp.2d 1158 (C.D. Cal. 2007). In Hong, the defendant (among several
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others named) was Grant, who was the Chair of the Department of Chemical Engineering
and Materials Sciel1ce at the University of California-Irvine. The plaintiff was Hong,
who was an engineering professor at the unjversjty. He made several critical statements
about the hiring and promotion of other professors. He claimed his First Amendment
rights were violated when the university retaliated against Iris statements by denying him
a salary increase. The defendants moved for summary judgment, which the district court
granted in their favor.
The dismct court analyzed whether Hong's statemellts were matters of public
concern and concluded that they were not by stating:

~IWhile

Hong argues that his

statements are of public concern because they exposed government waste and
mismanagement, they are more properly characterized as internal administrative disputes
which have little or no relevance to the community as a whole." ld. at 1169, The court
followed the rule set out in Connick that a statement by an employee is not the public's
concern if it "cannot fairly be considered as relating to any matter of political, social or
other concern to the community." Hong at 1169 quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 146, 103
S.Ct. 1684.

TIle Hong Court also related its decision to a 7th Circuit case, Colburn v. Trustees

ofIndiana University, 973 F.2d 581 (7tJ1 Cir. 1992). In Colburn, two professors claimed
that they were denied tenure and a promotion because the university retaliated against

their claimed protected speech. In the letters that the professors wrote they claimed that
the "integrity of the University was being threatened." Id. at 586. The court held that
CV-2008-3942-0C
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even though the public would have appreciated the knowledge of the alleged wrongdoing
departmen~

of the

it noted that simply because the matter would be interesting to the

public does not make it a matter of public concern. Id. As a result~ the court granted the
defenda.nt's motion for summary judgment against the two professors.
After reviewing the a.rgument of Sadid, the case law, and the entire content, form
and context of his letters, the Court disagrees with Sadid's claim that this was a matter of
public concern. The Court finds that the letters contain nothing more than personal
grievances against ISU regarding matters that relate directly to Sadid's interest in his'
employment. The content and opinions may in fact be interesting to the public; however,
the value of interest alone does not make the matter a public concern. Furthermore,

simply because it involves a matter that may have occurred behind close governmental

doors does not make it a public concern. Sadid's statements go more to matters of an
internal administrative dispute than a matter of public COnCelTI. Here, Sadid has failed to
show that the statements made were a public concern. He cannot pass the 1at test under
Eng. As a

result~

Sadid does not have a valid First Amendment claim for protected

speech.
2. Spealcing as a Public Employee or Private Citizen. When a person enters the
government employee workforce, by llecessity~ he must accept certain limitations on his
freedom, Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.s. 661, 671, 114 S.Ct. 1878 (1994). Government
employers need a significant degree of control over their employees' words and actions,
much like private employers do. Connick at 143, 103 S.Ct. at 1684. If the government
CV-2008-3942-0C
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employer did not have control "there would be little chance for the efficient provision of
public services." [d.
To this end, the Government, as an employer, must have wide discretion
and control over the management of its personnel and internal affairs. This
includes the prerogative to remove employees whose conduct hinders
efficjent operation and to do so with dispatch. Prolonged retention of a
disruptive or otherwise unsatisfactory employee can adversely affect
discipline and morale in the work place, foster disharmony, and ultimately
impair the efficiency of an office or agency,

Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168,94 S.Ct. 1633, 1651, (1974). Also, governmental
employees "often occupy trusted positions in society" and therefore, when they speak out
in public "they can express views that contravene governmental policies or impair the
proper performance of governmental functions." Id.
Sadid asserts that he was speaking as a private citizen when he wrote the articles

for the newspaper. 2 He argues that because his job description does not mention anything
to the fact of a duty to write newspaper articles that critique the ISU administration is
evidence that he was speaking as a citizen. The Court disagrees with Sadid's argument.
Whether his job description requires him to write articles is not the detennining factor of
him being in the role of a citizen or a public employee. After reviewing Sadid's letters

that were published, the Court finds that the tone of the letters is that of an employee of
lSU. Additionally, Sadid should understand that he has limitations of his speech that he
accepted '\-vhen becoming a state employee. Furthennore, Sadid continuously argues in
his brief and even in the published article itself that he was speaking as a private citizen,
2 This at'guttlent is directly contrary to his assertion in the Amended Complaint that he spoke in
"his capacity as a Faculty Member and Full Professor of ISU".

CV-2008-3942-0C
DECISION ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Page 12 of 25

12

12/18/2009

17:35

208235

JUDGE NVE

PAGE

yet in both of the published articles he identifies himself as an ISU employee. Therefore,
due to the tone and language of the letter the Court finds that Sadid was speaking as an
nd

employee and not as a private citizen,. As a result, Sadid has also failed to meet the 2
test under Eng.

3. Whether the Protected Speech waJ a Substantial or Motivating Factor in
ISU's Action.

As found in the discussion above, the Court fInds in favor of the

Defendants on this issue for two reasons: 1) the letters "'Titten by Sadid were not
protected speech and 2) nothing in the evidence provided by the Plaintiff proves that ISU
had any motivation for not hiring Sadid as the Chair. In fact, the Court finds that there is
nothing in the record to suggest that Sadid even applied for the position of Chair.
Without such an application, Sadid could have no reasonable expectation that he would
be hired for the position. Sadid has failed to meet the 3rd test under Eng.
In light ofllie foregoing analysis, Sadid's First Amendment claim fails each of the
first three questions under the Eng test and the Court fInds that there is not a valid First
Amendment claim.

Therefore~

Defendants are granted summary judgment on Count One.

II. Breach of Contract and Implied Warranty
Sadid alleges, in Count Two of his Amended

Complaint~

that ISU breached his

employment contract and breached the implied warranty of good faith and fair dealing
associated with that contract. Specifically, Sadid alleges that ISU and its employees
failed to perform annual evaluations of Sadid for the years 2001 through 2006 and that
this failure constitutes a breach of ISU policy and his employment contract. Defendants
CV-2008-3942-0C
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allege, in their motion for summary judgment, that they are entitled to summary judgment
on Count Two because the contract claim is time barred, plaintiff has failed to establish a
breach, plaintiff has failed to establish any damages, and because he failed to fonow the
grievances procedures set forth in the Faculty Handbook.

In response to defendants' summary judgment motion as to Count Two, Sadid
argues that breaches occurring in 2003 through 2006 are not barred by the five year
statute of limitatiol1s and breaches occurring in 2001 and 2002 are not time balTed
because they are "captured" by the continuing violation doctrine. Additionally~ Sadid

argues that he did file a grievance under the Fa.culty Handbook and that it was denied.
1. Whether The Contract Claim Is Time Barred. An action for a written

contract must be brought within five years.

Ie. § 5-216. The statutory time period does

not begin to run until a cause of action has accrued. Saddlehom Ranch Landowner's,
Inc. v. Dyer, 146 Idaho 747~ 750, 203 P.3d 677, 680 (2009); citin.g Simon.s v. Simons, 134

Idaho 824; 830, 11 P.3d 20, 26 (2000).

Sadid is claiming that ISU had a contractual

obligation to perfonn annual evaluations and ISU breached the contract because from
2001 until 2006 ISU did not complete his an11ual evaluations.
Sadid argues that because the Complaint was filed on September 29, 2008, the
five year statute of limitations allows the Court to look back to September 29,2003, for
any alleged breach of contract. Sadid further argues that the "continuing violatioll'1

doctrine applies to his breach of contract claim and would allow hhn to attach the 2001
and 2002 alleged breaches. Sadid did not provide any law that supports the argument that
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the "continuing violation" doctrine applies to contract actions as opposed to § 1983
actions or state tort actions. The Court did not find any law that states that the doctrine
relates to claims of breach of contract, similar to this situation.

In the absence of any case law on this issue~ this Court finds that each incidence each time an evaluation was not performed - constitutes a separate breach and not an

ongoing breach. To find othelWise would effectively render the limitation period for any
cause of action alleging failure to perform meaningless when the perfonnance is to be
done on a regular basis. The purpose of a statute of limitations is to bar stale claims and

avoid problems of proof arising from stale memories. Accepting Sadid's continuing
violation theory on a breach of contract claim would hinder and fiustrate the ultimate aim
of limitations periods. The breach of contract claim does not involve an ongoing breach
but multiple separate breaches. Therefore, the statute of limitations bars any alleged
breach occurring more than five years prior to the filing of the Complaint. Sadid cannot
purse a breach of contract claim for any event-occurring prior to September 29,2003.
2. Whether Plaintiff Has Shown a Breach of Contract. Sadid claims that tbe

failure of ISU to do the evaluations caused him damages because he did not receive an
annual salary increase or the Chair position. Sadid directs the Court to section (B)(1) of
the ISU Handbook, which states:
Each year the chair of a department must submit to the Dean of the Chair's
college an evaluation of each faculty member in that department. .. the
evaluation, together with the opinion of higher administrators, will be used
as one (1) basis for the final recommendation relative to reappointment,
nonreappointment~ acquisition or tenure~ or as other personnel action,
whichever is appropriate.
CV-2008 3942-0C
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FACULTY/STAFF HANDBOOK, Part 4, Section IV, (B)(I). The Defendants argue th.at
(B)(7) actually app1ies~ which states:
It is the policy of the Board that at intervals not to exceed five (5) years

following the award of tenure to faculty members, the performance of
tenured faculty must be reviewed by members of the department or unit and
the department chairperson or unit head. The review must be conducted in
terms of the tenured faculty member's continuing performance in the
following general categoties: (a) teaching effectiveness, (b) research or
creative activities, (c) professional related services, (d) other assigned
responsibilities, and (e) overall contributions to the department.
FACULTY/STAFF HANDBOOK, Part 4. Section IV, (B)(7). Overall, after reviewing the

T.SU faculty handbook provisions that counsel has provided, the Court does not agree with
Sadid.'s argument of a breach of contract by ISU by failure to conduct an annual
evaluation of Sadid. The Court recognizes that Defendant Kunze acknowledged that he
had a re..r;;ponsibility to conduct faculty evaluations and that he did not complete the
performance evaluation process with Sadid on an annual basis. Kunze's Deposition,

Exhibit A to the Affidavit a/Counsel, p. 46, Ll. J1-22; p. 49, LI. 9-14; p. 56; LI. 1-10)' p.
62, Ll. 2-22. However, Sadid received his tenure in 1993, and according to the ISU

Faculty Handbook, annual evaluations of a tenured professor are not required. What

matters in this ca.se is whether Sadid received an evaluation every 5 years after receiving
tenure. For the five year period immediately preceding the filing of the Complaint Sadid
. testified that he did not receive an evaluation in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006. See..

Affidavit of Plaintiff in Opposition to Defenndants I Alotion for Summary Judgment, para.
5.

There is nothing in the record relating to 2007 or 2008. If Sadid received an
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evaluation in either of these years, his breach of contract claim fails. Sadid, as plaintiff,
carries the burden of proof on the issue of breach of contract. His failure to provide any
evidence that ISU failed to evaluate him at any time during the five years immediately
preceding the filing of his Complaint warrants summary judgment against him on the
breach of contract claim.
Alternatively, the Court does not need to determine whether or not the evaluations
were completed at least every five years for a tenured professor because Sadid did not
provide any evidence that shows he had a contract for a yearly salary increase.
Additiollally~ at the hearing for this motion, Sadid did not rebut the Defendant's claim

that he could not receive the Chair position simply because he did not apply for the
position. Sadid's contract does not guarantee annual evaluations, yearly salary increases,
or the Chair position. He has not shown any injury from the alleged breach of contract.
The Court grants Defendants summary judgment on Count Two of the Amended
Complaintp th.e breach of contract claim, on the grounds that the statute of limitations has
terminated any claim for breach occurring prior to September 29, 2003, and that the
Plaintiff has not shown that ISU failed to evaluate him at any time within the five years
immediately preceding the filing of the Complaint. Alternatively, Sadid has not shown a
contractual requirement that in which the parties agreed to assign Sadid the Chair
position, a yearly salary increase, or an annual evaluation.

ISU did not breach the

contract. Defendants are granted sUinmary judgment on Count Two.
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'ill. The Defamation Claim
Sadid alleges, in Count Three of his Amended Complaint, that Lineberry and ISU
defamed him. This is a tort claim under state law. Specifically, Sadid alleges that
Lineben-y sent an e-mail on the ISU email system on August 1, 2008, and it addressed

matters regarding the operation of the College of Engineering. Also in the e. .mail was a
statement about Sadid that refelTed to him as a "nut case." Sadid aUeges that the contents
of the email were defamatory to his character and that the e-mail constituted retaliation.
Lineberry and ISU moved for summary judgment on Count Three on the grounds that
Sadid failed to file a Notice of Tort Claim prior to commencing litigation, that defendants
are entitled to immunity under I.C. § 6-904(3)~ and that no defamation OCCUlTed.

In response to Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Count Three,
Sadid argues that his Notice of Tort Claim was timely filed because it was filed before
the filing of the Amended Complaint, that Lineberry was not acting within his official
capacity at ISU when he made the

"nut~case"

statement, and that Lineberry acted with

malice such that the immunity under I.C. § 6-904(3) does not apply.
1. Whether the Plaintiff's Defamation Claim is Barred by the Idaho Tort
Claim Act.

Sadid filed his original Complaint on September 29~ 2008. He served the

Complaint and Summons on ISU and Lineberry on October 15, 2008. See, Affidavit of
Service signed by Eric Hansen and filed on October 31, 2008, and Affuiavit of Service
signed by Jamie Hansen andfiled on October 31, 2008. Two copies ofthe Summons and

Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial were served on the Attorney General 011 October 6,
CV-2008-3942~OC
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See, Affidavit of Service signed by Tri-County Process Serving and filed on

October J5, 2008.

Defendants ISU and Lineberry filed a Motion to Dismiss on

November 26, 2008, alleging that Plajntiffhad not properly served the Secretary of State
as required by the ITeA.

On December 3, 2008, Plaintiff served the Summons,

Complaint and Notice of Tort Claim on the Secretary of State. See, Affidavit of Service

signed by Tri-County Process Serving and filed on December 8, 2008..3 Sadid filed his
Amended Complaint on October 15, 2009. It alleges that "A written Notice of Tort

Claim has been flled in compliance with the Idaho Tort Claims Act, with the Secretary of
State for the State of Idaho pursuant to Idaho Code § 6~905 and § 6-907." See paragraph

32 qfthe Amended Complaint.
Lineberry's e-mail that Sadid claims is defamatory was sent in August 2008.
"Whether his defamation claim is barred is an issue that ':'can be decided as a matter of law

via the notice requirement of the Idaho Tort Claims act." McQuillen v. City of Ammon,
113 Idaho 719, 722, 747 P.2d 741, 744 (1987).
Idaho Code § 6·905 reads:
All claims against the state arising under the provisions of this act and all
claims against an employee of the state for any act or omission of the
employee within the course or scope of his employment shall be presented
to and filed with the secretary of state within one hundred eighty (180) days
from the date the claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered,
whichever is later.
3 Th.e Notice of Tort Claim is ·not in the Court's file. However, the Affidavit of Plaintiff in
Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment states that"A written Notice of Tort
Claim has been filed in compliance with the Idaho Tort Claims Act, with the Secretary of State
for the State ofIdaho pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-905 and, § 6-907:' See paragraph 20 of the
Affidavit;
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I.C. §6-905. The statutory period begins to run at the occurrence of the wrongful act
even if th.e full extent of damage is unknown. McQuillen, 113 Idaho, at 722.
''Knowledge of facts which would put a reasonably prudent person on inquiry is the
equivalent to knowledge of the wrongful act and will stalt the running of the 120-day

period." Id. The IrCA states that the claim must be "presented and filed within the time
limits." I.C. § 6-908.

The State or its employee has 90 days to resp011d to the claim.

I.e. § 6~909. If the claim is denied~ the claimant may institute an action in the district
court. I.C. § 6-910. Compliance with the Idaho Tort Claims Act's notice requirement is
a mandatory condition precedent to bringing suit, the failure of which is fatal to a claim,
no matter how legitimate. t ' McQuillen (citing Overman v.

Klein.~

103 Idaho 795, 654 P.2d

888 (1982); I.e. § 6-908), The notice requirement is in addition to the applicable statute
of limitations. Jd.
In the original Complahlt filed on September 29, 2008, the Plaintiff did not allege
the he had filed a written notice in compliance "with the Idaho Tort Claims Act. The
Plaintiff argues that this was remedied by his Amended Complaint filed on October 15,

2009, which does note the filing of the notice with the Secretary of State. Plaintiffs First
Amended Complaint And Demand For Jury Trial, p. 9.

However~

the Plaintiffs

argument is misleading, whether the Amended Complaint corrects the problem is
irrelevant. The focus should be that the Plaintiff filed suit before he filed the notice with

the Secretary of State, "vWch is a mandatory condition precedent to bringing the suit

CV-200B-3942-0C
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193 P.3d 853 (2008), Euclid

filed a Complaint, Petition for Judicial Review and Request for Jury Trial on December
12, 2005. The pleading sought judicial review of the City's
emergency ordinance was

invali~

actions~

a declaration that an

mandatory relief and civil damages. A few days after

the complaint was filed, Euclid filed a tort claim. Euclid filed an amended complaint in
January, adding a due process claim. The City filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for
summary judgment. The trial court granted the City summary judgment and Euclid
appealed. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that the trial court had granted

summary judgment to the City on Euclid's claim under the ITCA because Euclid did not
comply with the notice requirements of the ITCA. The Supreme Court affinned the
summary judgment without any discussion of whether the amended complaint cured the
failure to file the notice before filing suit
Plaintiff, in effect, asks the Court to ignore the filing of the original camp laint and
to look only to the filing of the amended complaint to detennine if notice was timely
given.

However, plaintiff also argues that for purposes of deciding the statute of

limitations issues, the filing of the amel1ded complaint relates back to the date of filing of
the original complaint. These are inconsistent positions. A plaintiff cannot "cure" a
failure to give proper notice prior to filing suit by giving such notice after filing suit. To
do so defeats the purpose of the notice requirement. SOOid's original Complaint alleged a
claim for defamation. This claim clearly falls under the ambit of the ITCA. ISU and
Lineben-y had the right to receive a notice of this claim before litigation began. ISU and
CV~2008-3942-0C
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Lineberry had the right to have 90 days to decide whether to accept or reject the claim
before litigation began. Those rights, granted under the ITCA~ were denied when Sadid
served the notice of tort claim with the complaint on the Secretary of State. By then, the
complaint for defamation had been filed and the purposes for the notice requirement
frustrated.
The purposes of the notice of claim requirement under the rrCA are to: (1) save
needless expense and litigation by providing opportunity for amicable resolution of
differences among parties, (2) allow authorities to conduct a full investigation into the
cause of the injury in order to determine the extent of the state's liability, if any, and (3)
allow the state to prepare defenses. Driggers v. Grafe, --- PJd ~---, 2009 WL 4067998
(Ct App. 2009).

Therefore~

using its discretion, the, Court finds that the alleged

defamation claim is batted by the Idaho Tort Claim Act as to any claim against ISU or
against Lineberry alleging he acted within the scope of his official capacity at ISU.4
In reaching this

conclusion~

the court is aware of Madsen v. Idaho Dept. of Health

and Welfare, 114 Idaho 624, 759 P.2d 915 (Ct. App. 1988)~ in which the Court of

Appeals suggested that a plaintiff could dismiss his complaint without prejudice, serve
his notice under tbe ITCA, and then file a new complaint - if the time period for serving
notice had not yet expired. However, Sadid did not dismiss his Complaint but merely
filed an Amended Complaint, thus frustrating the purposes of the notice requirement.
Sadid even filed a Notice of Intent to Take Default prior to the flling of the Amended
4 These

are the only two defendants against whom. the defamation claim is assf:llted.

CV-2008-3942~OC

DECISION ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Page 22 of 25

22

12/18/2009

17:35

208235

JUDGE NYE

PAGE

Complaint and within 90 days of the time he claims the notice of tort claim was served on
the Secretary of State. Obviously, Sadid had 110 intent to stay litigation while the State
investigated his claim or the other purposes of the notice requirement were met.
2. Whether Immunity Applies. Defendants argue that even if the defamation
action is not barred by the notice requirements of the ITCA, they have immunity under
LC. § 6-904(3). That statute states:
A government entity and its employees while acting within the
course and scope of their employment and without malice or
criminal intent shall not be liable for any claim which:
3. Arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment; false
malicious prosecution~ abuse of process, libel, slander~
misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.
arres~

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint asserts that Lineberry acted with malice when he sent the
e~mai1.

Sadid further argues in opposition to summary judgment that Lineberry did not

act within his course and scope of employment when he sent the e-mail. I.C. § 6-903(a)
states that the State is only liable for '\vtongful acts of its employees if they were acting
'\vithin the course and scope of employment.

Therefore, Sadid cannot bring this

defamation action against lSD. Lineberry, on the other hand., cannot claim the immunity
afforded by I.e. § 6-904(3) for conduct failing outside the scope of his employment and
done with malice.
3. Whether Defamation Occurred. If the comments do not harm the reputation
of the plaintiff in the community or deter third parties from associating with him then
they are not defttmatory comments, even if they are derogatory. Ru.benstein v. University
CV~2008-3942-0C
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of Wisconsin Ed. Of Regents, 422 F.Supp. 61, 64 (B.D. Wis. 1976). Additionally, if

comments are not made to the general community then the community cannot "lower its
estimation" of the plaintiff. [d. In Rubenstein, the plaintiff fIled a claim of defamation
for the

defendant~s

comment of "old biddy" referring to the plaintiff, along with an

additional opinion that the plaintiff was not suitable for the promotion at issue and also
commenting that the plaintiff was ':just out i'O make trouble.'~ Id. The court dismissed the
plaintiffs defamation claims because the remarks did .uot harm her reputation. Id.
The issue of defamation in this case is much like that of Rubenstein. Sadid claims
that the comments made by Linebeny were defamatory and resulted in him not getting
the Chair position. The

e~mai1

was not sent to the general public and therefore it could

not affect his reputation in the community or deter any third parties from associating with
him. Furthermore, Sadid has failed to provide any evidence that any opinion of Sadid
was affected by the email.

Therefore~

the Court finds that even though the e-mail's

language is derogatory, the term ''nut case" is not defamatory because Sadid's reputation
was not affected. Lineberry is entitled to his opinion.
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Count Three.
CONCLUSION
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on each count in the Amended
Complaint. Both parties raised issues not addressed in this decision; however, those
issues were not addressed because the above issues are dispositive. Defendants are
hereby granted summary judgment in this matter. Defense counsel is instl'Ucted to submit
CV-2008-3942~OC
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a proposed final judgment. Plaintiff's counsel will have three days to file any objection
to the proposed judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: December 18,2009.

<::::~
DAVID C. NYE
District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
t HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

Ii':;,y of December, 2009, I served a true and correct

copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals in the manner indicated.

Sam Johnson
Johnson & Monteleone, LLP
405 S. Eighth Street, Suite 250
Boise, Idaho 83702
John A. Bailey
Racine, OlS011~ Nye, Budge & Bailey, Chtd.
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83204

oo U.S.
Mail
Overnight Delivery
o~ Fax:
Hand Deliver
208-947-2424
o U.S. Mail

D Overnight Delivery
OHand Deliver
Fax: 232-6109

lX!

CV-2008-3942-0C
DECISION ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Page 25 of 25

25

t"-

LAW OFFICES OF

RACINE OLSON NYE BUDGE & BAILEY
CHARTERED
201 E. CENTER STREET

• .J

POST OFFICE BOX 1391

.- )

POCATELLO, IDAHO 83204-1391

<£
l!.J
U-'.1
\.

,-.::

INDUSTRlAL COMMISSION
JUDICIAL DIVISION, IDOL ApPEALS

POBox 8370
BOISE, ID 83720-0041
II •• 1," II. I. II I•• I.111 ••• 11,"11 •••• 1•• 1. "II. 1.1.1

021

From: Lynn

.

,<' '~~~1

'.'

DATE: 212512010

IT6 E. Riverside Dr. Ste 200
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 685-2333
Fax: (208) 685-2355

PAGES (INCLUDING COVER): 8

MATTER:

TO:

~ 9~1/

JOHN C. LYNN
Attorney at Law

').,

ORIGINAL TCfFOLLoW: [ x ] Yes

#508 P.001/00a

From:

FAX CO.VER SHEET
I

o 14: 12

[] No

Habib Sadid, Claimant
9KT# 1IT7-2010

Dena Burke, Fax # 332-7558

,~r,"

MESSAGE:

Please file the attached CLAIMANT'S BRIEF

r

m

If transmis~ion is incomplete, call John Lynn at (208) 685-2333.
,

~,}.

t

,

.. * .. * * * * * . . * * * * .. CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE" ........................ ..
THIS FACSIMlLE'W,Y CONTAIN CONFIDENTIAL INFORMA11ON THAT IS PROTECTED BY THE ATTORNEY-CUENT OR WORK PRODUCT PRMlEGE. IT IS
INTENDED ONlY FOR THE USE OF THE INoMDUAl.(S) NAMED ABOVE. IF YOU ARE NOT A NAMED RECIPIENT OR AN EMPLOYEE RESPONSIBLE FOR
DEUVERING THE FACSIMILE. YOU ARE INSTRUCTED NOT TO DELIVER, DISTRIBUTE OR COPY THIS FACSIMILE, NOR SHOULD YOU DISCLOSE ITS
CONTENTS OR TAKE ANY ACTION IN RELIANCE ON THE INFORMATION IT CONTAINS. IF YOU HAVE RECEI\IED THIS FACSIMILE IN ERROR, PLEASE
NOTIFY US IMMEDIATELY BY TELEPHONE TO ARRANGE FOR THE RETURN OF THE TRANSMITTED DOCUMENTS TO US. THANK YOU.

o 14: 12

From: Lynn

,-*-

#509 P.002/00B

JOHlil c. LYNN
Attorney at Law
776 E. Riverside Dr.
Si:dte.200
Eagle, ID 83616
SAM" JOHNSON '.
JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, L.L.P.
40~ South Eighth St., Suite 250
BoiSe~ II) 83702
Attorneys for Claimant
:'1'"

IDAHO INDUSm.L\L COMMISSION
JUDICIAL DIVISION, IDOLAPPEALS

HABIB SADID
SSN:

)
)
)
)

Claimant,

DOCKET NO. 1777-2010

) CLAIMANT'S BRIEF

IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY,

)
)
)

.

Employer,
,

And

IDAlIO'DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR,
,

\,

)

)
)

)
)

*.. "

'

)
1

Comes now, the Claimant, by and through his counsel of record, and submits the
"

following BRIEF in response to the EMPLOYER'S BRIEF ON CLAIM FOR REVIEW.

FACTS
It is apparent that Claimant's claim for unemployment benefits and the
Employer's response follows a long and contentious dispute over the reasons behind

cl8ii:hant's teimination of employment.
the~o,rkplace was
'~':; I · '

The Employer alleges that Claimant's conduct in

"Unprofessional, disrtlptive and non-collegial" which support'

'

cLAIMANT's BRIEF P.l

m

JOHNC.LYNN
Attorney at Law
776 E. Riverside Dr.
Suite 200
Eagle, ID 83616
O[C~I\f[

SAM JOHNSON
INDUS Tf~L4.LtCOfP
JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, L.L.P.
.
.MISS/ON
405 South Eighth St., Suite 250
Boise, ID 83702
Attorneys for Claimant

IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
JUDICIAL DIVISION, IDOLAPPEALS

HABIB SADID
SSN:
Claimant,
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY,
Employer,
And

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR,

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

DOCKET NO. 1777-2010

CLAIMANT'S BRIEF

Comes now, the Claimant, by and through his counsel of record, and submits the
following BRIEF in response to the EMPLOYER'S BRIEF ON CLAIM FOR REVIEW.
FACTS
It is apparent that Claimant's claim for unemployment benefits and the

Employer's response follows a long and contentious dispute over the reasons behind
Claimant's termination of employment. The Employer alleges that Claimant's conduct in
the workplace was "Unprofessional, disruptive and non-collegial" which support'

CLAIMANT'S BRIEF P.l

adequate cause' for termination under Idaho State University ("ISU") policy (Exhibit 7).
Claimant, in tum, maintains that the ostensible grounds for termination are mere pretext,
and that the true reason for discharge stems from Claimant's criticism of ISU
administrators, much of which was published in the local newspaper (Exhibit D).
The Employer has taken great pain and considerable liberty with its rendition of
the facts to convince this tribunal that Claimant committed misconduct as contemplated
by Idaho Code § 72-1366 (5). However, the facts upon which this tribunal must decide
are limited. The Commissioners must conduct a de novo review of the record here
which consist of the documents admitted during the proceeding below and the testimony
of Dr. Sadid at the January 5th hearing.
Given the state of this record, the Commission is not in a position to determine
whether Claimant was rightfully or wrongfully terminated. The only determination that
can be made by this tribunal is whether the Employer has met its burden or proof, on this
record, that Claimant committed some form of misconduct. The Employer cannot meet
its burden of proof because it had not offered substantial and competent evidence
supporting its case. The documents presented by the Employer (Exhibits 3-7) are
hearsay and hearsay evidence, standing alone, is not sufficient to support fmdings of fact
(Application of Citizen's Utilities Company, 82 Idaho 208,213,351, P. 2d
487,492 (1960)). On the other hand, the positive, uncontradicted testimony of a credible
witness must be accepted as true even if the witness is an interested party. Thus the
Claimant's sworn testimony must be given greater weight and consideration over
allegations of misconduct contained in the documents. Here the Claimant not only
testified that the alleged claims of misconduct were false, but that the numerous

CLAIMANT'S BRIEF P.2

documents submitted corroborate his position.
For example, the Employer cites many alleged transgressions committed over a
lengthy period of time up to and including certain events in April of 2009 and thereafter
(Exhibit 3-7), culminating in Dean Jacobsen's recommendation for dismissal (Exhibit 5,
pp 15-20). What the Employer did not reveal, however, is the fact that all of these
transgressions were the subject of a Faculty Appeal Board grievance hearing. This
hearing transpired over several days with numerous witnesses sworn under oath and
cross-examine; a recording of this hearing has been provided as Exhibit 10, F. This
grievance process culminated in a decision dated October 23, 2009, whereby four of the
five Board members l found insufficient evidence to justify tennination. Not only did the
Faculty Appeal Board find inadequate cause for tennination, but opined "In view of the
gravity of the recommended action, the majority found the absence of required
documentation disturbing" (Exhibit 9, A). Moreover, there is nothing in the record that
explains or justifies the President's decision to overturn the recommendation of the
Faculty Appeal Board. Therefore, even if the Commissioners were inclined to give
credence to the documentary evidence here, there is nothing in this record to undetmine
the findings of the Faculty Appeal Board. Consequently, the Employer's proof of
misconduct is wholly lacking particularly in the face of Claimant's uncontradicted sworn
testimony.
THE CIVIL LITIGATION
The Employer places import on the civil proceedings before Judge Nye
(EMPLOYER'S BRIEF, p.3, 4). Judge Nye has granted ISU's Motion for Summary

1

The lone dissenting member was appointed by the Provost
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Judgment and has found that Claimants alleged 'protected speech' in his pending civil
lawsuit against ISU is not protected. However, the Employer neglected to advise the
Commission that this is not a fmal decision.

2

The question as the whether Claimant

engaged in 'protected speech' is and will remain highly contested. An example of this
speech can be found in the record (Exhibit 10, D) where an article dated November 10,
2008, posits the question: "Are President Vailas' Policies Damaging ISU"? A review of
this article may shed light on why this claim is so hotly contested; but whether Claimant
engaged in 'protected speech' and retaliated for it is not within purview of this tribtmal
and is better left to the civil court to decide. Moreover, the 'protected speech' inquiry
does not address the issue of misconduct as the two are separate and distinct. Even if the
speech reviewed by Judge Nye is ultimately deemed unprotected, it may still explain why
President Vailas countermanded the Faculty Appeal Board decision and the Board's
concern over a "disturbing" termination process (Exhibit 9, B). The fact that Claimant's
speech may not be protected does not, in any way, prove misconduct.
THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
Having no substantial or competent evidence to reply upon, the Employer makes
claim that its documents are not hearsay. The Claimant concedes that the documents
authored by him may be excepted by the hearsay rule, however, these documents support
Claimant's position (Exhibit 4. pp 4-6, 29-31; pp 12, 13 and 10 C, G, H, I).
The Employer represents that its documents authored by its agents are admissible
under the public record and reports exception to the hearsay rule (LR.E. 803 (8)). This
assertion is disingenuous. These self-serving documents were not records or reports
setting forth 'regularly conducted and regularly recorded activities'. Their veracity and
2

A decision on Plaintiff's (Claimant's) Motion for Reconsideration is pending.
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trustworthiness is challenged, highlighting, precisely, the reason for the hearsay rule.
The only document that could fall within this exception would be the Faculty Appeal
Board findings as they followed from an investigation pursuant to authority granted
by law, ISU policy (Exhibit 5, pp 11-13).
Likewise, in no way do lSD's one-sided documents establish termination for
cause. The documents as a whole establish nothing except that the parties strongly
disagree as to why Claimant was terminated

a matter better left to the civil court for

resolution. Suffice it to say that lSD's leitmotif, its sweeping claim that these documents
"recite a long history of unprofessional, disruptive and insubordinate behavior"
(EMPLOYER'S BRIEF, P.8) flies directly in the face of Claimant's last three
performance evaluations (Exhibit 10, C (2006, 2007); Exhibitl0, E (2008)). The
documents thoroughly impeach lSD's justification for termination.
DR. SADID'S DENIAL OF MISCOi'-JTIDCT
As if existing in a parallel universe, the Employer suggests that Claimant didn't
deny, and therefore admits, misconduct. The appeal hearing held January 5th speaks for
itself. Claimant clearly stated that he committed no misconduct. Claimant also testified
and outlined the course of history with ISD including his lengthy and distinguished
service (Exhibit 10, C, attachment 6 (CV)). Claimant testified that all of the nonsense
leveled against rum culminated in a grievance hearing where ISU threw everything at him
ad nauseam including new charges that surfaced during the hearing (Exhibit 10, F). It is

not necessary to do so, but Claimant invites the Commissioners to listen to this hearing
for it reflects Claimant's denial of any wrongdoing and provides insight as to why the
Faculty Appeals Board found that the tennination process was not only without merit but

CLAIMANT'S BRIEF P.5

disturbing.
CONCLUSION

As the Commission may well sunnise, this dispute goes far beyond eligibility for
unemployment benefits. The narrow focus here, however, is easily resolved. The
Employer has not offered substantial and competent evidence supporting its case and,
therefore, cannot meet its burden of proof. The proof evidence by the Employer consists
of self-serving documents and uncorroborated hearsay. Claimant, on the hand, testified;
he denied doing anything that would constitute misconduct, corroborated his own
documents filed in response to the numerous accusation brought against him and
explained the context from which this dispute arose- a context which surely raise
concerns over ISU's good faith.
But Claimant's testimony does not stand alone. Claimant's peers reviewed all the
alleged transgressions in detail and found a disturbing termination process lacking in
merit. In short, the Employer's effort to justify a denial of employment benefits rings
hollow - full of hyberbole, silliness and zeal. The true significance of the Employer's
position here is that it shows, again, the arrogance and conceit with which it destroyed the
career of one of its most accomplished professors. This is but one chapter in a long story
that is far from over.
Dated this 23 rd day of February, 2010

John C. Lynn
Attorney for Claimant
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Industrial Commission
Tracey K. Rolfsen
' ... SamJohnson

FROM:

Jol'm A. Bailey, Jr.

RE:

Sadid v.ISU and IDOL

FIL

D

Pages (incltlding this one) are beingtrartsmitted. l[you do not receive all of the pages, please
contact our office immediately at the above telephone number. An original:

'! "

(x]

will NOT follow.

[]

will follow by mail.
will fonow by overnight courier.
will be hand~delivered.

[]

[]

COMMENTS: Attached please find the [oUowin.g documents in the above-captioned matter:
1. .
2.

Letter to the Industrial Commission; and
Employer's Reply Brief on Claim for n.eview.
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JudicialOivision, IDOL Appeals
P. O. Box 83720
Boise~ Idaho 83720~0041
"

t):,'

0

Re:

!

Sadid v. lSU and JDOL
IDOL Docket No:
1777-2010
Claimant:
Habib Sadid
Employer:
Idaho Stale UniverSity

Dear Clerk:
Q'Enclosed please find Employer's Reply Brief on Claim for Review for filing in the above~
captioned matter.

Thank you for your assistance and if you have any questions, please give me a call.

~
,
JO~

JAB~riic
Enclos\.U'c
c:
TraceyK. Rolfsen (via facsimile)
Sam Johnson (via facsimile)
c..

,
•

ej'
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John A. Bailey. Jr. (lSB No. 2619)
RACJNE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE
& BAILEY, CHARTERED
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83 204~ 13 91
Telcphorle: (208) 232-6101
Fax: (208) 232·6109
'J,,",

Attorney jor Employer Idaho Siale University
IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
JUDICIAL DIVISION, IDOL APPEALS
HABIB.,SADID~

SSN:
,Claimant,

vs.
, '.i:

IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY,
'Employer,
and

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

IDOL Docket No. 1777-2010

EMPLOYER'S REPLY BRIEF ON
CLAIM FOR REVIEW

FfLE

-5

)

Comes now. the Employer, Idaho State University, by and through its counsel of record, and
submits the following reply brjefin response to the Claimant's brief in the above captioned case.
1. ",The Commission May Considel' All of the Documents on Record
A~

discussed in the Employer's Brief on Claim for Review, the Appeals Officer in this case

erroneously held that all documentary evidence is hearsay, which is insufficient to support findings
I,;

EMPLO,Y£Jl'S ru;PLY BRIEF ON CLAIM FOR REVIEW • Pag~ 1
" \~ ','

P. 03/18
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of fact. ·In.o~r
previous brief, we demonstrated iher error; documents authored by the claimant are not
..

hearsay. official documents and records ofISU are not hearsay for these purposes. And even hearsay
\

documents arc sufficient to support a finding of fact if they are corrobora.ted by non~hearsay

evidence/such as the letters and cmails authored by the Claimant. Viewed in light of the correct
underst~ding

of law, the evidence in the record is more than sufficient to establish cause for

tennination.

The documents submitted by ISU conclusively establish that the Dean of Engineering, Dr.
ruchartf·Jacobseo, began proceedings to terminate Dr. Sadid's employment for cause; namely, a
long history of unprofessional and disruptive behavior that was deemed to be detrimental to the
H;I\

,

.,

Col1ege of Engineering. Numerous examples of that behavior are noted in the documents and
testified to in the recording of the faculty semlte hearing which Dr. Sadid submitted as Exhibit 10 F.
The official records submitted by ISU are excluded from the hearsay rule pursuant to the business
records ex.ception. They are direct evidence that the reason given by ISU at the time of the
r,! ,

tcnnination was cause, namely, the particular behavior of Dr. Sadid recited in those documents.
In ~ther words, the evidence is undisputed that ISU cited cause as the reason for Dr. Sadid's
termination. There is no contention that the reason given at the time was retaliation or some other

reason other than cause. The questions before the Industrial Commission are whether this cause
cited is suflicient, and whether the stated cause is merely a pretext tor unlawful retaliation, as alleged
by Dr~"'S'adid.

Wppe the official records of 18U are non~hearsay evidence of the reasons for termination, the
Claimant argues they should be considered hearsay for purposes of determining whether that
behavior actually occurred. Even if that were correct hearsay for that purpose, they arc richly

EMPLOYER'S llEPLY BRIEF ON CI..A.Il\l FOR REVIEW· PaJe 1
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I'

corroborated by the letters and emaiisauthoredbyDr.Sadid.whicharcnothearsay.This
Commission may consider hearsay evidence that is corroborated by non-hearsay evidence. Carroll v.

Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N.Y. 435,440. 113 NE 507,509 (NY 1916); Williapoint Oyslers v.
Ewing, 174 f.2d 676, 691 (9 th Cir. 1949); ConEd. Co. ojN.Y. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197,217,59
S.Ct. 206. 230 (1938).

z.

TIle Doc~mentary Evidente establishes Suffictent Cause for Termination.

At page four of his briet: the
\:

cl~\imant

concedes that the documents authored by him are not

hearsay. He argues, however~ that they support his position. A review ofthe~e documents shows
precisely the opposite. For instance, Dr. Sadid cites Exhibit 4, pages 4 to 6, as documents that
suppoIt'his position. ISU submits that his letter is a perfect example of the lmprofessional and
disruptive behavior that led to his termination. This letter is Dr. Sadid's response to a letter of
'1';,

reprimand from his department chair (Ex. 4, p. 7) for Dr. Sadid's statements about the Dean of
Engineering in a widely disseminated e-mail (Ex. 4. p.9). The email shows that Dr. Sadid became
upset, Gf claimed to be upsel, when he reviewed the dral1 minutes of a faculty meeting. He accused
the dean of having changed the minutes to reflect badly on Dr. Sadid. As anyone who has ever
attended a committee meeting knows, minutes arc a)ways draft until they are approved at a
,1\"'",

j

subsequent meeting. Dr. Sadid, however, assumed foul play. Rather than merely asking for a
correctjon of the Pattieular item. he launched into an unnecessary tirade in an e-mail to an
administrative assistant which he copied to all members of the engineering facuHY:
I never said the faculty shotlld be consulted about decisions at all levels. Yes, I did express
. my dissatisfaction with Dr. Jacobson's perfonnance. Dr. Jacobson has done nothing for the
College in three years except, hiding behind three chairs who do not know what they are
doing and a spokesman who has been defending him for some time. Dr. Jacobson ignores
the faculty, has no focus on the college issues, manipUlation [sic] faculty all the time and
I~I I I.

'

,

.. "

,;

,
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;,l,

creates friction among faculty. The faculty in the ICollege of Engineering] do agree with
what I a~ saying. 1 truly believe that Dr. Jacobson and his three chairs should step down
immediately, if we want the college to move forward and be prepared for ABET....
'Priscilla; was someone else involved in writing the minu~es? I would like to know who was
involved (if any) in preparation ofthe minutes.
(Ex. 4, p. 9) When he was mildly reprimanded by the chair of his department for this unprofessional
behavior (See letter by Dr. Zoghi, Ex. 4, p.7). Dr. Sadid responded with additional invective in a
letter t(l~he TSU Provost, Dr. Gary Olson. (Ex. 4, ppA-6) He makes the disingenuous argument that
he did not know they were a draft ofthe minutes, and that he was not "accusatory." He then goes on:
Have I q'llestioned the dean's honesty? Yes, I cannot trust this man based on many untrue
statements he has made to me. The majority of the faculty would support my claim. The
\\dean's behavior has been reported to the administration long ago through his job
performance evaluations by the engineering faculty_However. the administration has
'"ignored taculty complaints. This has forced some people to take the case to the public; which
pays our salaries.
'.' My su~picions that Dr. Jacobsen intentionally changed the minutes of the March 11 faculty
meeting stems from my previous knowledge of what had happened to the minutes of
[College of Engineering] chairs' meetings. Apparently, the minutes taken in some chairs'
i'meetings do hal accurately describe the discussions that took place during the meetingsImportant discussions are sometimes eliminated from the minutes. Some raculty members
" .will attest to these claims.
... My distrust of Dr. Jacobsen is nol new. I am not alone in this distrust, and it has been
. reporte~ to the upper administration many times tl"U'ough several channels. Unfortunately,
, the administration has not responded to these complaints. JSU is a public institution; when
the system does not respond to complaints, isn't it any citizen's obligation to report misuse of
":"power and waste of money?
'"~

Dr. Sadid cites the!ie documents to the Commission as evidence tending to prove that he was
tel1l1inated in retaliation for his exercise of free speech. ISU submits to the contrary that these
documents are examples of Dr. Sadid's unprofcss.ional and disnlptive behavior. He turned a

q~stion about the wording of meeting lllinutes into an occasion for a public tirade against his dean,
EMI'I.OYU'S REPLY BRlEF ON eLM'" FOR REVltW - Puat 4
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and when reprimanded for it, he used his response for a further opportunity to accuse his superiors of
dishonesty, 1raud, misuse of power, and waste of money. In most workplaces, sLlch insubordination
as this \'IibuId

be adequate grounds for tennination by itself.

unprofc~sional

outburst was merely one of many incidents.

In the case of Dr. Sadid, this

3. Dr. Sadid's Denial of Misconduct is Insufficient Evidence to Disprove cause.

Clearly, Dr. Sadid does not recognize this behavior as misconduct of any kind. Apparently, he
leels he is privileged to accuse any administrator who disagrees with him offraud and corruption. It
was therefore to be expected that Dr. Sadid would testify to the appeals officer that he committed no
misGonduct. That is his conclusion, but it is not evidence. Dr. Sadid made no effort to deny the
behaviors shown in the documentary evidence, in particular as shown in his own writings. He goes
;',k',

,

'

so far as to hold up this evidence of his own indviHty as proof of the bad behavior of his ~uperiors in
the TSUAdministration. The evidence,

th~reforc,

is undisputed that Dr. Sadid engaged in the

behaviors which ISU round to be unprofessional and disruptive.
4. The Opinion of the Fac,dty Senate 15 Insuffident Evidence to Disprove cause.

ISU submits that Dr. Sadid's behavior would be cause for tennination in any workplace. In Dr.
Sadid'~'case.

because he was a tenured member of the faculty ofISU, he was entitled to a hearing

before ,a committee of the faculty senate. This committee was empowered to advise the university
!C.b·',

'I,',

president of its opinion whether there were sufficient grounds for termination of a tenured faculty
member.. However. under the applicable rules, this opinion is advisory only. It should be noted by
,

.

the Commission that the faculty committee made no findings about Dr. Sadid's behavior; it fOlmd
that thF procedures followed by ISU were inadequate, in that it should have given Dr. Sadid more
time 19 remediate his behavior. Thus, the committee did not make a finding that Dr. Sadid did not
1,.".\("

r"

i

I."

"

_

'
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engage in misconduct, in fact, the clear conclusion !i.-om their decision is that his behavior was bad
enough 'ktrequire remediation. Further. its one page advisory opinion to Dr. Vailas is not evidence
thal his. tennination was not for cause.
if.!J'

S. Dr. Sadid Presented No Evidenc:e of Pretext or Retaliation.

The evidence in the record, as discuS$ed above, establishes that Dr. Sadid engaged in behavior
that ISlfconsidered tobe misconduct, and thatISU considered them to be cause for termination. Dr.
Sadid

~Ueges

that the cause cited by JSU is a pretext, and that ISU really tem1inated him in

retaliation for his exercise of free speech. As discussed in our previolls brief, Dr. Sadid makes little
effort to argue that the ~<cause" did not OCCUT. He simply argues that it was not the real reason for his

tel111ina:tion. But. neither in his testimony to the appeals officer, nor in his documentary evidence,
nor in hl,s eyidence to the faculty ~enate. nor in his evidence to the SiXlh District Court, did Dr. Sadid
ever submit a single piece of proof that the real reason for his termination was retaliation over his
i.

'I

letters to the editor and editorials in the local newspaper. Although. Dr. Sadid states repeatedly that
he beHaves it to be tme, he has never presented any evidence in support ofthat belief.
,.. As we noted before, Dr. Sadid has pursued
this claim in a lawsttit against ISU and several
, '
'("

"

coUeagues and superiors in the university. His claim was dismissed on summary judgment. We
previously provided to the commission a copyofthe decision by Judge Nye dismissing Dr. Sadid's

case. ",
In his response briet~ the claimant dismisses Judge Nye's decision on the grOtmds that it is not
I,

fina1~
,

.

as a decision on Dr. Sadid's motion for reconsideration was pending. However, Judge Nye
.,;1.'1'

,

.

issued his decision denying the motion for reconsideration on February 24, the day before the
c\a.imantfiledhis brief. A copy of Judge Nye's decision on motion for reconsideration is attached
~MPLOYER'S REPLY
,'\,,J,
" f
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111e Cl)mmission nlay take notice of this decision, and

consider it to be conclusive 011 this issue.
6. eotaclusion.
'J

11

,

In summary> the evidence is undisputed that Dr. Sadid' s tennination was for cause. The evidence
is undisputed that the misconduct ciled by ISU as cause for termination actually occurred. Dr. Sadid
adm~ts.th~t the
,

behavior occurred but attempts to claim that it does not amount to misconduct, and

t.;':{",'..

,

further alleges that the "cause" stated by ISU is a pretext jor rctaJiatjon agains.1 him for a exercising

his Ilrst amendment rights. He presents no evidence beyond his own opini<.m that his tennination

was in ,t:utal iati on for his letters and editori€lls. The courts of Idaho have already dismissed his
retaliation claim on the grounds that he has no evidence to support it.
Thus, what is left before the Commission is to detemlinc whether the undisputed behavior of

Dr. S'aChd as shown by the evidence in the record is sufficient misconduct to be considered adequate
causefQ,rt~nnination.

ISU respectfuHy submits that Dr. Sadid would have been fired fclTcause fnml

any workplace in which he exhibited similar behaviors.
For this reason, ISU respectfully requests that the Commission overturn the decision of the

appealS'Jofficet at th~ Department of Labor granting unemployment benefits to the claimant.

r--

RESPEC1FULLY SUBMITTED this :>

,

"\,

~~C\....

day of~lttMY, 2010.

RACINE, OLSON, NYE. BUDGE
& BAILEY. CHARTERED
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STATE OF IDAI-IO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

HABIB SADID, an individual.
Plaintiff:
v.

IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY,
RQBI~,RTWHARTON,

JAY KUNZE,

MICHAEL JAY LINEBERRY,
.
MANOOCHEHR. ZOGHI, RICHARD
JA'COBSEN, GARY OLSON,
AUTHUR VAILAS and JOHN/JANE
D~E$ I through X, whose true
identities are presently unknown,

DECISION ON MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

Defendants.
This matter came before this Court for bearing on Plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration on January 19, 2010. The Plaintiff was represented by Sam
Johnson.
, 1\.'.,',

The Defendants were represented by lohn Bailey.

The Plaintiffs

Motion was filed in response to the Court's Decision on Motion for

~ummary

.Jj'1

Judgment dated December 18, 2009.

The Court reviewed the documents

submitted bytbe parties, heard oral argument from counsel, reviewed its Decision
'. Oll.,~ummary ,udgment and due to the complexity of the case, the Court took the
"

i

matter under advisement.

Now, the Court issues its decision denying the

Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration.
CV-2008-3942-0C
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DISCUSSION

1.

Whether the Court Applied the Proper Test. The Plaintiff asks the Court to

apply Karr v. Bermeos%, 142 Idaho 444, 129 PJd 88 (2005) rather than Gareett!

v.''Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425(2006) when analyzing protected speech. Plaintiff

asserts that the Idaho Supreme Court in Karr uses the Pickering balancing test~
:which better applies to academic settings. See, Plaintiffs Memorandum On
~

\~

Motion for Reconsideration; p. 4. It should be noted that Karr did not involve an

a~~emic setting in that Maureen Karr was employed by the Idaho State Veterans
Home as a registered nurse manager.. Karr wrote a letter to the Governor of Idaho
a.s,~g

him to address issues at the. Veterans Home.

She was disciplined for

writing the letter. Ultimately, Kerr was terminated from employment. She filed
suit alleging that she was wrongfully tenninated. The District Court granted all
defendantS sunllnary judgment on the basis that the letter was not protected speech

under the First ft-mendment and th~re was no evidence linking ilie termination to
.tn,e letter. The Supreme Court affumed the summary judgment.
liIJ.'r>

,

I

""

In light of Plaintiffs request; the Court has reviewed Karr, in which the

Id.~o Supreme Court stated tile four part test for determining whether speech is
c6nstitutionally protected as follows:
First, the court must detennine whether the speech lUay be fairly
characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern.
If the speech' involves a matter of public concern, then the court must
balance the employee's interest in commenting upon matters of
public concern against the interest of the state, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it perfonns. ·Third, if
C'V':'2008-3942'-OC
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the balance favors the employee, then the employee must show that
the protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the
detrimental employment decision. Finally, if the employee meets
this burden, then the employer is required to show by a
preponderance of the evidenc~ that it would have reached the same
decision even in the absence of protected speech.
Frtdenstine v. Idaho Dept. of Admin., 133 Idaho 188, 194, 983 P.2d
842, 848 (1999) (quoting Lockhart v. Staie, Dept. of Fish & Game,
127 Idaho 546~ 552, 903 P.2d 135, 141 (Ct.App.l995)). "[T]he
inquiry into the protective status of the speech is one of Jaw. not
fact." Lubcke v. Boise City/Ada County Hous. Auth, '124 Idaho 450,
466~ 860. P.2d 653, 668 (1993) (quoting Connick v_ Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 148 n. 7, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1691, 75 LEd.2d 708; 720 (1983»;
see also Farnworth v. Femling, 125 Idaho 283, 286) 869 P.2d 1378,
1382 (1994). The Court makes an independent judgment of whether
the statement is of public concern taking into consideration the
manner, tiple and place in which it was made. Lockhart, 127 Idaho at
552, 903 P.2d at 141 (citing ConniCk, 461 U.S. at 152, 103 S,Ct. at
1692-93, 75 L.Ed.2d at 723).

'\

K '

"Whether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern
must be; determined. by the content; form, and cOntext of a given
statement, as revealed by the who'le record." ConniCk, 461 U.S. at
147-48, 103 S.Ct. at 1690-91, 75 L.Ed.. 2d at 720-21. TIlis
determination turns on the nature of the employee's speech-whether
it concerns matters involving political, social or other concerns to the
communitY. Gardner 1J. Evans~ 110 Idaho 925, 933, 719 P.2d 1185,
1193 (1986) (citing Connick; 461 U.S. at 146. 103 S.Ct at 1689-90,
75 L.Ed.2d at 719-20). A public employee still enjoys First
Amendment protection even if his or her views are expressed
privately. Givhan v. W. Line Consolo Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 41516, 99 S.Ct. 693, 696, 58 L.Ed.2d 619, 624-25 (1979). However,
spe~ch focused on internal policy and personnel grievances does
not implicate 1~le First Amendment. Hyland v. Wonder, 972 F.2d
1129. 1137 (9thCir.l992). (emphasis added)

Karr v. Bermeosolo, 142 Idaho 444 (2005).
",

This Court is not 'convinced that the Karr test is the correct test to apply.
J...

Karr was decided by the Idaho Supreme Court on October 5,2005. Garcetti was
CV-200B-3942-0C
DECISION' ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2006. Although there is some discussion in

Garcetti that "expression related to academic scholarship or classroom
instruction" may be outside the Gareetti test, the Supreme Court expressly did not
carve, out an academia exception. I
e~ception"
'),'1';",

I

'

This Court will not carve out such an

but ,,,ti111eave it to the appellate courts to address. Garcerti is more
,

'

I,

recent thall Karl' and this Court believes it is the test to be applied.
Alternatively. even though the Plaintiff asserts Karr is the correct test to
use'regardlng academics and protected speech, the results are the same. The Court
still, must detennine whether the speech at issue may be characterized as public

.sl'eeph.
,

The Court delved into this discussion in its Decision on Motion for

M,,_,

Summary Judgment. The result in the Court's Decision was that there was no
matter of public concern because the statements Sadid made went to matters
involvingintemal administrative disputes and relayed personal grievances. As

such,! ' Sadid does not pass the first prong of the Karr test and therefore no more
fA,'>i

n.

,

'j-

; . ,

analysis needs to be done under this test.
Furthermore, the Court agrees with the Plaintiff in that 'Tt]he guarantees of
th~ First Amendment 'share a common purpose of assuring freedom of

ct)nununication

~m

matters relating to the functioning of govenll11ent. ", McKinley

v~ City of Eloy, 705 F.2d IllO, 1114 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting Richmond

Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575, 65 L. Ed. 2d 973, 100 S.Ct. 2814
I Additionally, this Court perceives a distinction between speech in the classroom setting and speech in a
newspaper. Even if there is an academia exceptioIl, this Court would not apply it to the facts of tllis case .

.CV·2008..3942.0C
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(1980») (plaintiffs Memo In Supp. Of Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 5-6).
However, the very case that Sadid asks this Court to review clearly states that
"speech focused on internal policy and personnel grievances does not implicate

the.,First Amendment." Karr (citing Hyland), This rule) when applied to the
fio,dings from the Court's earlier decision, again results in the Court holding that
'l);!I'

. , . '

,

the Plaintiffs argument of protected speech does not rise to the level of
implicating the First Amendment protections because it was personal and not
public.

2.'

Multiple letters. Plc;tintiff argues that the Court focused on only two letters

he wrote to the newspaper when the Court held that Plaintiffs speech was not
protected speech. While the Court only referenced two letters in the recitation of

fa~ts, the Court's holding was that all of the challenged speech was made by a
public employee rather than a private citizen. Additionally, it is the Court's
h~!4iDg ~at n~:>ne
"

,

Instead~
,!

of the challenged speech was "a matter of public concern."
'j

the Court determined that all of the speech dealt with "individual personal

Ii

disputes and grievances," The Court's intent was to apply this holding to all of
Professor Sadid's expressions of record.
3•.,

l3.reach of Contract: Plaintiffs Argument of Failure to Complete

Evaluations. Plaintiff asked the Court to reconsider the contract claim as he
"',;"

asserts that the Court committed error in reaching its conclusion that annual

evaluaticms of a tenured professor are not required. Sadid's argument relies on
C\i'!'2008.. 3942...0C
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. ,

the "section of the Handbook favorable to Plaintiff which on its face compels the
annual evaluation of 'each faculty member in that department.,.'" See, Plaintiffs
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration. p, 7. Sadid asserts that
the"annual evaluations cited in the handbook in section (B)(I) are a separate
responsjbility to the periodic tenure evaluations that should be done every five
years cited in (B)(7).2 After reconSidering and reviewing the file and arguments,

th~'Court again fmds that the language of the handbook is clear and unambiguous
andi,thererore it again applies (B)(7) as the relevant provision for the evaluation
re~~itements o~ a

tenured faculty.

Furthermore, Plaintiff contends that he has not received a performance
evaluation since 1999, and therefore when following the five year rule of (B)(7)
the hext evaluation is due in 2004. Plaintiff asserts that 111e evaluations during that
tim~. were not 90P1pleted.~

However, in Exhibit A, attached to Defendant's

Memorandum in Opposition of Reconsideration, the copies of the evaluations
show that evaluations were done for 2000 (signed by Sadid), 2003 (evaluation

completed but not delivered to Sadid due to a "contentious situation"), 2005 (copy
of evaluation sent to Sadid), 2006 (signed by Sadid) and 2007 (signed by Sadid).
2 :sciili."Ofthe h~dbo~i, citations are found in the FACULTY ISTAFF HANDBOOK under Part 4. Section
. IV.
3 ~ jts Decision on Motion for SUlJ:!lllaJY Jlldgltlent" the Court fO'UJld mar the Statute of Limitations bars any
alleg~r! bre~ occun'ing n+orc i:h.an five years prior to the filing of the Complaint. 'The Court reaffirms this
fmding and therefore considers only tbose alleged breaches that took place after 2003. In Defendant's
Exhibit A, attached to the Defendant'S memorandum in Opposition of Reconsideration, copies of the
eval\l~o1l5 for JIilluar.Y 2006 - December 2006 and January 2007 - December 2007 are both signed and
datad by the Plaintiff. this shows that evaluations were completed within a 5 year span from 2003 to 2008,
and ultimately eliminates the breach of contract claim by the Plaintiff.

C:V~~,908-394~·qC

'
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The,efore, the Court ,finds that the. Plaintiffs contentions are misleading as
evaluations were completed at least withIn five years of each other. The Court,
"'A

therefore, reiterates that there was no breach of contract by the Defendant and its

deci~ion is affirrned.
Redress of Grievances.
J\.l~~ellt

The Decision on the Motion for Summary

issued by this Court was I'against the Amended Complaint and against

all defendants." Decision, p. 4. The Court recognizes that Plaintiff filed this
action on September 29.2008 and that he petitioned for redress of his grievances.

rl~ Court also'recognizesthe Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants have continued
to;,x:ctaliate agai.n,st him after the flling of this claim. That is One of the reasons he
filed a Motion to Amend Complaint on August 27, 2009. The Decision on
"t.

,"

"

I

i

'

Swnmary Judgment deals only with those allegations of retaliation that come
~: i .

before August 27.2009.
CONCLUSION

"The Court has reconsidered the issues raised by Plaintiff. Based upon the
; .,

~"

'

,

•

r

'"

above discussion, the Court stands by its prior decision. Therefore, the Plaintiff s
Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.

1'1'18 SO ORDERED.
, DATED: February 24,2010.

~-=::
District Judge

.01

1,"/,
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John C. Lynn, ISB No. 1548
776 E. Riverside Drive, Ste. 200
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 685-2333
Facsimile: (208) 429-1925
Attorneys for Claimant

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
JUDICIAL DIVISION, IDOL APPEALS
HABIB SADID,
SSN:
Claimant,
v.

DOCKET NUMBER: 1777-2010

IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY,
Employer

MOTION TO STRIKE EMPLOYER'S
REPLY BRIEF ON CLAIM FOR
REVIEW

and
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

COMES NOW Claimant, by and through his attorney, Sam Johnson of the law
firm of Johnson & Monteleone, L.L.P., and hereby moves to strike the "EMPLOYER'S

REPLY BRIEF ON CLAIM FOR REVIEW", filed by counsel for the Employer, on or
about March 5,2010.

MOTION TO STRIKE EMPLOYER'S REPLY BRIEF ON CLAIM FOR REVIEW - 1

THIS MOTION is made and based upon the grounds that Rule 5 of the Rules of
Appellate Practice and Procedure Under the Idaho Employment Security Law expressly
prohibits the filing of a reply brief. The Rule plainly states, "No reply brief shall be
allowed." (Emphasis added). The Employer here should not be able to gain an unfair
advantage in this proceeding by ignoring the governing rules of procedure and submitting
a "reply brief' in flagrant violation thereof. The act of doing so here by the Employer is
particularly egregious in light of the fact the reply brief contains an abundance of
inaccurate information.
WHEREFORE, Claimant respectfully asks that the "EMPLOYER'S REPLY
BRIEF ON CLAIM FOR REVIEW" be immediately stricken from the record.

DA TED: This ----'"'--_ day of March, 2010.

Sam Jolmson I,
Attorney for Clafmant

MOTION TO STRIKE EMPLOYER'S REPLY BRIEF ON CLAIM FOR REVIEW - 2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING, DELIVERY, OR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION
I CERTIFY that on March 10, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document to be:

o mailed
o hand delivered
o CMIECF Electronic Filing

ittransmitted fax machine
to: (208) 232-6109

John A. Bailey, Jr.
Racine Olson Nye Budge & Bailey, Chtd.
201 E. Center
P. O. Box 1391
Pocatello,ID 83204-1391

Sam\ hnson 1/
Atto~ey for Claimant

MOTION TO STRIKE EMPLOYER'S REPLY BRIEF ON CLAIM FOR REVIEW - 3

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
HABIB SADID,
Claimant,
vs.
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY,
Employer,
and
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

IDOL # 1777-2010

FILE

MAR 15 2010
iNDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 15 day of March, 2010, a true and correct copy of Claimant's
Attorney's Motion to Strike Employer's Reply Brief on Claim for Review, filed March 10,
2010 was served by regular United States mail upon the following:
JOHN A BAILEY JR
RACINE OLSON NYE BUDGE &
BAILYCHTRD
PO BOX 1391
POCATELLO 83204-1391

DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
STATEHOUSE MAIL
317WMAIN ST
BOISE ID 83738

mcs
Cc: SAM JOHNSON
405 SOUTH EIGHTH ST
BOISE ID 83702
JOHN C LYNN
776 E RIVERSIDE DR
EAGLE ID 83616
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

HABIB SADID,
SSN:

,
Claimant,

vs.
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY,
Employer,
and
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

IDOL # 1777-2010
DECISION AND ORDER

F LE D

4 2010
iNDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

Appeal of a Decision granting Claimant unemployment insurance benefits and an Order
denying Employer's request to reopen issued by an Idaho Department of Labor Appeals
Examiner. AFFIRMED in part, and REVERSED in part.

Employer, Idaho State University, appeals the Idaho Department of Labor's ("IDOL" or
"Department") Decision finding Claimant eligible for benefits as well as IDOL's Order denying
Employer's request to reopen the hearing. The Appeals Examiner found in her Decision that
Employer discharged Claimant, but not for misconduct.

Employer failed to appear for the

hearing. On August 8, 2008, Employer submitted a request to re-open the hearing. The Appeals
Examiner denied that request because Employer failed to provide sufficient facts to warrant reopening. Employer appeals the Order to Deny Re-Opening to the Commission. We will address
both that Order and the Decision below.
Employer also specifically requested a new hearing before the Commission, or in the
alternative, to remand back to the Appeals Bureau. (Employer's Claim for Review, filed January
19,2010; Employer's Reply to Memorandum in Opposition to Claim for Review, filed January
29,2010). The Commission denied both requests, however the Commission granted the parties
DECISION AND ORDER - 1

parties the opportunity to file briefs regarding the matter. (Order Denying New Hearing and
Setting Briefing Schedule, filed February 9, 2010). Both Employer and Claimant submitted
briefs. (Employer's brief, filed February 22, 2010, Claimant's brief, filed February 25, 2010).
Employer further submitted a reply brief, to which Claimant moved to strike. (Employer's reply
brief, filed March 5, 2010, Claimant's Motion to Strike, filed March 10,2010).
The undersigned Commissioners have conducted a de novo review of the record in
accordance with Idaho Code § 72-1368(7). Super Grade, Inc. v. Idaho Depart. of Commerce and
Labor, 144 Idaho 386, 390, 162 P.3d 765, 769 (2007). The Commission has relied on the audio
recording of the hearing held before the Appeals Examiner on January 5, 2010, along with the
Exhibits [1 through 10] admitted into the record during that proceeding.
Employer's Brief

According to the Commission's February 9, 2010, Order Setting Briefing Schedule,
Employer's brief was due no later than February 19,2010. Employer's brief is date stamped as
"filed" with the Commission on February 22, 2010. Therefore, whether Employer timely filed
its brief with the Commission pursuant to the Rules of Appellate Practice and Procedure under
the Idaho Employment Security Law ("RAPP"), effective as amended March 1, 2009, is at issue.
"Appeals before the Commission are governed by the Rules of Appellate Practice and
Procedure Under the Idaho Employment Security Law." Vernon K. Smith v. Idaho Dept. of
Labor, 148 Idaho 72, 218 P.3d 1133, 1135 (2009). Rule 2 of the RAPP defines "filing" as either
personal delivery, mailing or faxing a document to the Commission. Rule 2(D) further provides
that when faxing, the document must be received by 5:00 p.m. to be considered filed on that
date. Documents filed thereafter are deemed filed on the next business day.

According to the

facsimile time stamp found on the top of Employer's brief, Employer faxed the brief at 5:35p.m.
on Friday, February 19, 2010. (Employer's brief). Because Employer filed its brief after 5:00

DECISION AND ORDER - 2

p.m., it is deemed filed on Monday, February 22, 2010. Employer did not timely file its brief
with the Commission. Employer's brief will not be considered in this decision.
Motion to Strike

Claimant moved to strike Employer's reply brief on the basis that the Commission's rules
expressly forbids reply briefs.

(Claimant's Motion to Strike).

RAPP Rule 5(A) states in

pertinent part that "No reply brief shall be allowed." Therefore, Claimant's Motion to Strike
Employer's reply brief is GRANTED. Since the Commission's rules do not allow reply briefs,
Employer's reply brief will not be considered.
FINDINGS OF FACT

The Commission concurs with and adopts the Findings of Fact set forth in the Appeals
Examiner's Order to Deny Re-Opening. The Commission sets forth additional findings of fact
as follows:
1. Claimant worked for Employer on two occasions. During his last period of
employment, Claimant worked as a full professor from August 1991 until he
was discharged on October 23, 2009. Claimant was suspended on August 4,
2009 pending the University President's ruling on the recommended
termination notice.
2. Claimant had a history of voicing concerns via emails and at faculty meetings.
On April 6, 2009, Claimant received a warning letter from the Chair of the
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering informing Claimant to
raise his concerns via the proper procedure. Claimant was to first discuss the
matter with the Chair of the Department, then to the Dean of the College of
Engineering, then to Employer's upper administration.
3. Employer sent another letter on April 15, 2009, again warning Claimant that
voicing his concerns at faculty and campus-wide meetings and through widely
disbursed emails and communication intended to expose another individual to
public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to impeach his or her integrity or
reputation was not appropriate. The letter, again, reminded Claimant to utilize
proper procedures from raising his concerns.
4. At an April 21, 2009 faculty meeting, Claimant again raised personal matters
and expressed criticism of the administration.
5. Dean Jacobsen issued a Notice of Contemplated Action due to Claimant's
DECISION AND ORDER - 3

continued pattern of behavior.
6. After further review, the University President, Dr. Vailas, discharged
Claimant.
DISCUSSION
Order to Deny Re-Opening

After failing to appear for the hearing conducted by the Appeals Examiner on January 5,
2010, Employer timely requested that the Appeals Examiner re-open the hearing. The Appeals
Examiner denied Employer's request finding that Employer received adequate due process and
had an opportunity to participate in the hearing. The Commission previously dealt with whether
the Order to Deny Re-opening was proper in its February 9, 2010, Order to Deny New Hearing.
The Commission agreed that Employer had received adequate due process and therefore was not
entitled to a new hearing. Therefore, the analysis in the Commission's February 9, 2010 Order
to Deny New Hearing is incorporated herein. Employer was provided adequate due process and
had an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time, in a meaningful place.

The Appeals

Examiner's Order to Deny Re-opening was proper and is AFFIRMED.
Decision of the Appeals Examiner

Claimant worked as a full professor for Employer from August, 1991 until October 23,
2009. Employer discharged Claimant for a myriad of reasons, including insubordination and for
being disruptive and unprofessional.

(Exhibit 5, pp. 19-20).

Due to Claimant's ongoing

behavior, Employer believed that it had adequate cause to discharge Claimant. Employer points
to several emails and letters Claimant sent showing criticism to the administration, as well as
statements made by Claimant at faculty meetings and an awards banquet that Employer contends
were unprofessional and disruptive. Employer's decision to discharge Claimant was based on its
policies which state that discipline is warranted if acts or omissions directly and substantial affect
or impair an employee's performance of his or her profession or assigned duties or the interest of
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the Board; or constitutes conduct that is seriously prejudicial to the University. (Exhibit 5, p.
15). In April, 2009, Employer supplied Claimant with two letters, each stating to use the proper
protocol in expressing his concerns, and that failure to follow the protocol could lead to
discipline. (Exhibit 3, p. 28; Exhibit 4, p. 32). Employer contends that Claimant again expressed
previously raised personal concerns during a staff meeting that had a designated agenda.
Claimant does not dispute that he authored the emails and letters found in the record or
that he made the comments in the staff meeting.

Instead, Claimant denies that his actions

constitute misconduct and maintains that his actions were not disruptive or unprofessional.
(Audio Recording).
Idaho Code § 72-1366(5) provides that a claimant is ineligible for unemployment
insurance benefits if that individual's unemployment resulted from the claimant's discharge for
employment-related misconduct. What constitutes "just cause" in the mind of an employer for
dismissing an employee is not necessarily the legal equivalent of "misconduct" under Idaho's
Employment Security Law. The two issues are separate and distinct. In a discharge, whether the
employer had reasonable grounds for dismissing a claimant is irrelevant. The only concern is
whether the reasons for discharge constituted "misconduct" connected with the claimant's
employment such that the claimant can be denied unemployment benefits. Beaty v. City of
Idaho Falls, 110 Idaho 891, 892, 719 P.2d 1151, 1152 (1986).
The burden of proving misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence falls strictly on
the employer. Appeals Examiner of Idaho Dept. of Labor v. l.R. Simplot Co., 131 Idaho 318,
320, 955 P.2d 1097, 1099 (1998). A "preponderance of the evidence" simply means that when
weighing all of the evidence in the record, the evidence on which the finder of fact relies is more
probably true than not. Edwards v. Independence Services, Inc., 140 Idaho 912, 915, 104 P.3d
954, 957 (2004).
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The Idaho Supreme Court has defined misconduct as a willful, intentional disregard of
the employer's interest; a deliberate violation of the employer's rules; or a disregard of standards
of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of its employees. Gunter v. Magic Valley
Regional Medical Center, 143 Idaho 63, 137 P.3d 450 (2006) (citing Johns v. S. H. Kress &
Company, 78 Idaho 544, 548, 307 P.2d 217, 219 (1957)). In addition, the Court requires the
Commission to consider all three grounds in determining whether misconduct exists. Dietz v.
Minidoka County Highway Dist., 127 Idaho 246, 248, 899 P.2d 956, 958 (1995). We have
carefully considered all three grounds for determining misconduct.
Before analyzing each of the following grounds, the Commission must clarify the hearsay
evidence found in the record.

Employer did not appear at the hearing.

Instead, Employer

supplied a significant amount of correspondence from individuals regarding the alleged adverse
affects of Claimant's criticisms. The written statements made by those other than Claimant are
considered hearsay.

"Hearsay is defined as testimony in court, or written evidence, of a

statement made out of court, the statement being offered as an assertion of the truth of the
matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court
asserter." State v. Woodbury, 127 Idaho 757,759, 905 P.2d 1066, 1068 (Ct.App. 1995).
The Commission holds discretionary power to admit or exclude hearsay evidence. As
stated by the Idaho Supreme Court:
The Commission has the discretionary power to consider any type of reliable
evidence having probative value, even if that evidence is not admissible in a court
of law. Stolle v. Bennett, 144 Idaho 44, 49-50 (2007). The Commission has the
discretion to admit evidence if "it is a type commonly relied upon by prudent
persons in the conduct of their affairs." Id.; I.C. § 67-5251. This does not mean,
however, that the Commission is required to admit such evidence. Rather, the
Commission is given latitude to exclude hearsay evidence.
Higgins v. Larry Miller Subaru-Mitsubishi, 145 Idaho 1, 175 P.3d 163 (2007).
However, hearsay evidence, alone, is insufficient to support findings of fact. Application
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of Citizen Utilities Company, 82 Idaho 208, 214, 351 P.2d 487, 493 (1960). The Commission's
findings must be supported by substantial and competent evidence. Id. at 213, 351 P.2d at 492.
Substantial and competent evidence is defined as "relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept to support a conclusion." Henderson v. Ecclipse Traffic Control and Flaggin Inc.,
147 Idaho 628, 213 P.3 718, 722 (2009).
Employer's hearsay evidence is admitted into the record based on its probative value and
is afforded appropriate weight. Since Employer was absent from the hearing, the information
contained therein provides insights into Employer's arguments. However, because the authors of
the statements and those allegedly adversely affected by Claimant's emails/letters/public
statements did not testifY, that evidence is afforded a lesser degree of weight and persuasion in
the face of sworn testimony provided during the proceeding in direct contradiction to it. The
hearing examiner, as the trier of fact, is entitled to place greater or less weight on any particular
piece of evidence according to its relative credibility. Morgan v. Idaho Dept. of Health and
Welfare, 120 Idaho 6, 8, 813 P.2d 345, 347 (1991). Therefore, to the extent that Employer relies
on written assertions of individuals other than Claimant, those written statements are considered
hearsay and carry less weight than Claimant's assertions.
The analysis proceeds to determine whether Claimant's conduct constitutes misconduct.
Under the "standards-of-behavior" test, the employer must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the claimant's conduct fell below the standard of behavior it expected and that the
employer's expectation was objectively reasonable under the particular circumstances. Harris,
141 Idaho at 4, 105 P.3d at 270. As the Idaho Supreme Court has pointed out, an "employer's
expectations are ordinarily reasonable only where they have been communicated to the
employee." Folks v. Moscow School District No. 281, 129 Idaho 833, 838, 933 P.2d 642, 647
(1997). Therefore, the employer must communicate expectations and duties that do not naturally
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flow from the employment relationship. Pimley v. Best Values, Inc., 132 Idaho 432,974 P.2d 78
(1999).

Notably, there is no requirement that the employer must demonstrate that the

employee's behavior was subjectively willful, intentional, or deliberate in his or her disregard of
the employer's expectations. Welch v. Cowles Publishing Co., 127 Idaho 361, 364, 900 P.2d
1372, 1375 (1995).
Employer contends that Claimant's conduct of openly criticizing the administration in
widely dispersed emails, faculty meetings, and social functions constitutes misconduct.
Employer informed Claimant of the proper protocol to raise his concerns. In an April 6, 2009
letter to Claimant, Employer wrote "In the future, you are directed to follow proper protocol in
expressing your concerns (first to the Chair of the Department of Civil and Environmental
Engineering, then to the Dean of the College of Engineering, then to Idaho State University's
upper administration)." (Exhibit 3, p. 28). Again, in an April 15, 2009 letter, Employer stated
"Y ou should not use such channels as campus-wide meetings, engineering faculty meetings, and
widely-distributed email communications to make negative comments about the performance
and/or character of current and former university staff and employees ... Communications
intended to expose another individual to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to impeach his or
her integrity or reputation are not appropriate. You have previously been counseled to observe
collegiality in the workplace and to follow the protocol of meeting first with your department
chair, next with the dean of engineering, and then, if necessary, with other ISU administrators
regarding your concerns.

Continuing failure to follow these guidelines will be cause for

disciplinary action." (Exhibit 4, p. 32.).
Claimant did not rebut that he received the letters at hearing, and referred to receiving the
letters in his correspondence with Employer. (Exhibit 4, pp. 29-33, Exhibit 10, p. 146). This
information clearly shows that Employer informed Claimant of the proper procedure to express
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his concerns and that making statements that "expose another individual to public hatred,
contempt or ridicule, or to impeach his or her integrity or reputation are not appropriate" and
should not be made in faculty or campus-wide meetings or in widely distributed emails.
Employer's expectation is objectively reasonable under these circumstances. Employer
contends that actions, such as Claimant's, impair or affect the interest of the college and
university by creating a negative and disruptive atmosphere in the college, and that fundraising
efforts are hampered by negative publicity generated by Claimant's criticisms. (Exhibit 7, p. 3).
Employer's concerns are well taken and the adverse affect of openly criticizing administration
can have the above effect. It is important to note that Employer did not forbid Claimant from
raising his concerns. Rather, Employer required Claimant to raise his issues through a certain
procedure.

There is also nothing inherently inappropriate about the procedure required by

Employer, nor does Claimant directly attack the validity of the procedure at hearing. Therefore,
Employer's expectation is reasonable.
Therefore, the analysis turns to whether Claimant's conduct at an April 21, 2010, staff
meeting violated the "standard-of-behavior" expressed and warned of in Employer's previous
letters. Claimant provided a transcribed copy of the meeting for the record. (Exhibit 10, pp. 3647). According to that transcription, at the meeting Claimant stated that the University was
corrupt for 20 years, that the administration is absolutely corrupt, and that nothing has changed
since the University president arrived. (Exhibit 10, p. 38). Further, Claimant told the members
of the meeting that the administrators are lying with bold face, that they have isolated the faculty
and done nothing except when needed. (Exhibit 10, p. 38). Claimant further stated that the
administration refuses to communicate with faculty at all levels and that it is doing whatever it
wants. (Exhibit 10, p. 41). When discussing leadership of the administration, Claimant said that
he had documents to show that those people are unethical and are just "power hungers". (Exhibit
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10, p. 43). They were working to protect their own interest and not the public. Claimant stated
that he truly questioned the integrity and honesty of the administration in the College and the
University. (Exhibit 10, p. 44).
There is little doubt that these statements represent the type of conduct that Employer
warned Claimant of in the April 6 and 15, 2009 letters. Claimant's statements raised personal
concerns and attack members of the administration in a faculty meeting. Employer contends that
the faculty meeting had a set agenda, which did not include Claimant's statements or the subject
matter. (Exhibit 10, p. 11). Employer's expectation was clear that such matters should be raised
through proper channels and not at faculty meetings, the record demonstrates that Claimant's
conduct during the April 21, 2009, faculty meeting fell below Employer's reasonable and
communicated expectation.
This case is analogous to an Idaho Supreme Court case were a claimant continued to
criticize employer and its polices despite the employer's clear directive to express those criticism
in private. Gatherer v. Doyles Wholesale, 111 Idaho 470, 725 P.2d 175 (1986). The claimant in
that case continued to express his criticism vociferously and in front of other employees. Id.,
111 Idaho at 178, 725 P.3d at 473. The Court ruled that the claimant's repeated failure to
comply with the employer's directives was viewed as both an intentional disregard of the
employer's interest and violated the employer's standard of behavior.

Id.

In this case,

Claimant's criticism continued despite Employer's clear warning.
Claimant may argue that his actions did not constitute misconduct and were for the
benefit of the College and faculty. However, Claimant's subjective state of mind for making the
comments is irrelevant. Mattews v. Bucyrus erie co., 101 Idaho 657, 659, 619 P.2d 1110,1112
(1980.). Employer clearly informed Claimant that his critical comments should not be raised at
the faculty meetings.

Because Claimant is ineligible for benefits under the "standards-of-
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behavior" test, it is unnecessary to analyze this matter under the other two grounds. Claimant is
ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits.
CONCLUSION OF LAW

Employer discharged Claimant for employment-related misconduct.
ORDER

Based on the forgoing analysis, the Decision of the Appeals Examiner is REVERSED.
Employer discharged Claimant for employment-related misconduct. This is a final order under
Idaho Code § 72-1368(7).
DATED this

~ day of rY\(L,v c1h

,2010.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

Thomas E. Limbaugh, Commissioner

~D~

Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner
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THE STATE OF IDAHO

HABIB SADID,
Claimant,
vs.
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY,
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IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR,
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)
)
)
)
)
)
)

IDOL #1777-2010

MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

COMES NOW the above-named Claimant, by and through his attorney of record,
JOHN C. LYNN, and hereby moves the COMMISSION to reconsider its DECISION
AND ORDER filed March 24, 2010.

Claimant sincerely believes that two

COMMISSION members who signed this DECISION erred in the findings of fact and
the application of law. This Motion is based on the file herein and the specific factors set
forth below.
As an introduction, the COMMISSION cites the appropriate burden of proof, that
is, "the burden of proving misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence falls strictly on
the employer [citation omitted]. A 'preponderance of evidence' simply means that when
weighing all the evidence in the record, the evidence on which the fmder of facts relies is
more probably true than not [citation omitted]" (DECISION, p. 5).

Moreover, the

COMMISSION recognized that "to the extent that Employer relies on written assertions
of individuals other than Claimant, those written statements are considered hearsay and
carry less weight than Claimant's assertions" (Id. p. 7). With these principals of law in
mind, the COMMISSION should reconsider the evidence upon which its DECISION
rests; this evidence is insufficient to find in favor of the Employer.
First, it is apparent that Claimant's termination is not a typical case. Claimant's
dispute with Idaho State University ("ISU") has been long and contentious. The back
and forth documentation on the issues reflects a "stand-off' on who is right.

For

example, the April 6, 2009 reprimand (Exhibit 3, p. 28), which the COMMISSION holds
as significant in terms of establishing ISU's "standards of behavior", is countered by
Claimant's response (Exhibit 4, p. 5) that Chair Zoghi's accusations are "baseless and
untrue".

In the Exhibit, Claimant further admits that he has questioned the Dean's
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honesty as did "a majority of the faculty". Further, Claimant questioned the timing, and
therefore the sincerity, of Zoghi's letter. The allegations in Zoghi's letter dated April 6,
2009, were not mentioned in Claimant's April 7th Annual Evaluation, which raises further
concerns about credibility.
It is highly unfair and contrary to the principles of law mentioned above to
assume that Zoghi's April 6th Reprimand is true on this record. Likewise, ISU's April
15, 2009 letter signed by Dean Jacobsen (Exhibit 4, p. 32) is countered by Claimant's
April 27, 2009 letter to Provost Olson (Exhibit 10, 1). Claimant refutes the accusations as
baseless, untrue and fabrications:
I have served ISU for twenty-two years and performed my job very well, earned
many awards, and more importantly, I have earned the respect of all of my
students, the majority of my colleagues, and my fellow community members. I
work hard to promote ISU and its engineering program everywhere, and my
contributions to ISU and the community are well recognized and documented.
Dr. Jacobsen's accusations are totally baseless and untrue. I would hope that Dr.
Jacobsen would offer some evidence to prove his claim; I would certainly like the
opportunity to respond. I have never threatened anybody in my life, here on
campus or elsewhere. Dr. Jacobsen's comments are false accusations and
fabrications designed and systematically executed in an attempt to provide me and
create misleading evidence of supposed wrong-doings and violations on my part.
I believe his actions are retribution for my ongoing lawsuit against ISU.

(Id. at p. 2)
There is no way the COMMISSION can resolve the opposing assertions in the
extensive documentation involving the many issues in this case without a full-blown
evidentiary hearing. ISU's "evidence" establishing any wrongdoing here is all hearsay;
it is of questionable admissibility and value because Claimant has not had a chance in
these proceedings to challenge these assertions through cross-examination of witnesses.
Unresolved issues of fact do not run to the favor ofthe Employer.
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Second, the termination arose out of an academic setting which has its own
peculiar form of management

a two-headed management system where tenured faculty

have considerable say in how the University is

fUll.

Concurrent with that power is the

concept of "academic freedom" which provides considerable protection to faculty against
reprisals from administrators who, from time to time, must face criticism from faculty.
Here, Professor Sadid, a senior and highly accomplished member of the faculty
(see Exhibit 10, C, Attach. 6), has been critical of ISU administrators. For example, on
November 16, 2008, Claimant published an article entitled "Are President Vailas'
Policies Damaging ISU?" (Exhibit 10, D). The following is an excerpt from this article:
Many professors are choosing to leave ISU because they realize there is no future
here under V ailas' "blood from tumips" policies.
Vailas speaks of "honesty, transparency and accountability" without holding
administrators accountable for their actions and performance. Hiring unqualified
faculty for administrative positions, Vailas continues shuffling his fishing and
hunting buddies from one administrative position to another.
Claimant had published many such articles over the years and eventually filed suit
against ISU claiming retaliation over the expression of First Amendment "protected
speech"l, including the above quote. Claimant contends that his termination is the direct
result of "protected speech" and his lawsuit. The COMMISSION cannot determine, and
should not detennine, these issues, but it surely must have occurred to the
COMMISSION that a retaliatory motive may be behind the termination.

If so, then

ISU's sincerity over enforcement of what it presents as fair "standards of behavior"
would be seen in a much different light. Claimant testified at length as to his "protected
speech" and the role he believes it played in his termination. This testimony has gone

1 Judge Nye's decision holding the Claimant's speech was unprotected is now on appeal to Idaho Supreme
Court.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 4

unrebutted. Whether Claimant was the victim of retaliation is, at most, an unresolved
issue. Again, this undeveloped and unresolved issue is not a factor that runs in favor of
the Employer.
Third, the chain of events leading to Claimant's termination is highly unusual and
suspect. No doubt the COMMISSION is aware that for state employees, the Notice of
Contemplated Action ("NOCA") is designed to give the employee an opportunity to rebut
specific charges supporting discipline. Here, the May 6, 2009 NOCA (Exhibit 5, p. 22)
sets out one specific accusation of wrongdoing

the April 21, 2009 faculty/staffmeeting.

The NOCA was followed by Claimant's July 17, 2009 meeting (Exhibit 10, C, Attach. 2)
with Dean Jacobsen to discuss, supposedly, all the accusations against him.
ISU policy states:
2. General
This process is intended to assure a faculty member of his or her rights and
to resolve the grievance at the earliest moment possible. Therefore, the
following procedures include:
a.

an informal opportunity to meet with the person(s) making
the recommendation of suspension, dismissal or termination
to present any reasons, evidence, or information in
mitigation or opposition to the recommendation before a
recommendation is sent to the President recommending a
faculty member's suspension, dismissal, or termination, and

b.

a formal grievance procedure.
(Exhibit 5, p. 7)

The two April reprimands and the April 21 st meeting were the specific issues
discussed at the July 17th meeting (a written outline of this discussion is set forth in
Exhibit 10, C, p. 10). The COMMISSION should take note of the many mitigating
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factors identified with respect to Claimant's conduct at the April 21 5t faculty/staff
meeting. Notwithstanding the intent and scope of this July 17th meeting, the August 3,
2009 Recommendation of Dismissal (Exhibit 5, p. 15) is far more expansive, a tactic ISU
employed during the subsequent grievance hearing when additional, new charges were
advanced. The scope of ISU's claims greatly expanded from the events in April of 2009
to what ISU's attorney now claims is a "long history of unprofessional, disruptive and
insubordinate behavior by Dr. Sadid" (EMPLOYER'S BRIEF ON CLAIM FOR
REVIEW, p. 8).
The COMMISSION should be troubled by this obvious piling on of charges,
particularly when no ISU witness has offered any explanation for this deviation from
policy. Based on this record, it would be fair to conclude that ISU did not believe that
Claimant's conduct at the April 21, 2009 meeting was egregious enough to justify
termination.

Claimant's conduct at the meeting was not at all inappropriate given the

context of the meeting, the subjects discussed and the tradition of frank discussion.
Fourth, the COMMISSION's [mdings of fact with respect to Claimant's conduct
at the April 21, 2009 faculty/staff meeting is based on a synopsis (Exhibit 10, pp. 33-44)
submitted by Claimant; this is not a transcription of the actual meeting. This is double
hearsay and highly unreliable. The actual recording of tIns meeting is found on the CD
marked as Exhibit 10, F2. To do justice to this case, the COMMISSION should listen to
the actual comments made by all attendees. It was a lengthy meeting (two hours plus).
It was not a pubic meeting, but a private faculty/staff meeting.

Dean Jacobsen and

2 This CD has two types offiles - a standard audio recording of the Claimant's April 21 sl faculty/staff
meeting and eleven compressed MSV files of Claimant's Grievance hearing. Some computers may need to
download the free software "sonyplugin129" from the internet to allow a Windows Media Player to play
the MSV files.
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Provost Olson encouraged the participants to speak their mind.

In fact, the Provost

openly disparaged the Board of Education (minute 43l Professor Ellis told the Dean
personally that he had major issues with his performance (minute 30). Claimant, on more
than one occasion, expressed the idea that faculty and the administration should work
together. Dean Jacobsen ends the meeting with a comment to the effect that he was not
offended by anything said and he appreciated candor.
The point here is that the COMMISSION, if it truly believes that Claimant's
conduct at this meeting was somehow below the "standards of behavior" expected by
ISU should digest the actual meeting and the context from which it arose

a university

faculty/staff meeting - an open, candid and frank discussion, including the criticism of
Dean Jacobsen by Claimant and others which is typical of this type of meeting.
Fifth and most important, the COMMISSION has completely disregarded the
most significant aspect of the evidence presented.

After the Recommendation of

Termination was issued, Claimant initiated a formal grievance (Exhibit 10, C, pp. 3-6)
under ISU policy (Exhibit 5, pp. 3-14). This is the "due process" protection afforded ISU
tenured faculty.

Under the policies, ISU must establish "adequate cause" which is

defined rather expansively (Exhibit 5, p. 3). Moreover, the "adequate cause" standard is
a lower standard that the "misconduct" standard under Idaho's Employment Security
Law.
The gnevance process under ISU policy is extensive.

An Appeals Board is

established, composed of five persons: a Chair appointed by the Faculty Senate, two
appointees from the Executive Committee of the Faculty Senate, one faculty appointee by
the Provost and one faculty appointee by the grievant. A formal hearing is held (Exhibit
3

The time scale may differ depending on the player.
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5, p. 11). In this case, the hearing consumed several days of testimony; witnesses were
sworn under oath and the parties were represented by counsel. All of the myriad of
allegations against Claimant were addressed ad nauseum, including Claimant's conduct
at the April 21, 2009 meeting. The entire proceeding was tape-recorded and has been
presented to the COMMISSION as part of Exhibit 10, F, as mentioned above. It is by far
the best evidence to discern whether Claimant's conduct at the April 21, 2009 meeting, or
any other alleged misconduct, suffices for purposes of "misconduct" as contemplated by
these proceedings.
The COMMISSION might want to review the testimony of tenured Professor
Ellis who was present at the April 21 st faculty/staff meeting4 . Professor Ellis testified that
in ten (10) years, he never witnessed Claimant threaten anyone.

With respect to

Claimant's conduct at the April 21 st meeting, he did not believe Claimant was
unprofessional

other university meetings had been a lot more contentious and these

meetings were supposed to be open and frank. He recalled the remark by Dean Jacobsen
that the meeting had been good.
The COMMISSION should also review the testimony of Professor Delehante,
former Chairman of the Faculty Senates.

Professor Delehante testified about the

importance of professors speaking the truth as he or she sees it. He testified about the
importance of "academic freedom".

Part of a professor's service obligation to a

university is to criticize the administration. Heated discussions with strong language are
commonplace in the academic setting. Professor Delehante specifically testified that

4
5

"Grievance 4th B" at 1: 11 :50.
"Grievance 5th A" at 41 :00.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 8

accusations by faculty to the effect that administrators are "incompetent" or are
"destroying the university" are protected by "academic freedom".
The Appeals Board findings are set out in Exhibit 9, p. 4. Four of the five
Appeals Board members "found that sufficient evidence has not been presented to justify
termination .... " (The lone dissenter was the Provost's appointee). Noteworthy in these
findings is the following comment:
Furthermore, a significant factor influencing the decision was the majority's
belief that due process was not followed. In view of the gravity of the
recommended action, the majority found the absence of required documentation
disturbing.
(Id.)
The ISU Faculty Senate followed these findings with a Resolution dated October
26, 2009, in complete support of Claimant and expressed in the strongest of terms:
Whereas: Dr. Habib Sadid, ISU Professor of Engineering, ISU Distinguished
Teacher, ISU Distinguished Award recipient, ISU research-active scholar and 22year member of the ISU faculty has reported to the faculty the findings of the
Faculty Grievance Appeals Board.
Whereas: The Faculty Grievance Appeals Board, a panel of ISU faculty peers
duly selected using long-established principles and procedures to provide
reasoned judgment, has found the dismissal actions against Dr. Sadid to be
without merit.
WHEREAS: The recommendation for and pursuit of dismissal action against Dr.
Sadid calls into question the administrative judgment regarding due process of
ISU Provost Dr. Gary A. Olson and ISU College of Engineering Dean Dr.
Richard Jacobsen, and has resulted in highly uncomplimentary depictions of ISU
in the national higher education process.
Be it Resolved: The Ida.ho State University Faculty Senate, in the strongest
possible terms, requests and expects that ISU President Dr. Arthur C. Vailas
concur with the Faculty Grievance Appeals Board [mdings and restore Dr. Sadid
to his position as Professor of Engineering with all due rights and responsibilities.
(Exhibit 9, p. 5)
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Despite the above findings from the Appeal Board and the resultant Resolution
from the Faculty Senate, President Vailas terminated Claimant anyway. Nothing in these
proceedings explains or sheds light on this peculiar happenstance

President Vialas

turned ISU policy and process on its head. Given the principles of law to be applied
here, the fact that the best evidence before the COMMISSION runs in favor of the
Claimant should not be ignored.
The COMMISSION need not resolve whether Claimant has been systematically
set up to fail with phony and pretextual reprimands or whether ISU has acted in good
faith. What is important to recognize here is that this case is complex and will need to be
resolved in the courts. The COMMISSION should be mindful of the limitations of its
process and should not focus too narrowly on one event, the April 21, 2009 meeting, for
the simple reason the voluminous hearsay record before it suggests that Claimanfs
termination was flawed. Moreover, the COMMISSION has ignored or glossed over the
most important evidence before it. Further, no witness has testified on behalf of ISU
whereas Claimant, on the other hand, has testified and made an effort to describe the
history and context from which the termination arose.
The credibility of ISU is more relevant to a fair determination than anyone
alleged transgression, particularly when all have already been reviewed in exhausting
detail. Claimant encourages the COMMISSION to respect the burden of proof when
difficult and underdeveloped cases corne before it. When there is doubt, it must run to
the favor of the employee rather than the employer for obvious reasons. The Appeals
Examiner recognized the limitations of this process as well as the burden of proof. The
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COMMISSION should reconsider its DECISION in light of the true nature of the
evidence here.

DATED This /l..--day of April, 2010.

J9¥N C . LYNN

~orney

jI

for Claimant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this

~day

of April, 2010, I served a true and

correct copy of the foregoing document, by depositing the same in the US Mail, postage
prepaid, to the following:
John A. Bailey
Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge & Bailey, Chtd.
P. O. Box 1391
Pocatello, ID 83204
Deputy Attorney General
State of Idaho
Idaho Dept. of Labor
317 W. Main S1..
Boise, ID 83735

Jf)P
-17 /vvl C:...J/p/r

JOHN c. LYNN
. Attorney for Claimant

[/1
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W. MARCUS W. NYE
RANDALL C. BUDGE

RACINE OLSON NYE BUDGE Be BAILEY
CHARTERED

JOHN A. BAILEY, JR.

BOISE OFFICE
201 EAST CENTER STREET

JOHN R. GOODELL
JOHN B. INGELSTROM

POST OFFICE BOX 1391
POCATELLO, IDAHO 83204-1391

DANIEL C. GREEN
BRENT O. ROCHE

101 SOUTH CAPITOL
BOULEVARD. SUITE 208
BOISE, IDAHO 83702TELEPHONE: (208) 395-0011
FACSIMILE: (208) 433-0167

KIRK B. HADLEY
FRED J. LEWIS

TELEPHONE (208) 232-6101
FACSIMILE 1208) 232-6109

ERIC L. OLSEN
CONRAD J. AIKEN

IDAHO FALLS OFFICE
477 SHOUP AVENUE

RICHARD A. HEARN, M.D.
LANE V. ERICKSON
FREDERICK J. HAHN, III

SUITE 107
POST OFFICE BOX 50698

www.racinelaw.net

IDAHO FALLS, 10 83405
TELEPHONE: (208) 528-6101
FACSIMILE: (208) 528-6109

DAVID E. ALEXANDER
PATRICK N. GEORGE
SCOTT J. SMITH
JOSHUA O. JOHNSON

ALL OFFICES TOLL FREE
(S77) 232-6101

STEPHENJ.MUHONEN
CANDICE M. MCHUGH
CAROL TIPPI VOLYN

SENDER'S E-MAIL ADDREss:jab@racinelaw.net

BRENT L. WHITING
JONATHON S. BYINGTON

LOUIS F. RACINE (1917-2005)
WILLIAM O. OLSON, OF COUNSEL

DAVE BAGLEY
THOMAS J. BUDGE
JONATHAN M. VOLYN
MARK A. SHAFFER
JASON E. FLAIG

April 20, 2010

IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
Attn: Unemployment Appeals
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0041

Re:

Sadid v. ISU and IDOL
IDOL Docket No:
1777-2010
Claimant:
Habib Sadid
Employer:
Idaho State University

Dear Clerk:
Enclosed please find Employer's Objection to Claimant's Motion For Reconsideration
for filing in the above-captioned matter.
Thank you for your assistance and if you have any questions, please give me a call.
Best regards,

vt~

A. BAILEY, JR.

JAB:mc
Enclosure
c:
Tracey K. Rolfsen
Sam Johnson
John C. Lynn

John A. Bailey, Jr. (ISB No. 2619)
RACmE, OLSON,NYE, BUDGE
& BAILEY, CHARTERED
P .O. Box 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391
Telephone: (208) 232-6101
Fax: (208) 232-6109

Attorney for Employer Idaho State University

APPEAL,S BlJREAU
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR .
HABIB SADID,
SSN:
Claimant,
vs.
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY,
Employer,
and
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Docket No. 1777-2010

EMPLOYER'S OBJECTION TO
CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERA TION

CONiES NO\\! the Ernployer, Idaho State University, by and through its counsel

of!ecord ~

John A. Bailey, Jr., of the firm of Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge & Bailey, Chtd., and hereby states its
OBJECTION to the Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration filed April 12, 2010.
The comments to Rule 8(F) of the Rules of Appellate Practice and Procedure state that a
request for reconsideration "will ask that the Commission reexamine its decision in light of additional
legal arguments, a change in law, a misinterpretation oflaw, or an argument or aspect of the case that
was overlooked." The comment explains that requests based on legal arguments that could have been
EMPLOYER'S OBJECTION TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION-1

raised earlier will not ordinarily be granted; "the intent is ... to discourage reactionary motions when
a party merely wants the Commission to "think it over again.""
The Claimant's Motion to Reconsider merely asks the Commission to "think it over again."
The Commission's decision on March 24 finding that the Claimant was terminated for cause applied
the proper legal standard to the appropriate facts in the record. 1 Claimant confuses the standard
applicable before the Commission - whether the termination was the result of employment-related
misconduct - with that applicable in the administrative appeals of his termination, and with the
standard applicable in his wrongful termination, retaliation and other claims now pending in the
courts. The Claimant concedes that the Commission cannot decide whether there was "just cause"
for termination under University rules, or whether the University may be liable in the various claims
he has filed in Court actions. But he then argues that the Commission therefore cannot determine
whether Claimant's misconduct resulted in his termination. As the Commission found in its decision
in this case, what constitutes 'Just cause" for dismissing an employee is not necessarily the legal
equivalent of "misconduct" under the employment security law. Thus, there is no reason why the
Commission cannot decide this issue.
The Claimant's Motion points the Commission toward evidence which is not relevant to the
Commission's resolution of this case, because it deals with whether his termination was proper under
University procedural rules, or constituted unlawful retaliation for his First Amendment activities.
This evidence, which was fully before the Commission at the time of its March 24, 2010 decision,

1 The Commission made its decision without reference to the brief filed by the Employer,
holding that it was not timely because it was filed by fax after 5 p.m. on the date it was due. The
Employer respectfully brings to the Commission's attention that the brief was also filed by mail on
the same day, which, under Rule 2(D)(2), is timely filing.

EMPLOYER'S OBJECTION TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 2

does not change the core of relevant facts on which the Commission properly focused. They are:
1.

The Claimant was warned on April 9 and April 15, 2009, to follow the chain of
command in voicing complaints, and not to attack administrators in widelydisseminated emails and meetings.

2.

On April 21, 2009, in a faculty meeting that was open to persons outside of the
Department of Engineering, the Claimant made numerous scurrilous attacks on
administrators, accusing them of criminal activity, waste, fraud and abuse, among
other things.

3.

The Employer's expectations as to Claimant's behavior were objectively reasonable
and clearly communicated to the Claimant, and the Claimant's behavior on April 21
fell below those standards.

The Motion to Reconsider does not address these facts, but merely attempts to obscure them
by raising other issues. In any event, these other issues go primarily to the Claimant's subjective state
of mind, which is irrelevant in this proceeding. Matthews v. Bucyrus Erie Co., 101 Idaho 657, 659
(1980).
The Motion to Reconsider raises no argument not addressed below, and should be denied.
DATED this

/0

day of April, 2010.
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE
& BAILEY, CHARTERED

EMPLOYER'S OBJECTION TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 3

CERTIFICA TE OF SERVICE

'2!2.-

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of April, 2010, I served a true and correct copy
of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows:
/

Sam Johnson
JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, L.L.P.
405 South Eighth Street, Suite 250
Boise, Idaho 83702
(Attorney for Claimant)

[ v{
]
]
]

U. S. Mail
Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 947-2424

rl """'-:/TT
J
L. S 1\".f",;1
Postage Prepaid
] Hand Delivery
] Overnight Mail
] Facsimile (208) 429-1925
...l .lU..i..l

ATTORNEY AT LAW
776 E. Riverside Drive, Suite 200
Eagle, Idaho 83616
(Attorney for Claimant)
Tracey K. Rolfsen
Deputy Attorney General
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
3 17 W. Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83735
(Attorney for Idaho Department of Labor)

[~U. S. Mail
]
]
]

Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 334-6125
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RONALDO A. COULTER
Camacho Mendoza Coulter Law Group, PLLC
Attorney at Law
776 E. Riverside Drive, Suite 200
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 672 6112
Facsimile: (208) 672 6114
Idaho State Bar No.3850
ron@cmc1awgroup.com
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RECEIVED

fRDUSTRIA! COMMISSION

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

HABIB SADID
Claimant,
vs.
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY
Employer/Respondent

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Respondent

)
)
)
) NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL
)
AND SUBSTITUTION OF
)
COUNSEL
)
)
)
)
Docket No: 1777-2010
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Claimant, Habib Sadid has retained the law firm of
Camacho Mendoza Coulter Law Group, PLLC to substitute as counsel for Sam Johnson. The
following specific attorneys of the law firm of Camacho Mendoza Coulter Law Group, PLLC
will serve as counsel for Plaintiff in this matter:
RONALDO A. COULTER
Camacho Mendoza Coulter Law Group, PLLC
Attorney at Law
776 E. Riverside Drive, Suite 200
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 672 6112
Facsimile: (208) 672 6114
ron@cmclawgroup.com
NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL

ROBERT G. TEFFETELLER
Camacho Mendoza Coulter Law Group, PLLC
Attorney at Law
776 E. Riverside Drive, Suite 200
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 672 6112
Facsimile: (208) 672 6114
ron@cmc1awgroup.com
1

All notices, pleading and other correspondence in the above-captioned matter should hereafter be
directed to Ronaldo A. Coulter and Robert G. Teffeteller at the above address

Dated_ _&---'!--'~"'-'-!-"-~-=-",-""IO,---

c;;d~~
RA. (Ron) Coulter
Substituting Attorney

Dated_ _S-----'--f_"5--L'_1-_O_(_O_ _

(l~
Robert G. Teffeteller

Dated

01uly)

I

)[J (()

NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL
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\0J

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this '5A..Ji day of May, 2010, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to:

JOHN A. BAILEY, JR
RACINE, OLSON, NYE,BUDGE & BAILEY
CHTD.
PO BOX 1391
POCATELLO, IDAHO 83701

(x) U.S. Mail
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Certified Mail, Return Receipt
Requested
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
( ) Statehouse Mail

DEPUTY ATTORNEYS GENERAL
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
317 WEST MAIN STREET
BOISE, IDAHO 83735

(x) U.S. Mail
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Certified Mail, Return Receipt
Requested
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
( ) Statehouse Mail

NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

HABIB SADID,
SSN:
Claimant,
v.

IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY,
Employer,
and
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

IDOL # 1777-2010

ORDER GRANTING
RECONSIDERATION

Request for reconsideration of a decision from the Industrial Commission finding
Claimant was ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits. The request for reconsideration is
GRANTED.

Claimant filed a Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Idaho Code §72-1368(7).
Claimant requests reconsideration of the Idaho Industrial Commission's Decision and Order filed
on March 24, 2010. The Commission affirmed in part and reversed in part the Decision issued
by an Appeals Examiner with the Idaho Department of Labor ("Department"). The Commission
found that Employer discharged Claimant for employment-related misconduct, thus Claimant
was ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits.
Claimant worked for Employer as a full professor from August 1991 until he was
discharged on October 23, 2009. Claimant has a history of voicing concerns via emails and at
faculty meetings. In April 2009 Claimant received a two warning letters from the Chair of the
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering informing Claimant to raise his concerns
via the proper procedure.

Claimant was to first discuss the matter with the Chair of the

Department, then to the Dean of the College of Engineering, then to Employer's upper
administration. At an April 21, 2009 faculty meeting, Claimant again raised personal matters

ORDER GRANTING RECONSIDERATION
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and expressed criticism of the University's administration. Dean Jacobsen issued a Notice of
Contemplated Action, and after further review, University President Vailas discharged Claimant.
The Commission decision found that Employer communicated it standard of behavior to
Claimant and his conduct fell below that standard when, at a the April 21, 2009, staff meeting,
Claimant stated that the University was corrupt for 20 years, that the administration is absolutely
corrupt, and that the administrators are lying with bold face.

(Exhibit 10, p. 38).

The

Commission concluded that Employer discharged Claimant for employment-related misconduct
and Claimant was ineligible for benefits.
Claimant requests reconsideration of the Commission's conclusions because Claimant's
comments were not inappropriate given the context of the April 21, 2009 meeting. Claimant
argues that the audio recording of the April 21, 2009 meeting (Exhibit 10F), when taken as a
whole, demonstrates that Claimant's comments were accepted and appreciated by Employer's
administration.
Employer's objection to Claimant's motion avers that Claimant is merely asking the
Commission to reweigh the evidence and arguments already presented to the Commission.
Employer also argues that while its brief in the underlying matter was faxed after 5 p.m. on the
date it was due, February 19,2010, the brief was also mailed on the same day, which means the
briefwas timely filed.
For clarification and to assist with future filings, the Commission will briefly address
Employer's argument regarding its untimely brief. The envelope in which Employer's brief
arrived has a meter mark dated February 19, 2010, but does not contain a postmark from the
United States Postal Service.
determination of filing time.

The Commission does not recognize meter marks for the
As noted by the Idaho Supreme Court, the "USPS routinely

postmarks stamped mail but does not ordinary postmark metered mail. Thus, to ensure that a

ORDER GRANTING RECONSIDERATION
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mailed notice is timely filed, parties should always either use an ordinary postage stamp to
ensure that the mailpiece is postmarked or specifically request a postmark on metered mail to
verify when the USPS took custody." Smith v. Idaho Department of Labor, 148 Idaho 72, 218,
222 P.3d 1133, 1137 (2009). In the absence of a postmark the Commission looks to the date
Employer's briefwas filed by the Commission, which was February 22,2010. Thus, both filings
of Employer's brief were untimely.
In the motion for reconsideration, Claimant argues that when the CD of the April 21,
2009 meeting is reviewed it is apparent that Claimant's remarks were not inappropriate.
Claimant states that the audio recording was admitted as a CD labeled Exhibit 1OF. In reviewing
the record, the Commission finds that Exhibit 10F is a single piece of paper. The lower right
hand comer is labeled Exhibit 10, page 130, Exhibit F. The Commission file does not include
any audio recording, other than the recording of the hearing held by the Appeals Examiner.
Reviewing the file as whole, it appears that Exhibit 10F was an audio recording that was
admitted into evidence by the Appeals Examiner at the hearing. To further the interests of
justice, Claimant is entitled to a review of the complete evidentiary record. The Commission
will review a duplicate CD as was designated as Exhibit 10F by the Appeals Examiner.
ORDER
I

Claimant's request for reconsideration is GRANTED. Claimant will serve a duplicate
CD, Exhibit 10F, on the Commission and all interested parties within 10 days of the date of this
order. The Commission will not accept any additional evidence other than a duplicate of Exhibit
10F.
II

The parties will be afforded an opportunity to argue their positions based on Exhibit 10F

ORDER GRANTING RECONSIDERATION
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in briefs. Claimant will have 10 days from the date of service of Exhibit 10F to file a brief.
Employer and IDOL will have 7 days from the date Claimant's brief is filed in which to file
responding briefs, if they so choose.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
~
DATED this
day

v:J

of_~_--:---"r---!.._
STRIAL COMMISSION

(Thomas E. Umbaugh,

mm ss ner

~~)~

Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner

istai\t Commission Secretary
'\.

.~

"\

CERTIFICATE OF

SER'rCE~«~

o~;;'

\,
her:Jy certify that on the Sday
true and correct copy of
ORD~~NTING RECONSIDERATION w~s ~~ed by regular United States Mail upon:
\

JOHN A BAILEY JR
PO BOX 1391
POCATELLO ID 83204-1391
RONALDO COULTER
776 E RNERSIDE DR, SUITE 200
EAGLE ID 83616

\

DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
STATE HOUSE MAIL
317 W MAIN STREET
BOISE ID 83735

mcs
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RONALDO A. COULTER
Camacho Mendoza Coulter Law Group, PLLC
Attorney at Law
776 E. Riverside Drive, Suite 200
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 672 6112
Facsimile: (208) 672 6114
Idaho State Bar No.3850
ron@cmclawgroup.com
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Attorneys for Plaintiff

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
)
)

HABIB SADID,
SSN:
,

~
Claimant,

v.
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY,
Employer,
and
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

IDOL # 1777-2010
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF
DUPLICATE CD, EXHIBIT
10F, PURSUANT TO ORDER
GRANTING
RECONSIDERATION

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Claimant, Habib Sadid, through his counsel, R.A.
(Ron) Coulter, of the law firm of Camacho Mendoza Coulter Law Group, PLLC, has served a
duplicate CD, Exhibit 10F, on the Commission and all interested parties pursuant to the ORDER
GRANTING RECONSIDERATION (attached hereto as Exhibit A) dated August 5, 2010. For
the convenience of the parties, and in case the parties use multiple operating systems or hardware
platforms, the file on the disc is in four formats: MP3, WAV, WMA, and AAC.
Because the ORDER GRANTING RECONSIDERATION requires service of the CD
within ten (10) days of the date of the order (August 5, 2010), and because ten (10) days from the

NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DUPLICATE CD, EXHIBIT 10F, PURSUANT
TO ORDER GRANTING RECONSIDERATION
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date of the order is August 15,2010, a Sunday, Claimant is serving this CD on all interested
parties by mail, or personal delivery to the Commission by 5:00 p.m., on Monday, August 16,
2010, pursuant to the following administrative rule of the Department of Labor:
... In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by the
Employment Security Law or the Claims for Wages Act, the day of the act,
event, or default is not to be included. Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays shall
be counted during the period unless the last day of the period is a Saturday,
Sunday, or legal holiday in which event the period shall not expire until the
next business day following the Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.
See ID ADC 09.01.06.090
Claimant also notes that if the day of the ORDER GRANTING RECONSIDERATION,
August 5,2010, is excluded, ten (10) days from the 6th of August, 2010 is the 16th of August,
which is a Monday. By either computation, the serving of the CD on Monday, August 16,2010
is timely.

Dated this 16 th day of August, 2010.

~Lt
R.A. (Ron) Coulter
Attorney for Claimant

NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DUPLICATE CD, EXHIBIT 10F, PURSUANT
TO ORDER GRANTING RECONSIDERATION
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 16th day of August, 2010, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to:

IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
700 S. CLEARWATER LANE
BOISE, ID 83712
P.O. BOX 83720
BOISE, ID 83720-0041

( ) U.S. Mail
(x) Hand Delivery
( ) Certified Mail, Return Receipt
Requested
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
( ) Statehouse Mail

JOHN A. BAILEY, JR
(x) U.S. Mail
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE & BAILEY ( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Certified Mail, Return Receipt
CHTD.
Requested
PO BOX 1391
( ) Overnight Mail
POCATELLO, ID 83204-1391
( ) Facsimile
( ) Statehouse Mail

DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
STATE HOUSE MAIL
317 WEST MAIN STREET
BOISE, ID 83735

(x) U.S. Mail
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Certified Mail, Return Receipt
Requested
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
( ) Statehouse Mail

R.A. (Ron) Coulter

NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DUPLICATE CD, EXHIBIT 10F, PURSUANT
TO ORDER GRANTING RECONSIDERATION
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
HABIB SADID,
SSN:
Claimant,
v.
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY,
Employer,
and
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)

IDOL # 1777-2010

ORDER GRANTING
RECONSIDERATION

F I LED

AUG 05 2010
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

Request for reconsideration of a decision from the Industrial Commission finding
Claimant was ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits. The request for reconsideration is

GRANTED.
Claimant filed a Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Idaho Code §72-1368(7).
Claimant requests reconsideration of the Idaho Industrial Commission's Decision and Order filed
on March 24,2010. The Commission affirmed in part and reversed in part the Decision issued
by an Appeals Examiner with the Idaho Department of Labor ("Department"). The Commission
found that Employer discharged Claimant for employment-related misconduct, thus Claimant
was ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits.
Claimant worked for Employer as a full professor from August 1991 until he was
discharged on October 23, 2009. Claimant has a history of voicing concerns via emails and at
faculty meetings. In April 2009 Claimant received a two warning letters from the Chair of the
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering informing Claimant to raise his concerns
via the proper procedure.

Claimant was to first discuss the matter with the Chair of the

Department, then to the Dean of the College of Engineering,then to Employer's upper
administration. At an. April 21, 2009 faculty meeting, Claimant again raised personal matters

EXHIBIT
ORDER GRANTING RECONSIDERATION
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and expressed criticism of the University's administration. Dean Jacobsen issued a Notice of
Contemplated Action, and after further review, University President Vailas discharged Claimant.
The Commission decision found that Employer communicated it standard of behavior to
Claimant and his conduct fell below that standard when, at a the April 21, 2009, staff meeting,
Claimant stated that the University was corrupt for 20 years, that the administration is absolutely
corrupt, and that the administrators are lying with bold face.

(Exhibit 10, p. 38).

The

Commission concluded that Employer discharged Claimant for employment-related misconduct
and Claimant was ineligible for benefits.
Claimant requests reconsideration of the Commission's conclusions because Claimant's
comments were not inappropriate given the context of the April 21, 2009 meeting. Claimant
argues that the audio recording of the April 21, 2009 meeting (Exhibit lOF), when taken as a
whole, demonstrates that Claimant's comments were accepted and appreciated by Employer's
administration.
Employer's objection to Claimant's motion avers that Claimant is merely asking the
Commission to reweigh the evidence and arguments already presented to the Commission.
Employer also argues that while its brief in the underlying matter was faxed after 5 p.m. on the
date it was due, February 19, 2010, the briefwas also mailed on the same day, which means the
briefwas timely filed.
For clarification and to assist with future filings, the Commission will briefly address
Employer's argument regarding its untimely brief. The envelope in which Employer's brief
arrived has a meter mark dated February 19, 2010, but does not contain a postmark from the
United States Postal Service.

The Commission does not recognize meter marks for the

determination of filing time. ' As noted by the Idaho Supreme Court, the "USPS routinely
postmarks stamped mail but does not ordinary postmark metered mail. Thus, to ensure that a

ORDER GRANTING RECONSIDERATION
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mailed notice is timely filed, parties should always either use an ordinary postage stamp to
ensure that the mailpiece is postmarked or specifically request a postmark on metered mail to
verify when the USPS took custody." Smith v. Idaho Department of Labor, 148 Idaho 72,218,
222 P.3d 1133, 1137 (2009). In the absence of a postmark the Commission looks to the date
Employer's briefwas filed by the Commission, which was February 22,2010. Thus, both filings
of Employer's brief were untimely.
In the motion for reconsideration, Claimant argues that when the CD of the April 21,
2009 meeting is reviewed it is apparent that Claimant's remarks were not inappropriate.
Claimant states that the audio recording was admitted as a CD labeled Exhibit IOF. In reviewing
the record, the Commission finds that Exhibit 10F is a single piece of paper. The lower right
hand comer is labeled Exhibit 10, page 130, Exhibit F. The Commission file does not include
any audio recording, other than the recording of the hearing held by the Appeals Examiner.
Reviewing the file as whole, it appears that Exhibit 10F was an audio recording that was
admitted into evidence by the Appeals Examiner at the hearing.

To further the interests of

justice, Claimant is entitled to a review of the complete evidentiary record. The Commission
will review a duplicate CD as was designated as Exhibit 10F by the Appeals Ex~er.

ORDER
I
Claimant's request for reconsideration is GRANTED. Claimant will serve a duplicate
CD, Exhibit lOF, on the Commission and all interested parties within 10 days of the date of this
order. The Commission will not accept any additional evidence other than a duplicate of Exhibit
lOF.

IT
The parties will be afforded an opportunity to argue their positions based on Exhibit 10F
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in briefs. Claimant will have 10 days from the date of service of Exhibit 10F to file a brief.
Employer and IDOL will have 7 days from the date Claimant's brief is filed in which to file
responding briefs, if they so choose.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

/..

DATED this

fQ

day

of_-,--_~_-,--" 2010.

/j)~d
Ch~~

R.D. Maynard,

Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner
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CLAIMANT'S BRIEF ON
EXHIBIT 10F PERMITTED
BY ORDER GRANTING
RECONSIDERATION OF
AUGUST 5, 2010

COMES NOW, The Claimant Habib Sadid (Professor Sadid), by and through his
attorney of record, Ronaldo A. Coulter, and hereby submits his BRIEF ON EXHIBIT 10F
PERMITTED BY ORDER GRANTING RECONSIDERATION OF AUGUST 5, 2010.
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I
PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 30,2009, Claimant was discharged from his position at Idaho State
University and subsequently applied for unemployment benefits for which he was initially found
ineligible on December 3, 2009. On December 16,2009, Claimant appealed the original
determination. On January 5, 2010, a telephonic hearing was held to consider the appeal of
Claimant. On January 6, 2010, the Appeals Examiner reversed the original decision of
ineligibility of December 3,2009 and fOlmd that the Employer failed to meet its burden of
proving by a preponderance of evidence that the Claimant had engaged in inappropriate conduct.
On or about January 13,2010, the Employer through counsel requested that the hearing be reopened as through no fault of the Employer, the Employer did not receive adequate notice of the
telephonic hearing and therefore was unable to participate. On or about the January 14,2010, the
Appeals Bureau denied the request to re-open the hearing.
On or about January 18, 2010, the Employer through counsel tiled an appeal to the
Industrial Commission requesting that the Commission hold a hearing that would allow the
Employer to provide evidence which it could not previously provide at the telephonic hearing or
remand the case to the Appeals Examiner for an additional hearing and decision. On February 9,
2010, the Employer's request for a hearing before the Idaho Industrial Commission was denied.
Additionally, the Employer's request that the matter be remanded to the Appeals Bureau for a
new hearing was denied. However, The Industrial Commission ruled that the Employer's timely
appeal of the Appeals Examiner's decision denying a rehearing was also an appeal of the
decision of the Appeals Examiner's decision aw-arding unemployment benefits to Claimant.
Wherefore, the Industrial Commission infonned the parties that it would review de novo the
evidentiary record established during the Appeals Examiner's hearing of January 5, 2010,
CLAIMANT'S BRIEF ON EXHIBIT 10F
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established a briefing schedule for both the Claimant and the Employer, and infol1ned both
parties that it would then issue a new decision upon completion of its review.
On March 24, 2010, the Industrial Commission issued its Decision and Order wherein it
reversed the decision of the Appeals Examiner awarding unemployment benefits to Claimant and
declared that Claimant was discharged for employment-related misconduct and therefore
ineligible for unemployment benefits. On April 12, 2010, Claimant through counsel filed a
Motion for Reconsideration with the Industrial Commission. On or about April 20, 2010, the
Employer filed an Employer's Objection to the Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration.
On August 5,2010, the Industrial Commission issued an Order Granting
Reconsideration. It further ordered the Claimant to serve a duplicate CD, Exhibit 10F on the
Commission and all interested parties within ten (10) days of the date of the Order. It further
ordered that Claimant would be afforded the opportunity to submit a brief arguing its position
based on 10F; said brief to be submitted ten (10) days from the date of service of Exhibit 1OF.

Lastly, the order called for the Employer and IDOL, if they desired, to submit briefs within seven
(7) days of the date Claimant's brief was filed with the Industrial Commission. On August 16,

2010, Exhibit 10F was filed with the Industrial Commission, mailed to the IDOL and mailed to
the Employer.
II
THE APPLICABLE LAW

In reviewing Exhibit 10F, the Industrial Commission must decide whether the speech and
conduct of Professor Sadid at the April 21, 2009, Idaho State University, College of Engineering
Faculty Staff meeting constituted "misconduct" connected with the Claimant's employment such
that the Claimant can be denied unemployment benefits. Beaty v. City of Idaho Falls, 110 Idaho
CLAIMANT'S BRIEF ON EXHIBIT 10F
SUBMITTED PER ORDER GRANTING RECONSIDERA nON
OF AUGUST 5, 2010

Page 3 of23

891,892,719 P.2d 1151, 1152 (1986)." See March 24,2010 Decision and Order of the
Industrial Commission pages 5 and 6:

The burden of proving misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence falls strictly on
the employer. Appeals Examiner a/Idaho Dept. a/Labor v. JR .. Simplot Co., 131 Idaho
318,320,955 P.2d 1097,1099 (1998) The Idaho Supreme Court has defined misconduct
as a willful, intentional disregard of the employer's interest; a deliberate violation of the
employer's rules; or a disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has a right
to expect of its employees. Gunter v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 143 Idaho
63, 137 P.3d 450 (2006) (citing Johns v. S. H Kress & Company, 78 Idaho 544, 548, 307
P.2d 217, 219 (1957)).

See March 24, 2010 Decision and Order of the Industrial Commission pages 5 and 6

III
ANALYSIS

A. Professor Sadid Did Not Engage In Any Conduct Sufficient to Disqualify Him From
Receiving Unemployment Benefits As His Conduct was not a Willful, Intentional
Disregard Of His Employer's Interest; A Deliberate Violation Of The Employer's
Rules; Nor A Disregard Of Standards Of Behavior Which The Employer Had A
Right To Expect Of Him

1.

During the April 21, 2009 College of Engineering Faculty Staff Meeting, Professor
Sadid's Conduct Was Not In Disregard of the Standards of Behavior that His
Employer Had a Right to Expect. His Employer Expressed Satisfaction With The
Meeting, The Employer Expressed That the Employer Valued the Discussion, And
the Employer Publicly Expressed That the Employer Was Not Offended By Any
Remarks Made During the Meeting

The Notice of Contemplated Action (NOCA) (Exhibit 5., pp. 22-23) specifically alleges
that during the April 21 , 2009 College of Engineering F acuItyIStaff meeting (hereinafter referred
to as "the Meeting" or Meeting), Professor Sadid was unprofessional, non-collegial, disruptive
and insubordinate. The NOCA also alleged that Professor Sadid disrupted the meeting in
complete disregard of an established agenda by "revisiting personnel issues" that had previously
CLAIMANT'S BRIEF ON EXHIBIT 10F
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been discussed in an appropriate forum and by labeling some Idaho State University personnel as
corrupt and untruthful. Lastly, the NOCA alleged that Professor Sadid falsely asselied that for
the past fourteen years that the Deans of the College of Engineering had failed in their fund
raising responsibilities, as the Deans were deficient in their duties to raise funds for College of
Engineering.
An analysis ofthe 2 hour, 17 minute 21 second Meeting reveals that Professor Sadid's

behavior was that which could be expected of an academic fully engaged in discussions of
significant importance in a precise, forceful, professional and appropriate manner. A recording
of this meeting is captured on Exhibit 10F. A review of this recording reveals that Professor
Sadid was candid but in no way was Professor Sadid engaged in behavior that could be described
as misconduct especially in light of the academic setting in which the meeting took place.
Preliminarily, it must be noted that the first paIi of the published agenda was a Call to Order aI1d
Introduction and Comments by the Provost, Gary Olson. (Exhibit A) Rather than following the
established agenda, it is clear from listening to Exhibit 10F that Professor Sadid did not disregard
the established agenda; rather, it was Dean Jacobsen who departed from the agenda and began an
earnest discussion of the Faculty Workload Policy. What follows is an analysis of relevant
sections of the recording where Professor Sadid and others are engaged in discussions in the
meeting. For ease of identification, the specific place on the recording is marked in bold: 1

Recording: 3:20 -13:34 sec.
In a discussion prior to the arrival of Provost Olson, Dr. Jacobsen initiates a discourse
1 The annotations used to mark segments of the recording are as follows: 3:20 -13:34 would indicate that the
relevant segment of the recording begins at 3 minutes and 20 seconds into the recording and ends at 13 minutes and
34 seconds into the recording; 1: 12:59 - 1:21 :26 would indicate that the relevant segment of the recording begins at
1 hour, 12 minutes, and 59 seconds into the recording and ends at 1 hour, 21 minutes, and 26 seconds into the
recording.
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regarding the Faculty Workload Policy and how it must be addressed throughout the
University and specifically within the College of Engineering. At a point during this
discourse, Professor Sadid, in a very civil tone, questioned the metrics that would be
involved in determining the faculty workload specifically, what metrics would be used to
determine the research value of faculty members. It is clear that Dr. Jacobsen was
somewhat fmstrated by Professor Sadid's question and follow-up question and he
specifically asks other Chairs present in the meeting to join in the discussion. At this
point, Dr. George Imel, Chair of the Department ofNuc1ear Engineering joins in the
discussion with Professor Sadid. It is clear from listening to the recording that this issue
was important to both parties. However, both parties were engaged, Dr. George Imel
being louder, more argumentative, and more aggressive than Professor Sadid. It is
important to note that Dean Jacobsen actually agreed that the present ad hoc method
needed to be addressed and metrics established; thus agreeing with the argument set forth
by Professor Sadid.

Recording: 13:59 -17:50
In a continuation of the discussion of Faculty Workload Policy specifically in the College
of Engineering, Dr. Sadid tries to discuss the specifics of an evaluation that he received
from Dr. Zoghi. Professor Sadid' s point was that \vithout the establishment of a
standardized metrics based system. there did not exist an accurate way to judge a faculty
member's performance. Dr. Jacobsen informs Professor Sadid that a discussion of a
specific faculty member's evaluation is not a proper subject for an open discussion.
However, Professor Sadid disagrees with Dr. Jacobsen but does so in a civil tone and
provides his rationale. From the recording, one can hear an attendee ask that the
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discussion move toward a general discussion of a topic of common impOli to the college
and not dwell on a single person's issue, Professor Sadid remarked that it is a concem of
everyone especially in light of the lack of communication between the College of
Engineering Chair and the faculty. At one point, Professor Sadid asked for a show of
hands as to who in the room believed they had effective communications with the Chair
of the College of Engineering. From the recording, it can be surmised that Professor
Sadid only saw two people raise their hands. At all times, Professor Sadid's speech was
appropriate and there is nothing to indicate that his behavior was a disruption to the
meeting.

Recording: 23:24 - 25:17
Professor Sadid questions the workload criteria and mentions that this has been a problem
for the last three years. Professor Sadid again questions the metrics especially, when an
administrator tells the faculty that they have exceeded the expectations but there are no
metrics. Professor Sadid asked what is the administration doing and questions the
commitment of the Dean and the Chairs especially in light of his raising questions for
three years.

Recording: 28:50 - 29:40
Provost Olson opens the floor for questions. A faculty member other than Professor Sadid
prefaces a question to Provost Olson openly calling into question the perfonnance of
Dean Jacobsen and raising the issue of whether or not a dean, especially a part-time dean
is really needed in the College of Engineering. Indeed, this faculty member said to
Provost Olson, "I have some major issues with the perfonnance of our Dean." Provost
Olson jokingly said that he thought that when he came in he heard Professor Sadid say
that they could do away with deans. Professor Sadid points out that this is true. He states
Page 7 of23
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that in two years he has not noticed that the Dean had taken responsibility for anything.
Therefore, and based on that history, the necessity of a dean should be questioned.

Recording: 34:50 - 38:09
Professor Sadid in an exchange with Provost Olson asked if there would be
communications with the faculty from his office. Provost Olson responded that he had
just said that there would be. Professor Sadid then states that Idaho State University had a
long cormpt history prior to the an-ivaI of Dr. Vail as. Professor Sadid stated that with Dr.
Vailas' arrival that he expected change. However, Professor Sadid commented that the
present administration would lie with bold face and was not honest with faculty. Dr.
Olson was not offended by the question and cited his experience at the University of
South Florida. It was Dr. Olson's opinion that Dr. Vailas has instituted measures to
address issues raised by Professor Sadid to make them viable and more transparent.

Recording: 41:28 - 44:06 Discussion on the Budget Process Provost Disparages
Idaho State Board of Education
An unidentified faculty member (first name Ken) questioned the budget process and
insinuated that Dean Jacobsen had kept the process a secret. Dean Jacobsen wanted to
address the question but Dr. Olson stepped in and informed the faculty member that Dean
Jacobsen did not have access to the budget. The Provost went on to explain how the
process worked. The Provost expressed his dismay with the entire budget process.
Provost Olson then went on to disparage the members of the Idaho State Board of
Education. He remarked that he thought that he had already been in the state with the
"wackiest" state government with Blagojevich but this really ta1<.es the cake; and, if you
think that this is really something, you ought to go to the State Board of Education
meeting. That is really like going to the circus. "I don't think any of those people have
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ever gone to college much less getting a degree in one."

Recording: 59: 16 -1:01:24
There was a discussion regarding investment in education that the uni versity needed to
do. Dr. Olson brought up the government of Thailand's commitment to education and
what that country has done to improve its academic infrastructure. Professor Sadid
commented that no government would provide funds tlu'ough a grant if the government
did not see that the institution was already committed to the investment. Professor Sadid
then asked Dr. Olson if Dr. Olson would hold his Deans responsible for raising funds.
Dr. Olson replied, "I will yep". Professor Sadid said that in the past fourteen years, there
have been two deans neither of which raised any funds. Professor Sadid then rhetorically
asked how can we survive in this economy? Dr. Olson replied to Professor Sadid by
saying "Y ou are right" and then remarked that we all have a role to play.

Recording: 1:12:59 -1:21:26
An Administrative Assistant becomes very emotional, almost to the point of tears in
describing the treatment that she has received at the College of Engineering by its faculty.
She says she would leave if she could. Professor Sadid comments that her problem is a
result ofpoor leadership. The Administrative Assistant does not agree with Professor
Sadid that it is all leadership. This exchange provokes a response from Dean Jacobsen in
which Dean Jacobsen questions the basis of why Professor Sadid maintains that
every1hing that is wrong at the College of Education is based on the failure of leadership.
Professor Sadid, without being disrespectful replies to the Dean's inquiry and several
times in his reply stated that he had proof to back up his position. Dean Jacobsen
comments that he is not interested in any of Professor Sadid's proof. Dean Jacobsen
Page 9 of23
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suggests that they [faculty and administration] had to work together if they were going to
be successful. Professor Sadid asks of Dean Jacobsen if the Dean was working with them.
Dean Jacobsen replied that he was and Professor Sadid responded that he was not. Dean
Jacobsen responded that he did not agree with Professor Sadid's assessment.

Recording: 1 :45:50 - 1:46:45 Dean Jacobsen Not Offended by Comments and
Desires an Open Dialogue
In speaking to his belief that the members of the College of Engineering had to work
together, Dr. Jacobsen stated, "I'm not offended by anything you have said" in speaking
to the whole group. Dr. Jacobsen goes on to say that "I have never learned to properly
have the ability to hold a grudge" Further Dean Jacobsen said, "I like it when people
open up and say what they think." At that point Professor Sadid chimed in and mentioned
two words: "Honesty" and "Integrity" to which Dr. Jacobsen replied "that goes without
saying Habib."

Recording: 1:54:50 -1:55:00 Dr. Jacobsen Expresses that the Meeting was Good
"Don't Hate This Type of Discussion."
A faculty member "Bruce" asked to speak on a topic and in so doing remarked that the
meeting had been contentious. Dr. Jacobsen responded. "Its been a good meeting. Don't
hate this kind of discussion. It is not a bad idea to do this."

In summary, an analysis of Exhibit lOF reveals the following:
•

That Professor Sadid was engaged in the discussions during the meeting where he felt
that he had input. In addressing Dean Jacobsen, Provost Dr. Gary Olson and others,
Professor Sadid was very direct, very professional and not intimidated by others during
this discourse.
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•

That other faculty members beside Professor Sadid questioned the performance of the
administration and specifically questioned the performance of Dean Jacobsen. Indeed,
one faculty member suggested that given the part-time status of the Dean Jacobsen,
perhaps the College of Engineering would be better off without a Dean. Still another
faculty member, relying on false information, questioned Dean Jacobsen's honesty and
the lack of transparency in the budget process.

•

That Provost Dr. Gary Olson was not offended by Professor Sadid's descriptive words
used to underscore Professor Sadid's observation that the present administration of Dr.
Vailas' lacked in integrity and was not truthful.

•

That Provost Dr. Gary Olson in this public forum, in language that would be considered
insubordinate and disrespectful in a non-academic forum, lambasted the Idaho State
Board of Education and its members and in very strong and disparaging remarks likened
the members to uneducated circus performers.

•

That a member of the faculty was very upset with how she had been personally treated
and expressed a strong personal desire to leave the employ of the Employer.

•

That Dean Jacobsen publicly maintained that he was not offended by anything anyone
had said at the Meeting; and of significant importance Dean Jacobsen states publicly that
"Its been a good meeting. Don't hate this kind of discussion. It is not a bad idea to do
this."

2.

Professor Sadid's Speech Is Constitutionally Protected And Therefore Must Fall
Within the Standards Of Behavior Which The Employer Had A Right To Expect Of
Him

In the Employer's claim for review, the Employer relied heavily upon the grant of
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Summary Judgment issued in litigation involving the Employer and Professor on December 18,
2009. In that case, the Sixth District Court, Judge David C. Nye, presiding, held that as a matter
of law that there was no First Amendment protection for Claimant who was speaking not on
matters of public concern, nor was Claimant speaking as private citizen on matters of public
concern. Fruiher, even if the Claimant was speaking on a matter of public concern as a private
citizen, the speech of Claimant was not a motivating factor for the decision to take any action
complained of in Claimant's complaint. The Employer represented to the Industrial Commission
that:
"Accordingly, it has already been determined in a court oflaw that Dr. Sadid had no
"right" to make statements for which he has suffered retaliation, and that it was not a
cause for the adverse employment actions, including his terminatioll." (Emphasis added)
(Employer's Brief on Claim for Review., p. 4)

The above quote is a misstatement of fact. It is clear from Exhibit B herein that the court
considered the original complaint and the amended complaint. The amended complaint also
added new factual allegations but retained the same three counts: "(1) count one - claim under
§I983; (2) count two - breach of employment contact and implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing; and (3) count three - defamation." (Exhibit B., p. 3 01'25) An examination of Exhibit C,
the amended complaint, reveals that the complaint was not amended to include an additional
count ohwongful termination. Such a claim would have been an impossibility as Claimant was
discharged October 30,2009 and Exhibit C was filed on October 15,2009. Further, the Court's
decision was narrowly tailored to the allegations made in the complaint and concluded that the
"Defendants [Employer] are entitled to summary judgment on each count in the Amended
Complaint." (Exhibit B., p. 24 of 25) Claimant has yet to file a wrongful termination claim.
Therefore, the Industrial Commission cannot rely on a decision made by the Corui where the
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decision is not applicable to a cause of action that may be filed in the future. The Employer's
brief failed to inform the Industrial Commission that on January 19, 20lO, the Court specifically
refused to address the fact that the District Court failed to address a critical component of
Claimant's case specifically leaving the decision in the hands of the Appellate Courts. This
critical component is that all of Claimant's speech was done within the confines of academic
freedom and therefore is protected speech as guaranteed by the 1st and 14th Amendments of the
U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Sections 9 and 10 of the Constitution of the State of Idaho.
In the case of Garcetti v Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410,126 S.Ct. 1951 (2006), the court held that
when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, they are not speaking
as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their
communications from employer discipline. In response to a concern expressed by Justice Souter
in his dissenting opinion regarding the impact of the majority's holding on teachings of "public
university professors" and academic freedoms found in "public colleges and universities," the
majority qualified its holding, adding the following caveat:
Justice Souter suggests today's decision may have important ramifications for academic
freedom at least as a constitutional value ... There is some argument that expressions
related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional
constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court's customary
employee speech jurisprudence. We need not, and for that reason do not, decide whether
the analysis we conduct today would apply in the same manner to a case involving
speech related to scholarship or teaching. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. at 425
(Emphasis added)
In writing this caveat, the Court reserved for later resolution the intricate and complex question
of the First Amendment protections applied to academic speech.
Although aware of the Supreme Court's caveat concerning the academic freedom
exception to the Garcetti analysis, the District Court deliberately chose not to address the issue
of academic freedom and how Professors Sadid's speech was either protected or not protected by
CLAIMANT'S BRIEF ON EXHIBIT 10F
Page 13 of23
SUBMITTED PER ORDER GRANTING RECONSIDERATION
OF AUGUST 5, 2010

\rto

the First Amendment's application to academic freedom. Instead, the trial judge abdicated this
responsibility to the Idaho Appellate Courts:

THE COURT: What I hear you telling me basically
14 is -- if I pare it all down on that first issue - is
15 that I should not apply Garcetti to the facts of this
16 case because that case was not intended to extend to the
17 academic world. If that's true, isn't that a decision
18 better left to the appellate courts if we're going to
19 carve out an exception there?
20 MR. JOHNSON: Well, perhaps, your Honor. But I
21 believe the way that we would ask the Court to review
22 that and analyze that is at least give us a ruling on
23 it. Let us know where this Court stands on that
24 particular issue.
25 THE COURT: So you have something to appeal. (Tr. p. 112)2
10 THE COURT: And I understand that. Had they said11 if they were clear enough to say that this case does not
12 extend to the academic situation, then we've got the
13 exception. I'm not sure that I read their language as
14 being clear enough for me as a district judge. (Tr. p. 113)

In Kerr v. Hurd, 694 F.Supp.2d 817, 2010 WL 890638 (S.D.Ohio, March 15,2010), the
trial court at the federal level did not hesitate to let the parties know where it stood on a question
of significant importance to the academic community. Dr. Elton Kerr (Kerr) was a medical
professor hired by the entity, University Medical Services (UMSA). As an employee ofUSMA,
Dr. Kerr also taught at Wright State School of Medicine (WS-SOM). His immediate supervisor
was Dr. William W. Hurd (Hurd). Kerr was eventually terminated from his contract with USMA,
which had the effect of terminating his employment with the medical school. Kerr brought a
cause of action alleging, among other claims, a violation of his First Amendment rights in that he
had been retaliated against for advocating the use of "vaginal delivery over unnecessary cesarian
The relevant pages of the transcript on Claimant/Plaintiff's Motion For Reconsideration heard on January 19,2010
is included herein as Exhibit D.

2
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procedures, and lecturing WS-SOM residents on the proper and appropriate use of forceps" Id.
at 10. Hurd argued that Garcetti was applicable to this case, as Kerr was not speaking as a
private citizen as the speech concerning vaginal delivery was made in Kerr's role as an employee
instructing students at WS-SOM; therefore, the school had a right to regulate Kerr's speech.
Acknowledging Hurd's assertion that the United States Supreme Court did not decide whether

Garcetti applied to speech cases arising in an academic environment, in the absence of a United
States Supreme Court, or Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision to the contrary, the court was
bound by precedene. However the court, in performing its duty at the federal trial level, went
on to state the following:
Even without the binding precedent, this Court would find an academic exception to
Garcetti. Recognizing an academic freedom exception to the Garcetti analysis is
important to protecting First Amendment values. Universities should be the active
trading floors in the marketplace of ideas. Public universities should be no different from
private universities in that respect. At least where, as here, the expressed views are well
within the range of accepted medical opinion, they should certainly receive First
Amendment protection, particularly at the university level. See Justice Souter's dissent in
Garcetti, citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 87 S.Ct. 675, 17 L.Ed.2d 629
(1967). The disastrous impact on Soviet agriculture from Stalin's enforcement of Lysenko
biology orthodoxy stand as a strong counterexample to those who would discipline
university professors for not following the "party line." Dr. Hurd suggests that any
academic freedom exception to Garcetti must be construed narrowly and limited to
classroom teaching, relying on Gorum v. Sessions, 561 F.3d 179 (3rd Cir.2009)(Motion,
Doc. No. 84, at 14). The Court finds no suggestion in the motion papers that Dr. Kerr's
advocacy for forceps deliveries was outside either the classroom or the clinical context in
which medical professors are expected to teach. (Emphasis added)

Kerr v. Hurd, 2010 WL 890638 at 20.

Thus, the court found that Kerr's advocacy could not be excluded from the protection of the First
3 The precedent the court was referring to was the unreported case of Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Ed. ofTipp City
Exempted Village Sch. Dist., 2008 WL 2987174 (S.D.Ohio) which considered Garcetti rejecting the Seventh
Circuit's position and adopting the Fourth Circuit's position applying the traditional Pickering-Connick approach to
cases involving in-class speech by primary and secondary public school teachers. Applying the precedent the court
sustained the Defendant's motion for summary judgment.
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Amendment. The court based its decision on the fact that the speech was made within his role as
an employee and instructor of the school. Therefore, protecting First Amendment values
warranted an academic freedom exception to the rule that public employees making statements
pursuant to their official duties were not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes.
Public and private universities are supposed to be active trading floors in the marketplace of
ideas. Aware of the fact that the Supreme Court expressly left undecided in Garcetti the extent to
which its analysis would apply in an academic setting, the Sixth Circuit, granted constitutional
protection to teacher in-class speech; or as stated in Garcetti, speech related to scholarship or
teaching. 4 It may be expressly inferred from the position taken by the Sixth Circuit, that because
of the critical role that the academic community plays in educating the public and expanding the
scope of human knowledge, the boundaries around protected speech must be broad so as not to
chill the public discourse. See Amici Curiae Brieffor the American Association of University
Professors, the Foundationfor Individual Rights in Education (Fire), and the Thomas Jefferson
Center for the Protection of Free Expression in Support ofPlaintiff-Appellant, 2010 WL
2642629 at 23 (July 2010)
Academic speech under the First Amendment is neither governed by Garcetti nor
susceptible to the "official duties" analysis reflected in Garcetti. Therefore, the scope of First
Amendment protection for academic speech (i.e. scholarship or teaching) must be governed by
more than a half-century of decisions, beginning with Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,
77 S.Ct.1203, (1957), which recognizes the vital role that academic speech by college and
university professors plays in our society and the First Amendment interest in that speech:

See also Sheldon v. Dhillon, 2009 WL 4282086, pp. *3 -*4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2009) acknowledging that Garcetti
by its express terms does not address the context squarely presented here; and acknowledging that the Ninth Circuit
has not determined the scope of the First Amendment's application to the classroom.
4
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The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is almost selfevident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is played by those
who guide and train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in
our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation. No field of
education is so thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be
made. Particularly is that true in the social sciences, where few, if any, principles are
accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannotflourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and
distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to
evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise, our civilization will
stagnate and die. (Emphasis added)
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1211 - 1212 (U.S. 1957)

More recently, and one year prior to Garcetti, the Tenth Circuit, in Schrier v. University
of Colorado, 427 F.3d 1253 recognized that academic freedom was of particular concern of the
First Amendment:
Courts have conspicuously recognized that academic freedom is a "special concern" of
the First Amendment:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of
transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is
therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that
cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. ofState
a/NY, 385 U.S. 589,603,87 S.Ct. 675,17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967); Vanderhurstv. Colo.
Mountain Call. Dist., 208 F .3d 908, 913 (10th Cir.2000) (academic freedom is "a special
concern of the First Amendment"); see also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487,81
S.Ct. 247, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960) ("The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is
nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools."). We have also noted
that a greater degree of conflict is to be expected in a university setting due to the
autonomy afforded members of the university community. Hulen, 322 F.3d at 1239
(recognizing that "conflict is not unknown in the university setting given the inherent
autonomy of tenured professors and the academic freedom they enjoy,,).5

5

Hulen v. Yates, 322 F.3d 1229, 1239 (lOth Cir. 2003) reads in pertinent part as follows:

At the same time, conflict is not unknown in the university setting given the inherent autonomy of tenured
professors and the academic freedom they enjoy. See Sweezv, 354 U.S. at 250. 77 S.Ct. 1203 (plurality opinion); id.
at 262. 77 S.Ct. 1203 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result); American Ass'n ofUniv. Professors, 1940 Statement of
Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure with 1970 Interpretive Comments, available at http://
www.aaup.orgistatementslRedbooklI940stat.htm (last updated June 2002).
The actual website has changed to http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/policydocs/contentsI1940statement.htm and
the relevant quote is that "Controversy is at the heart of the free academic inquiry which the entire statement is
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Schrier v. University olCo. 427 F.3d 1253, 1265 -1266 (C.A.lO (Colo.),2005) (Emphasis added)

Through a review of Exhibit lOF, it can be seen that Professor Sadid's speech in the April
21, 2009 Meeting addressed issues critical to scholarship at Idaho State University. Professor
Sadid engaged Dr. Jacobsen in ,1 discourse regarding the Faculty Workload Policy and how it
must be addressed throughout the University and specifically within the College of Engineering.
Using his own circumstance by way of example, Professor Sadid made the point that without a
standardized metrics based system, the College of Engineering did not have an accurate way to
measure and therefore correctly and precisely judge the performance of its faculty. Professor
Sadid voiced his disappointment in the lack of honesty and integrity exhibited by the past and
present administrations. Professor Sadid addressed the need for the Employer to invest in the
infrastructure of the university commenting that it would be difficult for the university to receive
grant funding if the grantor did not see a commitment by the university. Professor Sadid openly
expressed his displeasure with what he perceived as the non-existent fund raising efforts of the
past fourteen years by the Deans of the College of Engineering. Exhibit 10F lays bare the robust
atmosphere in which Professor Sadid, as well as others, criticized the administration. Indeed,
there is no doubt that Professor Sadid's and other's comments were the spark of controversy;
however, controversy is to be expected and is the heart of free academic inquiry. See fn. 5.
On March 24, 2010, the Industrial Commission issued its Decision and Order wherein it reversed
the decision of the Appeals Examiner awarding unemployment benefits to Claimant and declared
that the Claimant was discharged for employment-related misconduct and therefore ineligible for
wlemployment benefits. In this case, the Industrial Commission stated:
designed to foster" (Emphasis added)
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... This case is analogous to an Idaho Supreme Court case were a claimant continued to
criticize employer and its polices despite the employer's clear directive to express those
criticism in private. Gatherer v. Doyles Wholesale, 111 Idaho 470, 725 P.2d 175
(1986) ... Claimant may argue that his actions did not constitute misconduct and were for
the benefit of the College and facuIty. However, Claimant's subjective state of mind for
making the comments is irrelevant. Mattews v. Bucyru- Erie Co., 101 Idaho 657, 659,
619P.2d 1110, 1112(1980.).
March 24,2010 Decision and Order of the Industrial Commission pages 10 and11

Contrary to the position taken in the Industrial Commission's March 24, 2010 Decision
and Order, it would be a mistake to simply equate Claimant's, administrator's (i.e., Provost etc.)
professor's, teacher's and other academic's standard of behavior with non-similarly situated
private or public employee's for purposes of First Amendment protection related to academic
freedom. Academic Freedom provides considerable protection to academics who from time to
time, or consistently as the situation dictates, criticize or face criticism of their academy peers or
superiors. Thus, the comparison of the Industrial Commission of this matter to that of the
Claimants in Gatherer v. Doyles Wholesale, and Matthews v. Bucyrus Erie Co is inappropriate.
In Gatherer, the Claimant was a warehouse supervisor of a candy and tobacco wholesaler.
Claimant's family had previously owned the business and Claimant constantly criticized and
took issue with the new owner's policies. Claimant was instructed not to raise his voice where
other employees could hear the criticisms. When asked to work overtime one day, Claimant
'''created a scene' in front of the other employees in the office." Gatherer at 471, 176. The
Claimant was subsequently discharged. In Matthews, the Claimant was terminated for obtaining
a leave of absence under false pretenses not for expressing his legitimated concerns in an
appropriate forum. In both cases, the Employers were not public entities, nor were the
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Claimant's distinguished tenured professors with more than twenty-two years seniority.6 The
latter comparison would chill an academic's ability to speak without fear on controversial
subjects, where the opinion ofthe academic ran counter to the administration's party line. The
current decision of the Industrial Commission is known throughout Idaho State University, the
Employer. The Industrial Commission's decision at present mirrors that of the District Court and
has thus far failed to take into consideration the fact that Professor Sadid's speech enjoys
constitutional protection. As could be predicted, the District Court's decision has brought
significant apprehension to academics within Idaho. (Exhibit E) As most recently argued in the
Fourth Circuit:

Botlt in practice and in constitutional law, tlte actual duties of state university
professors implicate - indeed, demand - a broad range of discretion and autonomy tltat
find no parallel elsewhere in public service. Much of the controlling language of
Garcetti implicitly recognizes the profound differences between academic speech by
professors and other public employees, something that the court below declined to do.
For example, tlte Garcetti majority's suggestion tltat most public employees are subject
to "managerial discipline" on the basis of statements contrary to agency policy would
be anathema in tlte academic setting; indeed, academic speech usually does not
represent tlte official policy or view of the university. Further, although the Garcetti
majority comfortingly referred to "whistle-blower protection laws and labor codes" as a
parallel source of protection for public workers, such alternate recourses are unlikely to
avail most state university professors. (Emphasis added)

Amici Curiae Brieffor the American Association of University Professors, the Foundation for
Individual Rights in Education (Fire), and the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of
Free Expression in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant, 2010 WL 2642629 pp. 21-22 (July 2010)

Academic Freedom if it is to mean anything must encompass the ability of faculty members of a
public university:
" to speak or write-as a private citizen or within the context of one's activities as an employee
6 The Bucyrus-Erie Company is a maker of heavy machinery used in heavy construction. See
http://www.bucyruseriemodels.com/home.aspx.This company is not a public university and its employees are not
public employees engaged in academic pursuit.
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of the university-without institutional discipline or restraint on matters of public concern as well
as on matters related to professional duties, the functioning of the university, and university
positions and policies." (Emphasis added)

University o/Wisconsin Madison, Recommendation to Amend Faculty Policies and Procedures
as adopted by the Faculty Senate, April 12, 2010 (Exhibit F)
In light of the facts of this case, the historical and special concern given to academic
freedom and the lead set in the judicial districts mentioned herein, it is imperative that the
Industrial Commission conclude that the academic freedom exception to Garcetti must apply to
this case.

IV

CONCLUSION

It has been shown herein, through a complete and thorough examination of Exhibit 10F, that

Professor Sadid's speech in the April 21, 2009 meeting was very direct, forceful yet professional
and of a character that one would expect to encounter in an academic setting among tenured
faculty members. As noted herein, contention and controversy are at the heart of a vibrant
academic community. In this case, the Employer's representative refused to characterize the
Meeting as contentious. Instead, the employer characterized the Meeting as "being a good
meeting" and implored the faculty to refrain from disdaining such meetings. The Employer's
representative further commented that he enjoyed it when faculty members "open[ed] up and say
[said] what they think [thought]". Given the content, context, and academic setting in which
Professor Sadid engaged in discussion, his actions were not only within the standard of behavior
an Employer could expect of its employees, Professor Sadid's speech and participation by the
Employer's own admission, did not offend the Employer. Lastly but of significant importance,
Professor Sadid's speech during the Meeting was protected under academic freedom, which is a
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"special concern" of the First Amendment. Therefore, Professor Sadid' s speech was sheltered
by the 1st and 14th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Sections 9 and 10 ofthe
Constitution of the State of Idaho. An examination of Exhibit 10F demands that the Industrial
Commission conclude that its Decision and Order of March 24,2010 must be reversed thereby
securing unemployment benefits for the Claimant in this matter.

Dated this 26th day of August 2010.

R.A. (Ron) Coulter
Attorney for Claimant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 26th day of August, 2010, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to:

IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
700 S. CLEARWATER LANE
BOISE, ID 83712
P.O. BOX 83720
BOISE, ID 83720-0041

( ) U.S. Mail
(x) Hand Delivery
( ) Certified Mail, Return Receipt
Requested
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
( ) Statehouse Mail

JOHN A. BAILEY, JR
(x) U.S. Mail
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE & BAILEY ( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Certified Mail, Return Receipt
CHTD.
Requested
PO BOX 1391
( ) Overnight Mail
POCATELLO, ID 83204-1391
( ) Facsimile
( ) Statehouse Mail

DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
STATE HOUSE MAIL
317 WEST MAIN STREET
BOISE, ID 83735

( ) U.S. Mail
(x) Hand Delivery
( ) Certified Mail, Return Receipt
Requested
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
( ) Statehouse Mail

R.A. ( on) Coulter
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College of Engineering
Faculty/Staff Meeting

TuesdaYJ April 21 2009 - 3:00 p.m.
Rendezvous A, REND
!

Agenda

1.

Call to Order

2.

Facufty Meeting Minutes - Wednesday, April 6, 2009. Minutes not yet available, will be distributed
later.

3.

Introduction and Comments - Provost Gary Olson

4.

Opening Remarks - Dean Jacobsen

5.

Lack of Academic Progress - Dismissal Policy - Dr. Wabrek (See attached Item #5)

6.

Utilizing Space In Colonial Hall- Bruce Savage

7.

ISU Enrollment Plan for AYs 2010·2014 (See attached Item #7)

B.

Proposed Path to an ISU Enrollment Plan (See attached Item #8)

9.

Other Business

10. Announcements:
a. Remlnder - Provost Olson's Meeting with ALL Faculty Tomorrow, Wednesday, April 22nd, in
the PSUB Movie Theater
b. Engineering Advisory Council Meeting, Monday, May 4Ut a15:30 p.m., PSUB Woodriver Room
(See attached Item #10b)
11. Adjourn
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IN THE DISTRIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
~'.

'.J

HABIB SADID, an individual,
Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. CV-2008-3942-0C

IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, ROBERT
WHARTON, JA Y KUNZE, MICHAEL
JAY LINEBERRY, MANOOCHEHR
ZOGHI, RICHARD JACOBSEN, GARY
OLSON, AUTHUR VAILAS and
JOHN/JANE DOES I through X, whose
true identities are presently unknown,

DECISION ON MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.

This matter came before this Court for hearing on Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment on November 2, 2009.

The Plaintiff was represented by Sam

Johnson. The Defendants were represented by John Bailey. Stephanie Morse was the
court reporter. The Court reviewed the documents submitted by the parties, heard oral
argument from counsel, and took the matter under advisement. Now, the Court issues its
decision granting the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL mSTORY
The Plaintiff, Habib Sadid, was an associate professor in the Department of Civil
Engineering at Idaho State University ("ISU"). He began working for the University in
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1991. In 1993, Sadid was given full tenure and he became an associate professor. In
1999, he became a full professor at ISU.
In 2001, Sadid published a letter to ISU faculty and administrators. The letter
criticized the ISU administration for its plan to merge the College of Technology with the
College of Engineering. The administration eventually decided not to follow through
with the merger for 2001 and the plan did not arise again until 2003,
In 2003, Sadid spoke to the Idaho State Journal about the merger again.

Sadid

argues that the plan was designed in secret, which is deceptive to the community and to
ISU faculty and staff. Some of Sadid's comments were published in the paper and some
were published internally by ISU. Sadid contends that ISU retaliated against him for the
comments made in 2001 and 2003.
Sadid claims that some of the acts of retaliation are that ISU did not perform its
faculty evaluations of him from 2001 to 2006. Sadid alleges that more acts of retaliation
came in 2006 when he was not appointed as the chair of the College of Engineering and
in 2008 when Michael Lineberry wrote an e-mail which referred to Sadid as a "nut case,"
Sadid claimed that the Lineberry statement defamed him and that it is part of the
retaliation against him.

Sadid claims that the 2006 retaliation led to an economic loss

suffered by Sadid in the amount of $35,000 per year. On August 24, 2006, Sadid was
offered an opportunity to apply for the chair position, however, he declined. The position
was eventually given to a candidate outside of ISU, Additionally, Sadid alleges that ISU
has further retaliated against him by increasing his salary at the lowest percentage.
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On September 29, 2008, Sadid filed a non-verified Complaint against ISU and
Lineberry that contains three counts:

(1) violation of constitutional rights under 42

U.S.C. §1983; (2) Breach of Employment Contract and the implied Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing; and (3) Defamation of Character. The Prayer for Relief seeks
monetary damages, costs, and attorney fees. On August 27,2009, Sadid filed a Motion to
Amend Complaint and attached a proposed amended complaint to the motion.

The

motion states that it is based upon the grounds that Sadid needed to identify and include
additional Defendants and needed to include additional factual allegations based upon
discovery ensued to date.
October 5, 2009.

The Motion to Amend Complaint was set for hearing on

The Defendants, ISU and Lineberry, filed a motion for summary

judgment based on the original Complaint and set it for oral argument on October 13,
2009.

In response to the motion for summary judgment, Sadid filed a motion for

additional time under Rule 56(f), which the Court granted. The Court also granted the
. motion to amend complaint and on October 15, 2009, Sadid filed his First Amended
Complaint, which added six more defendants: Robert Wharton; Jay Kunze; Manoochehr
Zoghi; Richard Jacobsen, Gary Olson; and Authur Vailas. 1 The amended complaint also
added new factual allegations but retained the same three counts: (1) count one - claim
under §I983; (2) count two - breach of employment contact and implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing; and (3) count three - defamation. Additionally, the Prayer
1 Nothing in the record suggests that the added defendants were properly served with the
Amended Complaint. However, Defendants' Reply Memorandum re: Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment states that it is filed on behalf of all defendants. Therefore, it appears that
the added defendants have at least voluntarily appeared in this matter.
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for Relief in the amended complaint still sought monetary damages, costs, and attorney
fees. However, it also sought injunctive relief ordering ISU to instate Sadid as Chair of
the College of Civil Engineering. No other relief is sought.
After allowing Sadid the additional time he requested pursuant to IRCP 56(f), oral
argument on Defendants' motion for summary judgment occurred on November 2,2009.
The Court deems the summary judgment motion to be against the Amended Complaint
and against all defendants.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure allows that summary judgment
"shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Smith v. Meridian
Joint School Dist. No.2, 128 Idaho 714, 718, 918 P.2d 583, 587 (1996) (quoting I.R.C.P.
56(c»; see also Idaho Building Contractors Association v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 126
Idaho 740,890 P.2d 326 (1995); Avila v. Wahlquist, 126 Idaho 745,890 P.2d 331 (1995).
The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests at
all times with the party moving for summary judgment. Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho
894,896-97, 155 P.3d 695, 697-98 (2007). Generally, the record is to be construed in the
light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, with all reasonable
inferences drawn in that party's favor. ld. If reasonable persons could reach different
conclusions or inferences from the evidence, the motion must be denied. Id. However,
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the nonmoving party must submit more than just conc1usory assertions that an issue of
material fact exists to withstand summary judgment. The nonmoving party's case must
be anchored in something more than speculation, and a mere scintilla of evidence is not
enough to create a genuine issue offact. Id.; Tuttle v. Sudenga Industries, Inc., 125 Idaho
145,868 P.2d 473 (1994).
Summary judgment is properly granted in favor of the moving party, when the
nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's
case upon which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Thomson v. Idaho Ins.
Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 530-31, 887 P.2d 1034, 1037-38 (1994); Badell v. Beeks,
115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126 (1988)). The party opposing the summary judgment
motion "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but
the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. (quoting IDAHO R. CIV.
P. 56(e); Nelson v. Steer, 118 Idaho 409, 797 P.2d 117 (1990). If the nonmoving party
does not come forward as provided in the rule, then summary judgment should be entered
against that party. State v. Shama Resources Ltd. Partnership, 127 Idaho 267, 270, 899
P.2d 977,980 (1995).
DISCUSSION
On or about September 14, 2007, Sadid filed a formal complaint with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and claimed ISU discriminated against
him for his national origin and/or religion and also retaliated against him since 2001.
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Sadid asserts that claim was filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.

He

acknowledges that he received a "right to sue" letter from the EEOC and he was
infonned that he must file a Title VII civil action for illegal discrimination within 90 days
of receiving the letter. Sadid admits he abandoned any claim under Title VII and is now
pursuing the claims under § 1983 and he claims that the only time barring for filing
Section 1983 claim is the statute of limitation as discussed below. Therefore, this matter
does not concern Title VII but concerns 42 U.S.C. § 1983, breach of contract law, and the
Idaho Tort Claims Act. The Court will first address the § 1983 Claim.

1. Plaintiffs 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim
Sadid claims that the Defendants have violated his right to freedom of speech
under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1 Sections 9 and
10 of the Idaho Constitution along with his property rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1 Section 13 of the Idaho
Constitution. Sadid seeks relief for these alleged violations under Title 42 Section 1983
of the United States Code.
Sadid alleges that in his capacity as a faculty member and full·professor of ISU, he
has, from time to time, openly and publicly expressed his views regarding matters of
public concern relating to ISU and its standing in the academic and local community.

See, First Amended Complaint, pg. 5, para. 13. Sadid further specifically identifies two
separate incidences in which he claims he exercised his protected right to free speech.
First, he alleges that in 2001 he published a letter to his fellow faculty members and to
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ISU administrators criticizing ISU's decision to merge the College of Technology with
the College of Engineering. Id., at para. 14. Second, Sadid alleges that in 2003, he
publically spoke out against ISU's renewed plan, designed in secret, to merge the two
colleges and that some of his comments were published in the Idaho State Journal while
other of his comments were published internally at ISU. Id., at para. 15. Sadid claims
that the University retaliated against him for the expression of protected speech.
There are five questions the court must answer to determine whether under § 1983
there is a valid First Amendment retaliation claim. Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1070
(9th Cir. 2009). The questions are:

1. whether the plaintiff spoke on a matter of public concern;
2. whether the plaintiff spoke as a private citizen or public employee;
3. whether the plaintiffs protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in
the adverse employment action;
4. whether the state had an adequate justification for treating the employee
differently from other members ofthe general public; and

5. whether the state would have taken the adverse employment action even absent the
protected speech.

Id. If the plaintiff did not speak as a citizen on a matter of public concern then the
plaintiff does not have a First Amendment cause of action based on his employer's
reaction to the speech. Brewster v. Bd. Of Educ., 149 F.3d 971 (9th Cir. 1991). The
plaintiff has the burden of proof on the first three tests. That is, Plaintiff has the burden
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of showing that: (1) "the speech addressed an issue of public concern"; (2) "the speech
was spoken in the capacity of a private citizen and not a public employee"; and (3) "the
state took adverse employment action" and the speech !twas a substantial or motivating
factor in the adverse action." Jacobson v. Schwarzenegger, --- F.Supp.2d ----, 2009 WL
2633762 (C.D.Cal. 2009). Only if plaintiff passes these three tests does the burden shift
to the defendants to show that the government's interests outweigh the plaintiffs First
Amendment rights, or that it would have taken the same action even in the absence of the
protected conduct. Id.
1. Matter of Public Concern. A public employee's speech is protected under the
First Amendment only if it falls within the core of First Amendment protection--speech
on matters of public concern. Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agr., ---

u.s. ----,

128 S.Ct.

2146, 2152, 170 L.Ed.2d 975 (2008); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-47, 103 S.Ct.
1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). The Supreme Court has made clear that public employees
do not surrender all their First Amendment rights by reason of their employment. Rather,
the First Amendment protects a public employee's right, in certain circumstances, to
speak as a citizen addressing matters of public concern. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S.
410,417, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 143, 103
S.Ct. 1684; Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811
(1968).
The question of whether the matter was a public concern is a question of law.
Berry v. Dept. ofSoc. Servs., 447 F.3d 642, 648 (9th Cir. 2006). If the speech in question

CV-2008-3942-0C
DECISION ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Page 8 of 25
378

does not address a matter of public concern then it is unprotected. Eng at 107l. When
the speech is a political, social or other concern to the community, then it is a matter of
public concern. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 128, 103 S.Ct. 1684 (1983). Alternatively,
if the speech deals with "individual personnel disputes and grievances" and it is not
related to the "relevance to the public's evaluation of the performance of governmental
agencies" then it is not a matter of public concern. McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705, F.2d
1110,1114 (9th Cir. 1983). Whether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public
concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as
revealed by the whole record. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-148. The plaintiff bears the
burden of showing the court that the speech is a matter of public concern. Eng citing
Connick.

Sadid claims that he was speaking of a matter of a public concern. In two of the
letters (Exhibit A, written February 9, 2003 and MarclL9, 2003) the Court infers that
Sadid is arguing that this is a matter of public concern because it is an issue of interest to
the tax paying public. However, "[t]o presume that all matters which transpire within a
government office are of public concern would mean virtually every remark and certainly
every criticism directed at a public official would plant the seed of a constitutional case."
Connick at 149, 103 S.Ct. 1684. Therefore, to simply claim that all matters relating to

ISU's plans of department mergers are matters of public concern is overly broad.
The Defendant directed the Court to a case that is similar to this one, Hong v.
Grant, 516 F.Supp.2d 1158 (C.D. Cal. 2007). In Hong, the defendant (among several
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others named) was Grant, who was the Chair of the Department of Chemical Engineering
and Materials Science at the University of California-Irvine. The plaintiff was Hong,
who was an engineering professor at the university. He made several critical statements
about the hiring and promotion of other professors. He claimed his First Amendment
rights were violated when the university retaliated against his statements by denying him
a salary increase. The defendants moved for summary judgment, which the district court
granted in their favor.
The district court analyzed whether Hong's statements were matters of public
concern and concluded that they were not by stating: "While Hong argues that his
statements are of public concern because they exposed government waste and
mismanagement, they are more properly characterized as internal administrative disputes
which have little or no relevance to the community as a whole." Id. at 1169. The court
followed the rule set out in Connick that a statement by an employee is not the public's
concern if it "cannot fairly be considered as relating to any matter of political, social or
other concern to the community." Hong at 1169 quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 146, 103
S.Ct. 1684.
The Hong Court also related its decision to a 7th Circuit case, Colburn v. Trustees
of Indiana University, 973 F.2d 581 (7 th Cir. 1992). In Colburn, two professors claimed

that they were denied tenure and a promotion because the university retaliated against
their claimed protected speech. In the letters that the professors wrote they claimed that
the "integrity of the University was being threatened." Id. at 586. The court held that
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even though the public would have appreciated the knowledge of the alleged wrongdoing
of the department, it noted that simply because the matter would be interesting to the
public does not make it a matter of public concern. Id. As a result, the court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment against the two professors.
After reviewing the argument of Sadid, the case law, and the entire content, form
and context of his letters, the Court disagrees with Sadid's claim that this was a matter of
public .concern. The Court finds that the letters contain nothing more than personal
grievances against ISU regarding matters that relate directly to Sadid's interest in his
employment. The content and opinions may in fact be interesting to the public; however,
the value of interest alone does not make the matter a public concern. Furthermore,
simply because it involves a matter that may have occurred behind close governmental
doors does not make it a public concern. Sadid's statements go more to matters of an
internal administrative dispute than a matter of public concern. Here, Sadid has failed to
st
show that the statements made were a public concern. He cannot pass the 1 test under

Eng. As a result, Sadid does not have a valid First Amendment claim for protected

speech.
2. Speaking as a Public Employee or Private Citizen. When a person enters the
government employee workforce, by necessity, he must accept certain limitations on his
freedom. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671, 114

~Ct.

1878 (1994). Government

employers need a significant degree of control over their employees' words and actions,
much like private employers do. Connick at 143, 103 S.Ct. at 1684. If the government
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employer did not have control "there would be little chance for the efficient provision of
public services." ld.
To this end, the Government, as an employer, must have wide discretion
and control over the management of its personnel- and internal affairs. This
includes the prerogative to remove employees whose conduct hinders
efficient operation and to do so with dispatch. Prolonged retention of a
disruptive or otherwise unsatisfactory employee can adversely affect
discipline and morale in the work place, foster disharmony, and ultimately
impair the efficiency of an office or agency.
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168, 94 S.Ct. 1633, 1651, (1974). Also, governmental

employees "often occupy trusted positions in society" and therefore, when they speak out
in public "they can express views that contravene governmental. policies or impair the
proper performance of governmental functions." ld.
Sadid asserts that he was speaking as a private citizen when he wrote the articles
for the newspaper.2 He argues that because his job description does not mention anything
to the fact of a duty to write newspaper articles that critique the ISU administration is
evidence that he was speaking as a citizen. The Court disagrees with Sadid's argument.
Whether his job description requires him to write articles is not the determining factor of
him being in the role of a citizen or a public employee. After reviewing Sadid's letters
that were published, the Court finds that the tone of the letters is that of an employee of
ISU. Additionally, Sadid should understand that he has limitations of his speech that he
accepted when becoming a state employee. Furthermore, Sadid continuously argues in
his brief and even in the published article itself that he was speaking as. a private citizen,
2 This argument is directly contrary to his assertion in the Amended Complaint that he spoke in
"his capacity as a Faculty Member and Full Professor of ISU".
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yet in both of the published articles he identifies himself as an ISU employee. Therefore,
due to the tone and language of the letter the Court finds that Sadid was speaking as an
nd

employee and not as a private citizen. As a result, Sadid has also failed to meet the 2
test under Eng.

3. Whether the Protected Speech was a Substantial or Motivating Factor in
ISU's Action.

As found in the discussion above, the Court fmds in favor of the

Defendants on this issue for two reasons: 1) the letters written by Sadid were not
protected speech and 2) nothing in the evidence provided by the Plaintiff proves that ISU
had any motivation for not hiring Sadid as the Chair. In fact, the Court finds that there is
nothing in the record to suggest that Sadid even applied for the position of Chair.
Without such an application, Sadid could have no reasonable expectation that he would
be hired for the position. Sadid has failed to meet the 3rd test under Eng.
In light of the foregoing analysis, Sadid's First Amendment claim fails each of the
first three questions under the Eng test and the Court fmds that there is not a valid First
Amendment claim .. Therefore, Defendants are granted summary judgment on Count One.
II. Breach of Contract and Implied Warranty
Sadid alleges, in Count Two of his Amended Complaint, that ISU breached his
employment contract and breached the implied warranty of good faith and fair dealing
associated with that contract. Specifically, Sadid alleges that ISU and its employees
failed to perform annual evaluations of Sadid for the years 2001 through 2006 and that
this failure constitutes a breach of ISU policy and his employment contract. Defendants
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allege, in their motion for summary judgment, that they are entitled to summary judgment
on Count Two because the contract claim is time barred, plaintiff has failed to establish a
breach, plaintiff has failed to establish any damages, and because he failed to follow the
grievances procedures set forth in the Faculty Handbook.
In response to defendants' summary judgment motion as to Count Two, Sadid
argues that breaches occurring in 2003 through 2006 are not barred by the five year
statute of limitations and breaches occurring in 2001 and 2002 are not time barred
because they are "captured" by the continuing violation doctrine. Additionally, Sadid
argues that he did file a grievance under the Faculty Handbook and that it was denied.

1. Whether The Contract Claim Is Time Barred. An action for a written
contract must be brought within five years. I C. § 5-216. The statutory time period does
not begin to run until a cause of action has accrued. Saddlehorn Ranch Landowner's,
Inc. v. Dyer, 146 Idaho 747, 750, 203 P.3d 677,680 (2009); citing Simons v. Simons, 134

Idaho 824, 830, 11 P.3d 20, 26 (2000).

Sadid is claiming that ISD had a contractual

obligation to perfonn annual evaluations and ISD breached the contract because from
2001 until 2006 ISD did not complete his annual evaluations.
Sadid argues that because the Complaint was filed on September 29, 2008, the
five year statute of limitations allows the Court to look back to September 29, 2003, for
any alleged breach of contract.

Sadid further argues that the "continuing violation"

doctrine applies to his breach of contract claim and would allow him to attach the 2001
and 2002 alleged breaches. Sadid did not provide any law that supports the argument that
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the "continuing violation" doctrine applies to contract actions as opposed to § 1983
actions or state tort actions. The Court did not fmd any law that states that the doctrine
relates to claims of breach of contract, similar to this situation.
In the absence of any case law on this issue, this Court finds that each incidence each time an evaluation was not performed - constitutes a separate breach and not an
ongoing breach. To find otherwise would effectively render the limitation period for any
cause of action alleging failure to perfonn meaningless when the perfonnance is to be
done on a regular basis. The purpose of a statute of limitations is to bar stale claims and
avoid problems of proof arising from stale memories.

Accepting Sadid's continuing

violation theory on a breach of contract claim would hinder and frustrate the ultimate aim
of limitations periods. The breach of contract claim does not involve an ongoing breach
but multiple separate breaches. Therefore, the statute of limitations bars any alleged
breach occurring more than five years prior to the filing of the Complaint. Sadid cannot
purse a breach of contract claim for any event occurring prior to September 29,2003.

2. Whether Plaintiff Has Shown a Breach of Contract. Sadid claims that the
failure of ISU to do the evaluations caused him damages because he did not receive an
annual salary increase or the Chair position. Sadid directs the Court to section (B)(l) of
the ISU Handbook, which states:
Each year the chair of a department must submit to the Dean of the Chair's
college an evaluation of each faculty member in that department. .. the
evaluation, together with the opinion of higher administrators, will be used
as one (I) basis for the fmal recommendation relative to reappointment,
nonreappointment, acquisition or tenure, or as other personnel action,
whichever is appropriate.
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FACULTY/STAFF HANDBOOK, Part 4, Section IV, (B)(l). The Defendants argue that
(B)(7) actually applies, which states:

It is the policy of the Board that at intervals not to exceed five (5) years
following the award of tenure to faculty members, the performance of
tenured faculty must be reviewed by members of the department or unit and
the department chairperson or unit head. The review must be conducted in
terms of the tenured faculty member's continuing performance in the
following general categories: (a) teaching effectiveness, (b) research or
creative activities, (c) professional related services, (d) other assigned
responsibilities, and (e) overall contributions to the department.
FACULTY/STAFF HANDBOOK, Part 4, Section IV, (B)(7). Overall, after reviewing the
ISU faculty handbook provisions that counsel has provided, the Court does not agree with
Sadid's argument of a breach of contract by ISU by failure to conduct an annual
evaluation of Sadid. The Court recognizes that Defendant Kunze acknowledged that he
had a responsibility to conduct faculty evaluations and that he did not complete the
performance evaluation process with Sadid on an annual basis. Kunze's Deposition,
Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Counsel, p. 46, Li. 11-22; p. 49, LI. 9-14; p. 56, LI. 1-10; p.

62, LI. 2-22. However, Sadid received his tenure in 1993, and according to the ISU

Faculty Handbook, annual evaluations of a tenured professor are not required. What
matters in this case is whether Sadid received an evaluation every 5 years after receiving
tenure. For the five year period immediately preceding the filing of the Complaint Sadid
testified that he did not receive an evaluation in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006. See,
Affidavit ofPlaintiff in Opposition to Defenndants' Motion for Summary Judgment, para.

5.

There is nothing in the record relating to 2007 or 2008.
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If Sadid received an

..,.

( ..

evaluation in either of these years, his breach of contract claim fails. Sadid, as plaintiff,
carries the burden of proof on the issue of breach of contract. His failure to provide any
evidence that ISU failed to evaluate him at any time during the five years immediately
. preceding the filing of his Complaint warrants summary judgment against him on the
breach of contract claim.
Alternatively, the Court does not need to determine whether or not the evaluations
were completed at least every five years for a tenured professor because Sadid did not
provide any evidence that shows he had a contract for a yearly salary increase.
Additionally, at the hearing for this motion, Sadid did not rebut the Defendant's claim
that he could not receive the Chair position simply because he did not apply for the
position. Sadid's contract does not guarantee annual evaluations, yearly salary increases,
or the Chair position. He has not shown any injury from the alleged breach of contract.
The Court grants Defendants summary judgment on Count Two of the Amended
Complaint, the breach of contract claim, on the grounds that the statute of limitations has
terminated any claim for breach occurring prior to September 29, 2003, and that the
Plaintiff has not shown that ISU failed to evaluate him at any time within the five years
immediately preceding the filing of the Complaint. Alternatively, Sadid has not shown a
contractual requirement that in which the parties agreed to assign Sadid the Chair
position, a yearly salary increase, or an annual evaluation.

ISU did not breach the

contract. Defendants are granted summary judgment on Count Two.

CV-200B-3942-0C
DECISION ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Page 17 of 25
387

III. The Defamation Claim
Sadid alleges, in Count Three of his Amended Complaint, that Lineberry and ISU
defamed him.

This is a tort claim under state law.

Specifically, Sadid alleges that

Lineberry sent an e-mail on the ISU email system on August 1, 2008, and it addressed
matters regarding the operation of the College of Engineering. Also in the e-mail was a
statement about Sadid that referred to him as a "nut case." Sadid alleges that the contents
of the email were defamatory to his character and that the e-mail constituted retaliation.
Lineberry and ISU moved for summary judgment on Count Three on the grounds that
Sadid failed to file a Notice of Tort Claim prior to commencing litigation, that defendants
are entitled to immunity under I.C. § 6-904(3), and that no defamation occurred.
In response to Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Count Three,
Sadid argues that his Notice of Tort Claim was timely filed because it was filed before
the filing of the Amended Complaint, that Lineberry was not acting within his official
capacity at ISU when he made the "nut-case" statement, and that Lineberry acted with
malice such that the immunity under I.C. § 6-904(3) does not apply.

1. Whether the Plaintifrs Defamation Claim is Barred by the Idaho Tort
Claim Act.

Sadid filed his original Complaint on September 29, 2008. He served the

Complaint and Summons on ISU and Lineberry on October 15, 2008. See, Affidavit of

Service signed by Eric Hansen and filed on October 31, 2008, and Affidavit of Service
signed by Jamie Hansen andfiled on October 31, 2008. Two copies ofthe Summons and
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial were served on the Attorney General on October 6,
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2008. See, Affidavit of Service signed by Tri-County Process Serving and filed on
October 15, 2008.

Defendants ISU and Lineberry filed a Motion to Dismiss on

November 26,2008, allegirig that Plaintiff had not properly served the Secretary of State
as required by the ITCA.

On December 3, 2008, Plaintiff served the Summons,

Complaint and Notice of Tort Claim on the Secretary of State. See, Affidavit of Service

signed by Tri-County Process Serving and filed on December 8, 2008. 3 Sadid filed his
Amended Complaint on October 15, 2009. It alleges that "A written Notice of Tort
Claim has been filed in compliance with the Idaho Tort Claims Act, with the Secretary of
State for the State of Idaho pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-905 and § 6-907." See paragraph
32 of the Amended Complaint.
Lineberry's e-mail that Sadid claims is defamatory was sent in August 2008.
Whether his defamation claim is barred is an issue that "can be decided as a matter of law

via the notice requirement of the Idaho Tort Claims act" McQuillen v. City of Ammon,
113 Idaho 719, 722, 747 P.2d 741, 744 (1987).
Idaho Code § 6-905 reads:
All claims against the state arising under the provisions of this act and all
claims against an employee of the state for any act or omission of the
employee within the course or scope of his employment shall be presented
to and filed with the secretary of state within one hundred eighty (180) days
from the date the claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered,
whichever is later.
The Notice of Tort Claim is not in the Court's file. However, the Affidavit of Plaintiff in
Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment states that "A written Notice of Tort
Claim has been filed in compliance with the Idaho Tort Claims-Act, with the Secretary of State
for the State ofIdaho pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-905 and § 6-907." See paragraph 20 o/the
Affidavit.
3
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I.C. §6-905. The statutory period begins to run at the occurrence of the wrongful act
even if the full extent of damage is unknown. McQuillen, 113 Idaho, at 722.
"Knowledge of facts which would put a reasonably prudent person on inquiry is the
equivalent to knowledge of the wrongful act and will start the running of the 120-day
period." Id. The ITCA states that the claim must be "presented and filed within the time
limits." I.C. § 6-908.

The State or its employee has 90 days to respond to the claim.

I.C. § 6-909. If the claim is denied, the claimant may institute an action in the district
court. I.C. § 6-910. Compliance with the Idaho Tort Claims Act's notice requirement is
a mandatory condition precedent to bringing suit, the failure of which is fatal to a claim,
no matter how legitimate." McQuillen (citing Overman v. Klein, 103 Idaho 795, 654 P.2d
888 (1982); I.C. § 6-908). The notice requirement is in addition to the applicable statute
of limitations. Id.
In the original Complaint filed on September 29, 2008, the Plaintiff did not allege
the he had filed a written notice in compliance with the Idaho Tort Claims Act. The
Plaintiff argues that this was remedied by his Amended Complaint filed on October 15,
2009, which does note the filing of the notice with the Secretary of State. Plaintiff's First

Amended Complaint And Demand For Jury Trial, p. 9.
argument

i~

However, the Plaintiffs

misleading, whether the Amended Complaint corrects the problem is

irrelevant. The focus should be that the Plaintiff filed suit before he filed the notice with
the Secretary of State, which is a mandatory condition precedent to bringing the suit.
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In Euclid Ave. Trust v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 306, 193 P.3d 853 (2008), Euclid
filed a Complaint, Petition for Judicial Review and Request for Jury Trial on December
12, 2005. The pleading sought judicial review of the City's actions, a declaration that an
emergency ordinance was invalid, mandatory relief and civil damages. A few days after
the complaint was filed, Euclid filed a tort claim. Euclid filed an amended complaint in
January, adding a due process claim. The City filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for
summary judgment. The trial court granted the City summary judgment and Euclid
appealed. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that the trial court had granted
summary judgment to the City on Euclid's claim under the ITCA because Euclid did not
comply with the notice requirements of the ITCA. The Supreme Court affirmed the
summary judgment without any discussion of whether the amended complaint cured the
failure to file the notice before filing suit.
Plaintiff, in effect, asks the Court to ignore the filing of the original complaint and
to look only to the filing of the amended complaint to determine if notice was timely
--

given.

However, plaintiff also argues that for purposes of deciding the statute of

limitations issues, the filing of the amended complaint relates back to the date of filing of
the original complaint. These are inconsistent positions. A plaintiff cannot "cure" a
failure to give proper notice prior to filing suit by giving such notice after filing suit. To
do so defeats the purpose of the notice requirement. Sadid's original Complaint alleged a
claim for defamation. This claim clearly falls under the ambit of the ITCA. ISU and
Lineberry had the right to receive a notice of this claim before litigation began. ISU and
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Lineberry had the right to have 90 days to decide whether to accept or reject the claim
before litigation began. Those rights, granted under the ITCA, were denied when Sadid
served the notice of tort claim with the complaint on the Secretary of State. By then, the
complaint for defamation had been filed and the purposes for the notice requirement
frustrated.
The purposes of the notice of claim requirement under the ITCA are to: (1) save
needless expense and litigation by providing opportunity for amicable resolution of
differences among parties, (2) allow authorities to conduct a full investigation into the
cause of the injury in order to determine the extent of the state's liability, if any, and (3)
allow the state to prepare defenses. Driggers v. Grafe, --- P.3d ----, 2009 WL 4067998
(Ct. App. 2009). Therefore, using its discretion, the Court finds that the alleged
defamation claim is barred by the Idaho Tort Claim Act as to any claim against ISU or
against Lineberry alleging he acted within the scope of his official capacity at ISU. 4
In reaching this conclusion, the court is aware of Madsen v. Idaho Dept. ofHealth
and Welfare, 114 Idaho 624, 759 P.2d 915 (Ct. App__ 1988), in which the Court of

Appeals suggested that a plaintiff could dismiss his complaint without prejudice, serve
his notice under the ITCA, and then file a new complaint - if the time period for serving
notice had not yet expired. However, Sadid did not dismiss his Complaint but merely
filed an Amended Complaint, thus frustrating the purposes of the notice requirement.
Sadid even filed a Notice of Intent to Take Default prior to the filing of the Amended

4

These are the only two defendants against whom the defamation claim is asserted.
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Complaint and within 90 days of the time he claims the notice oftort claim was served on
the Secretary of State. Obviously, Sadid had no intent to stay litigation while the State
investigated his claim or the other purposes ofthe notice requirement were met.
2. Whether Immunity Applies. Defendants argue that even if the defamation
action is not barred by the notice requirements of the ITCA, they have immunity under
I.C. § 6-904(3). That statute states:
A government entity and its employees while acting within the
course and scope of their employment and without malice or
criminal intent shall not be liable for any claim which:
3. Arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false
arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander,
misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.

Plaintiff s Amended Complaint asserts that Lineberry acted with malice when he sent the
--

e-mail. Sadid further argues in opposition to summary judgment that Lineberry did not
act within his course and scope of employment when he sent the e-mail. I.C. § 6-903(a)
states that the State is only liable for wrongful acts of its employees if they were acting
within the course and scope of employment.

Therefore, Sadid cannot bring this

defamation action against ISU. Lineberry, on the other hand, cannot claim the immunity
afforded by I.C. § 6-904(3) for conduct falling outside the scope of his employment and
done with malice.
3. Whether Defamation Occurred. If the comments do not harm the reputation
of the plaintiff in the community or deter third parties from associating with him then
they are not defamatory comments, even if they are derogatory. Rubenstein v. University
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of Wisconsin Ed. Of Regents, 422 F.Supp. 61, 64 (E.D. Wis. 1976). Additionally, if
comments are not made to the general community then the community cannot "lower its
estimation" of the plaintiff. Id. In Rubenstein, the plaintiff filed a claim of defamation
for the defendant's comment of "old biddy" referring to the plaintiff, along with an
additional opinion that the plaintiff was not suitable for the promotion at issue and also
commenting that the plaintiff was "just out to make trouble." Id. The court dismissed the
plaintiffs defamation claims because the remarks did not harm her reputation. Id.
The issue of defamation in this case is much like that of Rubenstein. Sadid claims
that the comments made by Lineberry were defamatory and resulted in him not getting
the Chair position. The e-mail was not sent to the general public and therefore it could
not affect his reputation in the community or deter any third parties from associating with
him. Furthermore, Sadid has failed to provide any evidence that any opinion of Sadid
was affected by the email. Therefore, the Court finds that even though the e-mail' s
language is derogatory, the term "nut case" is not defamatory because Sadid's reputation
was not affected. Lineberry is entitled to his opinion.
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Count Three.
CONCLUSION
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on each count in the Amended
Complaint. Both parties raised issues not addressed in this decision; however, those
issues were not addressed because the above issues are dispositive.

Defendants are

hereby granted summary judgment in this matter. Defense counsel is instructed to submit
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a proposed final judgment. Plaintiff s counsel WIll have three days to file any objection
to the proposed judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: December 18, 2009.

v

<::::=A~~
DAVIDC.NYE
District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

l~y

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
of December, 2009, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals in the manner indicated.

o U.S. Mail
o Overnight Delivery

Sam Johnson
Johnson & Monteleone, LLP
405 S. Eighth Street, Suite 250
Boise, Idaho 83702

o

Hand Deliver
QgFax:208-947-2424

John A. Bailey
Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge & Bailey, Chtd.
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83204

o U.S. Mail
o Hand Deliver

o Overnight Delivery

lXJ Fax:

CV-2008-3942-0C
DECISION ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Page 25 of 25

395

232-6109

Sam Johnson
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405 South Eighth Street, Suite 250
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 331-2100
Facsimile: (208) 947-2424

sam@treasurevalleylawyers.com
Idaho State Bar No. 4777

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
...J

«
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-oc

HABIB SADID, an individual,

o

Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. CV 2008-39420C

IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, ROBERT FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND
WHARTON, JAY KUNZE, MICHAEL DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
JAY LINEBERRY, MANOOCHEHR
ZOGHI, RICHARD JACOBSEN, GARY
OLSON, AUTHUR VAlLAS
and
JOHN/JANE DOES I through X, whose
true identities are presently unknown,
Defendants.

COMES NOW Plaintiff, Habib Sadid, by and through his attorney of record, Sam
Johnson, of the law fInn of Johnson & Monteleone, L.L.P., and for causes of action
against the above-named Defendants complains and alleges as follows:

EXHIBIT

C
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT Al\'D DEMAND FOR JURy TRIAL - 1
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PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.

Plaintiff, Habib Sadid, Ph.D., PE, is now, and at all relevant times herein was a

Tenured Faculty member and Full Professor with the College of Engineering at Idaho
State University, located in the city of Pocatello, Idaho. Professor Sadid currently resides
in Pocatello, Bannock County, Idaho.
2.

Defendant Idaho State University (hereinafter "ISU"), is now, and at all relevant

times herein was, a "body politic and corporate, with its own seal and having power to
sue and be sued in its own name" (See Idaho Code § 33-3003) and is now and at all
relevant times herein ''was established in the city of Pocatello, Idaho, an institution of
higher education to be designated and known as the Idaho State University, consisting of
such colleges, schools or departments as may from time to time be authorized by the state
board of education." See Idaho Code § 33-3001.
3.

Defendant Robert Wharton, at relevant times herein, held the position of Provost

and Vice President for Academic Affairs for ISU, and while in his official capacity acted
under color of law, regulation, custom or policy in a manner which caused Plaintiff to
suffer from the deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured to Plaintiff by the
United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State ofIdaho, and is being sued in
his individual and representative capacities.
4.

Defendant Jay Kunze, at relevant times herein, held the position of Dean for the

College of Engineering for ISU, and while in his official capacity acted under color of
law, regulation, custom or policy in a manner which caused Plaintiff to suffer from the
deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured to Plaintiff by the United States
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Constitution and the Constitution of the State ofIdaho, and is being sued in his individual
and representative capacities.
5.

Defendant Michael Lineberry, is now, and at all relevant times herein was acting

pursuant to custom and policy derived from the official capacity delegated to him by ISU,
and is being sued in both his individual and representative capacities.
6.

Defendant Manoochehr Zoghi, at relevant times herein, has held and does

currently hold the position of Chair of Department of Civil and Environmental
Engineering for ISU, and while in his official capacity acted under color of law,
regulation, custom or policy in a manner which caused Plaintiff to suffer from the
deprivation of rights, privileges,· or immunities secured to Plaintiff by the United States
Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Idaho, and is being sued in his individual
and representative capacities.
7.

Defendant Richard Jacobsen, at relevant times herein, has held and does currently

hold the position of Dean for the College of Engineering for ISU, and while in his official
capacity acted under color of law, regulation, custom or policy in a manner which caused
Plaintiff to suffer from the deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured to
Plaintiff by the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Idaho, and
is being sued in his individual and representative capacities.
8.

Defendant Gary Olson, at relevant times herein, has held and does currently hold

the position of Provost and Vice President for Academic Affairs for ISU, and while in his
-

official capacity acted under color of law, regulation, custom or policy in a manner which
caused Plaintiff to suffer from the deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured
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to Plaintiff by the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Idaho,
and is being sued in his individual and representative capacities.
9.

Defendant Arthur Vailas, at relevant times here~, has held and does currently

hold the position of President for ISU, and while in his official capacity acted under color
of law, regulation, custom or policy in a manner which caused Plaintiff to suffer from the
deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured to Plaintiff by the United States
Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Idaho, and is being sued in his individual
and representative capacities.
10.

John/Jane Does I through X, Defendants (''the Doe Defendants"), are individuals

or entities, political, corporate, or otherwise, whose true identities are unknown at the
present time, but who engaged in the activities and conduct set forth herein.
Alternatively, John/Jane Does I through X are entities or individuals who are now, or at
the material and operative times were, the agents, employees, independent contractors,
subdivisions, franchisees, wholly-owned subsidiaries, or divisions of Defendants herein,
or are entities or individuals acting on behalf of, or in concert with, the individual
Defendant(s) named herein.
11.

The amount in controversy is greater than the sum of $10,000.00, and this claim

therefore exceeds the jurisdictional limits of the magistrate's division and thereby
satisfies the monetary prerequisites of the district court.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

12.

Professor Sadid has been a Tenured Faculty member and Associate Professor in

the Department of Civil Engineering at ISU since 1994, and has been a Full Professor at
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ISU since 1999; and, as such, Professor Sadid enJoys a property interest m his
employment with ISU.
13.

In his capacity as a Faculty Member and Full Professor of ISU, Professor Sadid

has, from time to time, openly and publicly expressed his views embracing matters of
public concern relating to ISU, and its standing in the academic and local community;
these expressions constitute "protected speech".
14.

In 2001, for instance, Professor Sadid published a letter to his fellow faculty

members and ISU administrators criticizing ISU's decision to merge the College of
Technology with the College of Engineering. ISU ultimately withdrew the merger plan
by secretly tabling the issue for the time being.
15.

In 2003, Professor Sadid spoke publicly against ISU's renewed plan, designed in

secret, to again merge the College of Engineering with the College of Technology. (A
true and correct copy of the newspaper publication is appended hereto as Exhibit "A" and
by this reference hereby incorporated herein). Professor Sadid has spoken openly and
publicly on other matters and on other occasions relating to ISU and of importance to the
academic and local community, some of such publications were likewise published in the
newspaper (see Exhibit "A "), while others were published internally at ISU.
16.

Starting in 2001 and for the next five (5) years thereafter, ISU acting through the

then-Dean of Engineering, Defendant Jay Kunze, failed or refused to conduct annual
performance evaluations of Professor Sadid's work and these retaliatory practices caused
Professor Sadid to suffer economic losses due to a lack of otherwise normal and
customary salary increases and growth and advancement opportunities.

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURy TRIAL - 5

196

17.

Thereafter, in August 2006, the ISU facUlty by unanimous vote selected Professor

Sadid as the Chair of the Department of Civil Engineering which selection was approved
and ratified by the new Dean of Engineering, Defendant Jacobsen. Nonetheless, ISU
acting through its Provost, Defendant Wharton, overrode the selection of Professor Sadid
and instead demanded a national search be conducted by a committee chaired by two
non-engineering faculty, who were hand selected by Provost Defendant Wharton. These
retaliatory measures culminated in Defendant ISU's selection and appointment of an
associate professor from Dayton, Ohio, to Chair of the Department of Engineering,
effective July 2007. The new appointee was clearly not as qualified as Professor Sadid.
18.

Defendants would not have decided to hire the associate professor from Ohio

instead of Professor Sadid, unless motivated to retaliate against Professor Sadid for his
use of protected speech.
19.

Defendants have likewise retaliated against Professor Sadid by increasing his

salary at the lowest of percentages in spite of him performing at the highest levels of
academic excellence.
20.

On or about August 1, 2008, ISU once again retaliated against Professor Sadid.

This retaliation took the form of an e-mail published by ISU administrator, Defendant
Lineberry, where Defendant Lineberry accused Professor Sadid of throwing a ''tirade''
and referred to him as a "nut-case" who "cannot help himself'. (A true and correct copy
of the above referenced e-mail is appended hereto as Exhibit "B" and by this reference
hereby incorporated herein).
21.

On September 29, 2008, Professor Sadid petitioned the courts for redress of his

grievances and asserted his right to trial by jury by initiating this lawsuit.
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22.

Since filing suit on September 29, 2008, the Defendants have continued to

retaliate against Professor Sadid not only for exercising his rights to freedom of speech,
but have likewise retaliated against Professor Sadid for petitioning the court for redress of
grievances and for asserting his right to trial by jury.
23.

On or about, April 6, 2009, for example, Defendant Chair Zoghi sent a letter to

Professor Sadid falsely accusing him of, inter alia, confronting an administrative
assistant in an "accusatory" manner in an effort to tarnish the exemplary record Professor
Sadid has created for himself at ISD. (A true and correct copy of the above referenced
letter is appended hereto as Exhibit

"c"

and by this reference hereby incorporated

herein).
24.

Thereafter, on or about May 6, 2009, Defendant Dean Jacobsen placed Professor

Sadid on notice of his intent to have Professor Sadid dismissed from ISD based upon
outlandish accusations not supported by real facts. (A true and correct copy of the above
referenced notice is appended hereto as Exhibit "D" and by this reference hereby
incorporated herein). The outlandish nature of Defendant Dean Jacobsen's accusations
are demonstrated most positively by the contrasting performance evaluations signed by
Defendant Dean Jacobsen and Defendant Chair Zoghi, praising Professor Sadid for his
laudatory efforts as an outstanding and leading professor at ISD. (A true and correct
copy of the above referenced performance evaluations are appended hereto as Exhibit
"E" and by this reference hereby incorporated herein).
25.

Thereafter, on or about July 2, 2009, Defendant Provost Olson issued Professor

Sadid a "formal letter of reprimand" over alleged ''transgressions of lSD's purchasing
policies." The alleged transgressions claimed by Defendant Provost Olson, even if true,
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simply did not warrant the level of disciplinary action taken against Professor Sadid. (A
true and correct copy of the above referenced reprimand is appended hereto as Exhibit
"F" and by this reference hereby incorporated herein).
26.

Next, on August 4,2009, Defendant President Vallas, notified Professor Sadid of

Defendant Dean Jacobsen's recommendation that Professor Sadid's employment with
ISU be terminated for "adequate cause" and Defendant Professor Vailas has now
restricted Professor Sadid' s access to the ISU campus and has placed him on
administrative leave. (A true and correct copy of the above referenced notification is
appended hereto as Exhibit "G" and by this reference hereby incorporated herein).
27.

Defendants, through their concerted actions, systematically, and by design,

pattern, and practice have continually retaliated against Professor Sadid for speaking
openly on matters of public concern and by doing so have impaired and violated
Professor Sadid's rights to freedom of speech guaranteed under the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution, and Article 1, Sections 9 and 10 of the Constitution of the
state of Idaho. The incidents of retaliation have continued to the present day.
28.

Defendants have now placed Professor Sadid's employment based property

interest in jeopardy without due process by alleging arbitrary, capricious and pretextual
grounds for termination in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Constitution of the State of
Idaho.
29.

The above-referenced retaliatory actions likewise stand in direct violation of

Professor Sadid' s tenured contract of employment with ISU and the laws of the state of
Idaho, the Rules and Governing Policies and Procedures of the State Board of Education,
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and all policies and procedures of ISU and any of its departments or offices expressly
incorporated therein.
30.

As a direct and proximate result of the breach of the employment contract and the

violations of Professor Sadid's constituponal rights, Professor Sadid has suffered direct
and consequential losses and damages in amounts to be determined at trial. The losses
and damages comprise both economic and non-economic harms, including impairment of
reputation, personal humiliation, and injury to his mental and physical health and well
being. The losses and damages are prospective in nature and will likely continue for the
foreseeable future.
31.

Defend~ts

would not have retaliated against Professor Sadid but for the fact

Professor Sadid chose to exercise his right to engage in protected speech.
32.

A written Notice of Tort Claim has been filed in compliance with the Idaho Tort

Claims Act, with the Secretary of State for the State of Idaho pursuant to Idaho Code § 6905, and § 6-907.
33.

As a direct and proximate result of the acts and omissions of Defendants,

Professor Sadid has been required to retain the services of Johnson & Monteleone,
L.L.P., in connection with the prosecution of this action and requests an award of
attorney fees and costs incurred in the prosecution and maintenance of the instant action.
COUNT ONE - DEPRIVATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
UNDER COLOR OF LAW
34.

Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference all of the foregoing and following

allegations of the Complaint.
35.

By retaliating against Professor Sadid in the manner and under the circumstances

heretofore set forth in this Complaint, Defendants have impaired and violated Professor
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Sadid's rights to freedom of speech guaranteed under the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution, and Article 1, Sections 9 and 10 of the Constitution of the State of
Idaho and his property rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution and Article I, section 13 of the Constitution of the State of Idaho.
These violations entitle Professor Sadid to relief under Title 42, Section 1983 of the
United States Code, and under the Idaho Constitutional provisions cited above.
36.

As a direct and proximate result of the violations of Professor Sadid's

constitutional rights, Professor Sadid has suffered direct and consequential losses and
damages in amounts to be detemiined at trial.
COUNT TWO - BREACH OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT AND THE
COVENANT OF' GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING IMPLIED
THEREIN
37.

Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference all of the foregoing and foIIowing

allegations of the Complaint.
38.

A valid and binding contract of employment was formed and entered into by and

between Plaintiff and Defendant ISU.
39.

Defendant ISU materiaIIy breached the contract of employment and the covenant

of good faith and fair dealing implied therein.
40.

As a direct and proximate result of the breach of the employment contract and the

covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied therein, Plaintiff has suffered direct and
consequential losses and damages in amounts to be determmed at trial.
COUNT THREE - DEFAMATION OF CHARACTER
41.

Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference all of the foregoing and following

aIIegations of the Complaint.
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42.

Defendants ISU's and Lineberry's retaliatory and slanderous affronts perpetrated

against and published of and concerning Professor Sadid, with actual malice, have
defamed his character and good standing in the community.
43.

As a result of these libelous and defaming statements, Professor Sadid's

reputation in the community, and his professional, financial, and dignitary interests have
been harmed.

44.

Professor Sadid is therefore entitled to recover damages in amounts to be proven

at trial.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendants as follows:
1.

For Plaintiff's special and general damages in amounts which may be proven at

trial;
2.

For injunctive relief directing the instatement of Plaintiff to the PQsition of Chair

of the College of Civil Engineering or to such higher position as this Court deems just
and equitable in the premises;
3.

For Plaintiffs reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred herein; and

4.

For such other and further relief as this Court deems just and equitable in the

premises.
DATED: This

~ day of October, 2009.

JO~&W:::L2.
saIIlhIlSOIl I
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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DEMAND FOR JURy TRIAL

Pursuant to I.R.c.P. 38(b), Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury on any and ail
issues properly triable by jury in this action.
DATED: This ~ day of October, 2009.
JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, L.L.P.

srun~~

Attorneys for Plaintiff
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and the context of the speech here, Dr. Sadid was
2 clearly speaking as a private citizen. As we have
3 pointed out before, it's not a part of his official
4 duties to criticize ISU and the local newspaper. And
5 despite the arguments to the contrary, there is just no
6 way around that conclusion. That isn't a part of his
7 official capacity. He doesn't get paid to do that,
8 which was another item that the judge looked at in the
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Hong opinion. Those are outside the scope of his
duties.
And when the Court rendered its decision on summary
judgment, the Court indicated and found that whether the
job description requires Dr. Sadid to write articles is
not the determining fact. But, your Honor, we submit
that it is. Garcetti itself says that it is. Garcetti
talks about whether or not the speech is protected
hinging on whether or not the speech was uttered in the
scope of one's official duties.
The United States Supreme Court stated in Garcetti
the controlling factor in Ceballos' case -- again,
Ceballos was the deputy prosecuting attorney subjected
to discipline -- and says a controlling factor in
Ceballos' case is that his expressions were made
pursuant to his duties as a calendered deputy. That was
the controlling factor, your Honor. It's not a
109
the GarcettijEng type of test to the speech in question,
that the result would have to be the same and that
Dr. Sadid's speech is protected and should be protected,
your Honor.
Again, we are speaking on matters of public concern.
We're talking about a tenured professor who has been
with the institution at ISU for over 22 years, your
Honor. If people in his position can't speak publicly
on matters such as those that are found in those
articles, who will be able to do it? No one other than
a professor that's been there with that duration and
that length of tenure is in a position to make that kind
of speech, your Honor.
So we believe that it's particularly critical for
this Court to declare that Dr. Sadid spoke on matters of
public concern and,therefore, was protected from
discipline for doing it. And again, your Honor, we
believe that either test gets you there. But
nonetheless, we believe the proper test is the
pre-Garcetti framework.
And, your Honor, with respect to the First
Amendm!!nt, the only other item that I wish to fall back
on at the moment is this notion about the importance of
that public speech. If, again, a professor such as
Habib Sadid cannot speak on those matters and hope to
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1 controlling factor to look to see whether or not the
2 newspaper or someone identifies Dr. Sadid as a member of
3 the faculty at ISU.
4
What separates a public employee from someone acting
5 in their capacity as a private citizen is the
6 determination of whether or not when the speech was
7 uttered it was done pursuant to official duties. And,
8 your Honor, it quite clearly was not. Quite clearly it
9 was not.
10
And so, your Honor, with respect to this issue on
11 the First Amendment and the protected status of
12 Dr. Sadid's speech, we would ask the Court to reconsider
13 in light of the Pickering/Connick test. The most recent
14 case that has followed those principles in Idaho is the
15 KaIT case that I cited to a few moments ago.
16
Your Honor, we believe that in our particular case,
17 as a matter of law, that no matter really what test you
18 apply, you end up with the same result because it seems
19 to be that the distinguishing factor between the
20 Pickering/Connick and then the Garcetti and Eng is this
21 element of whether or not someone was acting in their
22 official duties when they gave the speech or issued a
23 speech.
24
And we think that whether or not the Court wants to
25 apply on reconsideration the Pickering/Connick test or

110
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

have protection under the First Amendment, I think it
creates a really troubling scenario for information to
be passed to our public so it can be informed on the
matters such as what's going on at a public institution
of higher learning.
And so we do believe that this is an important case,
your Honor. And we do believe that our position is
strong in this particular case with respect to the First
Amendment. But, your Honor, we also believe that we
have a valid claim for breach of contract.
THE COURT: Before you move on to that -MR. JOHNSON: Yes.
THE COURT: What I hear you telling me basically
is -- if I pare it all down on that first issue -- is
that I should not apply Garcetti to the facts of this
case because that case was not intended to extend to the
academic world. If that's true, isn't that a decision
better left to the appellate courts if we're going to
carve out an exception there?
MR. JOHNSON: Well, perhaps, your Honor. But I
believe the way that we would ask the Court to review
that and analyze that is at least give us a ruling on
it. Let us know where this Court stands on that
particular issue.
THE COURT: So you have something to appeal.
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1
MR. JOHNSON: So that we do have something, if we
2 need to go there.
3
THE COURT: Okay.
4
MR. JOHNSON: But better yet, your Honor, we believe
5 that in the Garcetti case, the United States Supreme
6 Court expressly stated that as of this date, we don't
7 feel we have the need and, therefore, we don't address
8 whether or not this analysis would carry over to a case
9 relating to scholarship and education.
10
THE COURT: And I understand that. Had they said -11 if they were clear enough to say that this case does not
12 extend to the academic situation, then we've got the
13 exception. I'm not sure that I read their language as
14 being clear enough for me as a district judge.
15
MR. JOHNSON: And Isee that as a fair point.
16 Certainly, your Honor. But I would say is that what the
17 United States Supreme Court is doing, we believe, is
18 saying that in cases involving speech, academia,
19 scholarship and teaching, we've got this other framework
20 that has already been established and has been in play.
21 And until the United States Supreme Court expressly
22 extends the Garcetti test to this setting, then the
23 previous analysis, by simple logic, must apply.
24
THE COURT: Okay. I understand your position.
25
MR. JOHNSON: And so our final position on the
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mandatory language in the legal setting, your Honor.
And so that mandatory language says that all faculty
members must be evaluated annually. And, your Honor,
there is no provision in that handbook that says, "Well,
by this we really just mean that it's the nontenured
faculty members."
And so our point on that particular item, your
Honor, is that we've got expressed, plain, unambiguous
language that requires ISU to conduct a performance
evaluation of each faculty member on an annual basis.
And if you apply that handbook language to the facts,
clearly lSU and the defendants here didn't fulfill that
obligation to Dr. Badid.
As the Court acknowledged in its decision on summary
judgment -- and I'm looking at your decision, your
Honor, on page 16 of 25 -- the Court -- this Court says,
"The Court recognizes that Defendant Kunze acknowledged
that he had a responsibility to conduct faculty
evaluations and that he did not complete the performance
evaluation process with Sadid on an annual basis."
And that testimony is from
directly on point
certainly creates a genuine issue of material fact on
whetherur not ISU breached its contractual obligation
with Dr. Sadid. In fact, I think it's fair to argue
that we ought to enter ajudgment finding that ISU, as a

rsu
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Garcetti matter, your Honor -- and I'll move on, but I
just want to make this one last point.
THE COURT: Go ahead.
MR. JOHNSON: Is that Garcetti certainly doesn't
expressly provide that the previous analytical framework
doesn't apply to the academic setting.
And so we've got a scenario where logic works its
way dOVID and the ultimate conclusion is that we've got
to look at the pre-Garcetti analysis for speech in this
setting, your Honor.
So that would be our position on it. And I thank
your Honor for inquiring on that particular question,
and I hope that I've addressed it to the Court's
satisfaction.
Your Honor, on the breach of contract, again, we're
asking the Court to reconsider a certain aspect of the
breach of the contract and that's whether
Professor Sadid has shown a breach. And, your Honor,
the way we read that Faculty Handbook, we just can't see
how any other conclusion can be rendered in this
particular case.
That handbook plainly and clearly spells out that
ISU has a duty to conduct an annual evaluation of each
professor. It says "must." The handbook expressly uses
the word "must, which has always been deemed as
114
II

matter of law, did breach the contract.
THE COURT: Well, I don't follow that, Counselor,
for the simple reason that Kunze is giving his
interpretation ofthe contract. But that's my job to
interpret the contract, not hk And if the contract is
clear and unambiguous, I have to interpret it. And if
he's wrong on that interpretation, that doesn't allow
you a judgment in his favor -- against him.
MR. JOHNSON: Well, that may all be true, your
Honor. And I will grant that to the Court that if this
Court declares that the language is clear and
unambiguous, then it's a matter for this Court to decide
what of law and not of fact. But if we look strictly at
the language and look at nothing else, your Honor -THE COURT: Tell me how you distinguish the
paragraph that's quoted from the contract higher up on
page 16. How come that doesn't apply to this situation?
MR. JOHNSON: Further up on page 16, your Honor?
THE COURT: On page 16 of my decision where there is
the block quote coming straight out of the handbook.
MR JOHNSON: Oh, on the periodic-THE COURT: The five years.
MR. JOHNSON: -- performance evaluation?
THE COURT: Are you saying that that's different
from the annual review?
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Academic Freedom, Constitutional Free Speech,
and Faculty Governance
By Nick Gier, President, Higher Education Council
Idaho Federation of Teachers, AFT/AFL-CIO
For more details on the Sadid case go to www.idaho-aft.org/Sadid.htm
The AAUP strongly supports the right of faculty to exercise an independent voice
in shared governance, without fear of discipline or punishment by the institution.
--Gary Rhoades, General Secretary
American Association of University Professors
In 1889 the founders of the State of Idaho gave the "immediate government of the
University of Idaho to the faculty." This faculty prerogative was not formally recognized
until 1968, when the Faculty Senate was established for "shared governance" between the
faculty and the administration.
Because meaningful faculty governance came so late in the life of the nation's
universities, the principle of academic freedom has not been formally extended to the
right to speak freely in all venues of university governance. Recently, cases of
administrators accusing their faculty of insubordination and unprofessional conduct and
actually dismissing professors for these reasons have increased. This obviously has
caused alarm among the nation's professors.
In 2006 Supreme Court voted 5-4 in Garcetti v. Ceballos that public employers
can limit their employee's constitutional right to free speech in the performance of their
official duties. Richard Ceballos was a deputy district attorney in Los Angeles who
claimed that he was demoted (to "DA Siberia" so it seems) because of a dispute with his
supervisor Gil Garcetti. Ceballos filed a grievance, but an appeal board ruled that
Ceballos had failed to prove retaliation.
Lower court judges have cited Garcetti in higher education cases, but they seem
to have ignored Justice Anthony Kennedy's exception. Writing for the majority, he stated
that the decision would not "apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related"
to university professors.
The four justices who dissented in Garcetti v. Ceballos were very concerned
about removing a large segment of the popUlation from constitutional speech protection.
Justice John Paul Stevens cited a case in which an English teacher's right to criticize her
school district's policies as racist was upheld.
Why should teachers lose their free speech rights just because they are public
employees, especially teachers whose job is to prepare students for life in a democratic
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society? The motto for my union, the American Federation of Teachers, is "Democracy
in Education--Education for Democracy."
When he proposed that faculty may be exempt from Garcetti, Justice Kennedy
mentioned only teaching and research, not faculty governance. As far as I know, the
principle of shared governance is practiced only on college and universities campuses,
and this makes them significantly different from a district attorney's office or any other
public employee workplace.
In a recent column in the Chronicle of Higher Education (12/9/09), Gary Olson,
Provost at Idaho State University, also limits academic freedom to teaching and research.
As he states: "A college or university has no comparable incentive to protect extradisciplinary speech because such discourse is peripheral to the normal workings of the
campus."
I'm truly amazed that Olson has somehow forgotten about faculty governance,
especially since his faculty has been so aggressive in claiming its prerogatives in this
area. In 2005 the ISU faculty held a no-confidence vote on then President Richard
Bowen and he was forced to leave the university. In April of 2010, 68 percent of those
ISU faculty voting declared that they had no confidence Provost Olson.
When professors raise issues in faculty senates and general faculty meetings, they
are rarely speaking from their disciplines; rather, they are talking generally about the
institution's mission, curriculum, or budget allocations. Faculty committees vote on
tenure and promotion across the disciplines, and faculty have a major say in these
essential decisions. Faculty appeal boards also consider faculty grievances and sometimes
(not often enough from my experience) rule against the administration.
In a strong response to the misuse of Garcetti in faculty cases, the American
Association of University Professors maintains that the "critical distinction between a
faculty member and an employee of a corporation [is that] the faculty member is acting
not as a spokesperson for the institution--and so subject to control for the views
expressed--but as a citizen of the institution."
A federal judge recently rejected a suit by a UC Irvine professor who claimed that
he was denied a merit raise because he had criticized his department for hiring too many
part-time faculty. Using Garcetti, the judge ruled that the professor was speaking as a
public employee and therefore not protected by the First Amendment.
Conscientious faculty members are now in an incredible bind: just when they
need free speech protection, Garcetti takes it away. In his dissent in Garcetti Justice
David Souter wrote: "I have to hope that today's majority does not mean to imperil the
First Amendment protection of academic freedom in public colleges and universities,
whose teachers necessarily speak and write 'pursuant to official duties. '"

Last October ISU President Arthur Vailas dismissed tenured engineering
professor Habib Sadid for a long history of criticizing (sometimes harshly) ISU
administrators. An award winning teacher, public servant, and active researcher, Sadid
had received excellent annual evaluations up until 2008.
The dismissal was triggered by an April, 2009 faculty meeting in which the dean
reminded those present that they should not afraid of expressing their opinions. Listening
to a tape of the meeting, a reasonable person could conclude that Sadid was far from the
most disruptive participant.
Sadid appealed his dismissal and an appeal board voted 4-1 in his favor. The
majority concluded that ISU administrators had denied Sadid due process and had failed
to prove its case. The Faculty Senate asked Vailas to reverse his decision by a vote of 195, but Vailas declined to do so.

In 2007 Sadid filed a suit charging that ISU had retaliated against him because he
had spoken out against administrative decisions. Last December District Judge David
Nye ruled against Sadid, arguing that he had not provided sufficient evidence for
retaliation.
Nye also cited Garcetti to bolster his defense of the ISU's actions. As Nye wrote:
"Sadid should understand that he has limitations of his speech that he accepted when
becoming a state employee," and that he "does not have a valid First Amendment claim."
Justice Kennedy, however, says that Sadid may indeed have such a claim.
The charges against Sadid involve very serious accusations of libel, harassment,
and threatening physical harm. Two security agents escorted him off the campus and he
has not been permitted to return. The faculty appeal board wrote that the lack of
documentation for these charges was "disturbing."
Many at ISU and the larger community are asking the following questions: Why
wasn't proper legal action taken at the time of these alleged infractions? Why didn't
Sadid's department chair mention them in his annual evaluations? Why wasn't Sadid
given a chance to defend himself? If these charges are as serious as the administrators
hype them, then they were negligent in not calling the police.
Sadid's attorney has appealed Judge Nye's decision and they are preparing a suit
challenging his dismissal. My faculty union has given Sadid • • • • • • • • • • •
_
for the obvious reason that if his termination stands, then the free speech rights
of all America's professors are threatened.
Last June the University of Minnesota Board of Regents issued a revised
statement on academic freedom, that includes "to speak or write without institutional
discipline or restraint on matters ... related to professional duties and the functioning of
the university."

Within the month I will be requesting that Idaho faculty senates adopt similar
language to make sure that academic freedom includes faculty governance as well as
teaching and research. Idaho's faculty deserve nothing less than full free speech rights in
all areas.

University of Wisconsin
Faculty Document 2186
Madison
1 March 2010
(As adopted by the Faculty Senate at its meeting on 12 April 2010)
RECOMMENDATION TO AMEND FACULTY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 8.01.
Sponsored by Donald Downs (District 68), Lester Hunt (District 66), Bruce Jones (District 1), Barry Orton
(District 115), Jean-Pierre Rosay (District 63), Eric Schatzberg (District 82), Howard Schweber (District
68), John Sharpless (District 60), Bruce Thomadsen (District 88), Stephen Vaughn (District 61), and the
University Committee

The Basic Issue
We ask that the Faculty Senate consider an important issue regarding academic freedom that has arisen in the
wake of a 2006 U.S. Supreme Court decision, Garcetti v. Ceballos. The issue has gained national attention,
and many academic freedom organizations have called for appropriate remedial action. The issue pertains to
the right of faculty members to criticize or question policies and actions undertaken by their respective
institutions. Our intention is to amend Faculty Policies and Procedures in order to address this problem.
Back~round

In 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court rendered an opinion that poses a threat to the academic freedom of faculty
members who make statements that challenge institutional authority and/or positions. In Garcetti v.
Ceballos, the court held that an assistant district attorney could be punished by his office for complaining in
a memorandum that the office had been submitting too many affidavits for warrants that were unsupported
by probable cause.
Even though Ceballos' comments raised important questions about an important public office, the court
concluded that he was not speaking as a private citizen, but rather was speaking pursuant to his official
duties as an employee. Consequently, his speech did not merit First Amendment protection. In order for
employee speech to be protected by the First Amendment, the person must be speaking as a "private
citizen" about a "matter of public interest." Ceballos fell short because he was speaking pursuant to his
official duties.

Garcetti v. Ceballos narrowed the First Amendment protection of public employees who make statements
critical of their employers. The issue is not that Ceballos and similarly situated individuals should always
prevail in their First Amendment claims, but rather that the court ruled that the First Amendment provides
no protection whatsoever when it comes to speech made as part of one's official duties. In the past, the
court applied a First Amendment balancing test to public employee speech that addressed a ''matter of
public concern." Garcetti v. Ceballos withdraws this protection if an employee is speaking as part of his or
her official duty-a term that is broadly defined for most faculty mem bers.
In a dissent in Garcetti v. Ceballos, Justice Souter worried that the new doctrine could harm the academic
freedom of faculty members, whose jobs often involve vigorous debate concerning university matters. Our
campus has witnessed vigorous debates in recent decades over such matters as free speech, academic
freedom, the Athletic Board, the Madison Plan, sexual orientation and the military, and the Graduate
School. These and other issues have often led to the formation of policy, yet such policy has seldom ended
the debate.
Judicial events since Garcetti v. Ceballos indicate that Justice Souter's concerns were well founded. In
Renken v. Gregory (2008), an engineering professor was punished for internally criticizing how the
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee was handling a grant he had received from the NSF; and in Hong v.
Grant (2007), a professor at the University of California at Irvine was denied a merit raise because he had
criticized the engineering school's actions regarding hiring, promotions, and staff. And in Gorum v.
Sessoms (2007), a professor was terminated after several public clashes with the president of Delaware State
University. In each of these cases the courts refused to apply a First Amendment balancing test on the basis
of the Garcetti v. Ceballos decision.
(continued)
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The impact of Garcetti v. Ceballos has garnered much commentary, including: reforms enacted by the
Faculty Senate of the University of Minnesota; an article by Peter Schmidt in the Chronicle of Higher
Education ("Balancing of Power: Professors' Freedoms Under Assault in the Courts," 27 February 2009:
http://chronicle.com/free/v55/i25/25a00103.htm); and extensive coverage by the AAUP (see the AAUP's
website: http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/protectvoice/Legal! "Legal Cases Affecting Free Speech."
Conclusion
State law (Wisconsin Administrative Code UWS 4.01(2)) says that faculty members enjoy "all the rights
and privileges of a United States citizen, and the rights and privileges of academic freedom as they are
generally understood in the academic community. This policy shall be observed in determining whether or
not just cause for dismissal exists. The burden of proof of the existence of just cause for a dismissal is on
the administration."

Faculty must be free "to speak or write without institutional discipline or restraint on matters of public
concern as well as on matters related to professional duties and the functioning of the university" (AAUP
1994 statement "On the Relationship of Faculty Governance to Academic Freedom"). The proposed
amendment to Faculty Policies and Procedures 8.01. would provide principled protection for faculty
engaged in speech pursuant to their official duties. It would also provide a concrete definition of academic
freedom that has been missing from FPP while also providing the university with appropriate power to
punish true insubordination.

8.01. FACULTY RIGHTS.
A. Members of the faculty individually enjoy and exercise all rights secured to them by the Constitutions
of the United States and the State of Wisconsin, and by the principles of academic freedom as they are
generally understood in higher education, including professional behavior standards and the expectation
of academic due process and just cause, as well as rights specifically granted to them by: regent action,
University of Wisconsin System rules, these policies and procedures, and relevant practices or
established custom of their colleges or schools and departments.
B. Academic freedom is the freedom to discuss and present scholarly opinions and conclusions regarding
all relevant matters in the classroom, to explore all avenues of scholarship, research, and creative
expression, and to reach conclusions according to one's scholarly discernment. It also includes the
right to speak or write-as a private citizen or within the context of one's activities as an employee of
the university-without institutional discipline or restraint on matters of public concern as well as on
matters related to professional duties, the functioning of the university, and university positions and
policies.
Academic responsibility implies the faithful performance of professional duties and obligations, the
recognition of the demands of the scholarly enterprise, and the candor to make it clear that when one is
speaking on matters of public interest or concern, one is speaking on behalf of oneself, not the
institution.
C. In any consideration of matters of tenure and academic freedom, the following statement of policy is
relevant. It was enunciated at the time of the previous codification of the Laws and Regulations of the
University of Wisconsin by the Regents of the University of Wisconsin on January 10, 1964. "In
adopting this codification of the rules and regulations of the University of Wisconsin relating to tenure,
the Regents reaffirm their historic commitment to security of professorial tenure and to the academic

(continued)
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-3freedom it is designed to protect. These rules and regulations are promulgated in the conviction that in
serving a free society the scholar must himselfbe free. Only thus can he seek the truth, develop
wisdom and contribute to society those expressions of the intellect that ennoble mankind. The security
of the scholar protects him not only against those who would enslave the mind but also against anxieties
which divert him from his role as scholar and teacher. The concept of intellectual freedom is based
upon confidence in man's capacity for growth in comprehending the universe and on faith in unshackled
intelligence. The university is not partisan to any party or ideology, but it is devoted to the discovery of
truth and to understanding the world in which we live. The Regents take this opportunity to rededicate
themselves to maintaining in this university those conditions which are indispensable for the flowering
of the human mind."
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IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
Attn: Unemployment Appeals
p, O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0041
Re:

Sadid v. ISU and IDOL
IDOL Docket No:
1777-2010
ClaimanT:
Habib Sadid
Employer:
ldaho State University

Dear Clerk:
Enclosed please find Employer's Brief on Reconsideration for filing in the above-captioned
matter.
Thank you for your assistance and ifyO'l
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John A. Bailey, Jr. (ISB No. 2619)
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE
& BAlLEY, CHARTERED
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391
Telephone: (208) 232-6101
Fax: (208) 232-6109

Attorney for Employer Idaho State University

BEFORE THE Il'<J)USTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
HABIB SADID,
SSN:

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Claimant,
vs.

IDAHO STATE lJNNERSITY,
Employer,

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.

IDOL Docket No. 1777-2010

EMPLOYER'S
BRIEF
RECONSIDERATION

ON

F r LED

COMES NOW the Employer, Idaho State University, by and through counsel of record, and
submits the follovving brief on Reconsideration of the Commission's Order denying benefits to the
Claimant, Dr. Habib Sadid, pursuant to the Commission's Order of August 5, 2010. The
Commission ordered Claimant to submit a duplicate of Exhibit 1OF, which is a recording of the April
21, 2009 faculty meeting of the College of Engineering, and held he could submit additional
arguments based on the recording to demonstrate that his conduct at that meeting was not
inappropriate. As discussed below, Employer submits that the recording demonstrates that
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
HABIB SADID,
SSN:
Claimant,
vs.
IDAHO STATE UNNERSITY,
Employer,
and
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

IDOL Docket No. 1777-2010

EMPLOYER'S
BRIEF
RECONSIDERATION

ON

COMES NOW the Employer, Idaho State University, by and through counsel of record, and
submits the following brief on Reconsideration of the Commission's Order denying benefits to the
Claimant, Dr. Habib Sadid, pursuant to the Commission's Order of August 5, 2010. The
Commission ordered Claimant to submit a duplicate of Exhibit 1OF, which is a recording of the April
21, 2009 faculty meeting of the College of Engineering, and held he could submit additional
arguments based on the recording to demonstrate that his conduct at that meeting was not
inappropriate. As discussed below, Employer submits that the recording demonstrates that

EMPLOYER'S BRIEF ON RECONSIDERATION-l

Claimant's conduct amounted to cause for dismissal, and urges the Commission to uphold its
Decision and Order of March 24,2010.
The Employer hereby objects to the Claimant's submissions dated August 26,2010. The
Commission's Order Granting Reconsideration stated that it would accept no additional evidence,
and the Claimant has attached six additional exhibits in violation of this Order. The Claimant also
raises new issues relating to First Amendment rights that are unrelated to the issues cited in his
Motion for Reconsideration. Employer respectfully requests that the additional evidence and
argument be disregarded. Also, Claimant's Briefis overlength, in violation of Industrial Commission
Rule 5(C).
FACTS

Dr. Sadid was a tenured professor of engineering at Idaho State University. His employment
was terminated for cause in November 2009 based on a recommendation by the Dean of Engineering
and approved by the university president. The university followed proper procedures leading to the
termination. The Dean of Engineering issued a notice of contemplated action to Dr. Sadid on May
6,2009. (Ex. 5, p.22) The notice cited a specific prior instance of "unprofessional, non-collegial,
disruptive and insubordinate" behavior; a prior warning against such behavior; specific warnings at
the time of the behavior (the meeting recorded in Exhibit 10F); a long history of disruptive and
defamatory behavior; and a similarly long history of refusing to comply with instructions and
counseling from his superiors. The notice invited Dr. Sadid to meet with the Dean to discuss any
reason, evidence or information in opposition or mitigation to the contemplated action. The
requested meeting was held in July, 2009, but failed to reach any satisfactory conclusion.
While the decision on the Dean's recommendation was pending, Dr. Sadid continued to

EMPLOYER'S BRIEF ON RECONSIDERATION - 2

engage in inappropriate behavior. In June 2009, in comments to College of Engineering staff
members, he accused the Dean of lying under oath in proceedings related to a lawsuit filed by Dr.
Sadid. He then distributed to the entire College of Engineering faculty cartoons on the subject. (Ex.
3, pp. 12-15) He also engaged in unauthorized purchases in violation of University procedures,
which he had twice previously been warned against. (Ex. 6,pp. 15-25) His response to an additional
warning was to have his lawyers accuse the University of "retaliation." (Ex. 6, p 17)
On August 4,2009, the lSU President accepted the recommendation of the Dean and placed
Dr. Sadid on administrative leave with pay. (Ex. 5,p. 2) Pursuant to University policy, Dr. Sadid was
given a hearing in front of a panel of faculty members, which was authorized to give a nonbinding
advisory opinion to the president. That hearing was held over several days in October. The panel
advised against termination, not on the grounds that his behavior had been appropriate, but on the
grounds that they felt he had not been given sufficient notice and opportunity to correct his
inappropriate behavior. The president declined to accept the recommendation ofthe faculty panel,
and terminated Dr. Sadid on November 8, 2009.
Dr. Sadid filed for unemployment benefits. The University submitted a response to his claim
for benefits. (Ex. 7) By decision dated December 3, 2009, the Department of Labor determined that
Dr. Sadid was ineligible for benefits. (Ex. 8)

The Department held, on the basis of the

documentation and written statement provided by lSU, that Dr. Sadid violated the University's
policies and was terminated for good cause. Dr. Sadid requested an appeal hearing, not disputing
the facts regarding his behavior, but, rather, asserting that the real reason he was fired was retaliation
for his exercise of his right to freedom of speech. (Ex. 9, p.2)
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Dr. Sadid had filed suit against ISU and some of his College of Engineering colleagues in
September 2008 alleging discrimination and retaliation. On December 18,2009, while Dr. Sadid's
appeal hearing was pending, Sixth District Judge David Nye granted summary judgment in favor of
Idaho State University and the other defendants. The court dismissed Dr. Sadid's claim that his
rights to free speech were violated. The court found that the public comments for which Dr. Sadid
claimed he suffered retaliation were not protected speech, but merely the kind of disruptive or
insubordinate speech for which an employee may be punished or terminated.
Dr. Sadid claimed in his lawsuit against ISU that he was retaliated against for a series of
public statements and newspaper articles in opposition to various plans of the previous
administration. The Sixth District Court considered his factual allegations and held that, as a matter
of law, the issues in question were not matters of public concern, but rather matters of internal
administrative dispute. Judge Nye also found that Dr. Sadid had not spoken as a private citizen, but
expressly as an employee ofISU. He ruled, consistent with U. S. Supreme Court precedent, that there
is no First Amendment protection for University employees speaking on matters of purely internal
interest. Finally, the court determined that there was no evidence that Dr. Sadid's speech, even if it
were protected, was a motivating factor in the employment decision.
Accordingly, it has already been determined in a court of law that Dr. Sadid had no "right"
to make the statements for which he claims he has suffered retaliation, and that it was not a cause
for the adverse employment actions for which he filed suit. 1

lDr. Sadid argues in his Brief on Exhibit 10F, at pp. 12-13, that Judge Nye's Decision
dismissing his case did not address his termination. This is arguable at the very least. Dr. Sadid's
Amended Complaint raised all the factual issues having to do with his termination, including the
Dean's Notice of Contemplated Action based on Dr. Sadid's behavior at the April 21, 2009
meeting (Claimant'S Exhibit C, ~24); his reprimand for violation of purchasing procedures (~25);
EMPLOYER'S BRIEF ON RECONSIDERATION - 4

On December 22, 2009, the Department of Labor mailed out a notice of the appeals hearing
scheduled for January 4. As Idaho State University was closed from December 23 until January 4,
lSU did not receive notice of the hearing in time to participate.
At the hearing, consistent with his notice of appeal, Dr. Sadid did not challenge the facts
which ISU contends were cause for his termination. He asserted that the letters of reprimand and
other complaints about his behavior were simply an attempt by ISU to lay a paper trail to cover lSU's
retaliation against him. (Recorded hearing at approximately 22:00) In responding to the allegations
of disruptive and insubordinate behavior, Dr. Sadid generally acknowledged that it had occurredhe merely justified his behavior on various grounds, while continuing to assert that the real reason
for his termination was retaliation for his protected speech. Essentially the only testimony directly
addressing whether cause for termination existed came at the very end of his testimony, when the
appeals examiner asked Dr. Sadid if he had done anything to warrant termination. Dr. Sadid
answered, "no." (Recorded hearing at approximately 23:45)
The appeals examiner held in favor of Dr. Sadid on the grounds that all of the documents
submitted by ISU were "hearsay," which could not support a factual finding, while Dr. Sadid's
uncontroverted oral testimony, that he did not do anything to warrant termination, was sufficient to
justify a finding in his favor.

lSU's Notification to Dr. Sadid of his termination for cause (~26); retaliation (various
paragraphs); and that the alleged cause for termination was a pretext to cover retaliation (~27).
Because his Amended Complaint was filed before the fmal decision to terminate him, he can
perhaps argue that his claim for wrongful termination was not decided by Judge Nye's summary
judgment ruling. But it is clear that he raised all the issues of retaliation and academic freedom
that he is arguing before the Commission on this Motion for Reconsideration. And Judge Nye
ruled firmly against him on these same issues. Whether he may have an additional claim for
wrongful termination is not relevant to any issue before the Commission.
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lSU's request for a rehearing was denied. lSU filed a claim for review before the Industrial
Commission and requested an evidentiary hearing, which was denied. However, on review, the
Commission admitted the documentary evidence that was excluded at the appeal hearing. (Decision
and Order of March 24, 2010, p. 7)
The Commission found that lSU clearly expressed to Dr. Sadid its standards of behavior,
which the Commission found were objectively reasonable. (Decision and Order of March 24,2010,
p. 9) The Commission then found that Dr. Sadid's admitted behavior at the April 21, 2009 faculty
meeting violated lSU' s standards of behavior, based on a transcript provided by Dr. Sadid. (Decision
and Order of March 24,2010, pp. 9-10). On review, the Commission held Dr. Sadid ineligble for
benefits. (Decision and Order of March 24,2010, p. 10)
Dr. Sadid contended in his Motion for Reconsideration that, in essence, it was beyond the
competence of the Commission to judge lSU's "sincerity" in establishing its standards of behavior.
(Claimant's Brief on Motion for Reconsideration, p. 4) Dr. Sadid further argued that it was improper
for the Commission to consider the transcript of the April 21 hearing that he submitted, and should
instead review the audio recording as a whole. He argued it would demonstrate that, in context, his
statements did not transgress lSU's standards of behavior. The Commission agreed that it should
consider the actual recording, if available, rather than a transcript, and has invited the parties to
submit arguments based on the recording.
LAW AND ARGUMENT

The Commission previously held that the question in a claim for unemployment benefits is
not whether the employer had "just cause" for terminating the claimant, but whether the reasons for
discharge constitute "misconduct" connected with employment within the meaning ofIdaho Code
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§ 72-1366. That section of the Code expressly states that the personal eligibility requirement of a
claimant is that his unemployment is not due to the fact that he was discharged for misconduct in
connection with his employment. It does not matter whether the termination would violate University
policies or breach the employment contract. Ifit was the result of the claimant's employment-related
misconduct, the claimant is ineligible for benefits.
The Commission previously held that the Employer has the burden of showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that the termination was for misconduct, citing Idaho Department of
Labor v. JR. Simplot Co., 131 Idaho 318, 320, 955 P.2d 1097, 1099 (1998). Misconduct is defined
as a "willful, intentional disregard of the employer's interest; a deliberate violation of the employer's
rules; or a disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of its
employees. Gunter v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 143 Idaho 63, 137 P.3d 450 (2006).
The Commission went on to find that ISU clearly communicated its expected standards of behavior
to Dr. Sadid, and that those standards were objectively reasonable. (Decision and Order of March
24,2010, pp. 7-9)
The Commission then considered the assorted allegations, contentions and slanders raised
by Dr. Sadid in the April 21, 2009 meeting, and found that "[t]here is little doubt that these
statements represent the type of conduct that Employer warned Claimant of in the April 6 and 15,
2009 letters." (Decision and Order of March 24,2010, p. 10) The Commission found that he violated
the clearly-expressed standards of the employer by raising them during a faculty meeting and not
through proper channels.
The sole issue on reconsideration is whether the recordings show that ISU "invited" Dr.
Sadid's comments in that forum. The recording indisputably show that ISU did not. Dr. Sadid, in his
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Brief on Reconsideration, also argues that his speech is constitutionally protected even ifin violation
of reasonable standards of behavior. This issue, although not relevant to this tribunal's decision, will
also be addressed below.
1. Dr. Sadid's Behavior at the April 21 Faculty Meeting. The College of Engineering

faculty meeting of April 21, 2009 lasted more than two hours. The Dean had prepared an agenda of
items for discussion, but the faculty also expected lSU's new Provost to address the faculty. The
Provost was not present when the meeting started, so Dean Jacobsen moved to the next item on the
agenda, which was to remind the department chairs and the faculty committee assigned to the task
that the new College-wide faculty workload policy needed to be finished within two weeks.
At about the 3: 15 mark ofthe recording, Dr. Sadid asked a question, ostensibly about the uses
to which the workload policy would be put, but in reality a complaint about his previous evaluations.
He asked the Dean specifically, "if the College did not have a policy, how did you evaluate faculty?"
The Dean explained that the individual Departments had workload policies, and that Dr. Sadid, when
he had been Chair of Civil Engineering, had used one. A discussion between Dr. Sadid and a current
Chair followed for several minutes, and at about the 11 :30 mark, Dean Jacobson intruded and took
control.
The Dean explained the history of workload policies at lSU and the College of Engineering.
At about the 13:00 mark, Dr. Jacobson suggests there is no need to ascribe blame for the
shortcomings of workload policies in the past, but the College should instead work on producing a
policy that has some uniformity while meeting the needs of the individual Departments. At about
14:00, Dr. Sadid asked a question about the policy under development, which the Dean answered.
Dr. Sadid can then be heard, beginning at 14: 17, reciting a litany of his accomplishments and asking
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how his Department chair, in his latest evaluation, "arrived at this decision that I barely meet
expectationsT
Dr. Sadid stated his disagreement with the evaluation, based on the supposed lack of metrics,
and asserted that Dr. Jacobson, as Dean, was responsible for the Chair's evaluation. At 15:06, Dr.
Jacobson cut him off. The conversation went on as follows:
Dean: "1 am not going to review a single annual review in this meeting, a public
setting -"
Sadid: "Well, I can't help that -"
Dean: "Nor, nor am 1 going to comment on what Dr. Zoghi's review of your
performance for this year was about. Sorry. It's not a subject-"
Sadid: "(garbled) But how can you approve of Dr. Zoghi' s decision, based on what
metric?"
Dean: "It's not a subject for an open meeting, Habib."
Sadid: "It is subject. When can we discuss it? You don't have any communication."
Dean: "Well that's not true, of course-"
Sadid: "Yes, it is very true. Ask how many people think we have communications
with Dr. Jacobson? Two? That's good."
An argument then developed between faculty members until Dean Jaconson cut it off at 16:20,

Dean: "There are always things we can do better, and I'd be the fIrst to admit it.
Beyond that, 1 really don't think we should discuss a single review process here.
(Inaudible objection) Now the workload policy is a fair subject for discussion-"
Sadid: "I'm asking you how you arrive at the conclusions -"
Dean: "You know, 1 think we should talk about the workload policy from the
bottom up. How -"
Sadid: "(inaudible statement; the words, "exceeds expectations" can be heard)"
Dean (cutting him off): "Sorry. Go ahead."
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Female faculty member: "I'm sorry, this is my first time attending a meeting, but that
sounds like a one-on-one personal meeting, and I really don't want to go through these
(inaudible) things ... "
Dean: "Yeah, this is just -"
Sadid: "This is everybody's problem. You guys are (inaudible) This is everyone's
problem. You are afraid to raise your voice because of all the retaliations."
Discussion ofthe workload policy followed. At the 23 :44 mark, Dr. Sadid again raised the
issue of how past evaluations were performed, and the failures of the administration to develop a
consistent workload policy over the previous three years. During this speech, the Provost, Dr. Olson,
arrived.
As the Commission can see, Dr. Sadid refused to stick to the agenda and ignored specific
instructions to keep to the agenda items and not to discuss matters relating to specific annual reviews,
to the point that other faculty members had to express an opinion that the issue he was raising was
not appropriate. Clearly, it represents precisely the kind of disruptive conduct that the Employer
warned Dr. Sadid against in the April 6 and April 15 warning letters establishing the standards of
behavior he was expected to follow.
But that was not all. About three minutes into the Provost's presentation, another faculty
member made a comment critical of the Dean's duties regarding the Idaho Falls program. Dr. Sadid,
unasked, cut off the Provost's response and spoke for nearly two minutes, concluding with,
Sadid: "If the Administration doesn't communicate with the faculty, we go up the
ladder, then faculty has no choice but to take issue public, so public can see what's
going on on this campus. So we don't want to go there, but the Administration-"
Provost: "Well, let me say two things about that. [Discussion of proposed town halltype meetings]. So at least out of my office, you'll see a lot more communication. That
doesn't mean necessarily we communicate about everything you might want. Because
sometimes personnel, well, more often than not personnel-type issue you can't
bring up."
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The Provost made a direct statement to Dr. Sadid that personnel issues of the type he regularly
sought to discuss in open meetings were not appropriate. He went on to discuss a review his office
was making of the College that could result in the closing of departments or of the entire College, and
requested faculty members make their views kno\vn.
Dr. Sadid then launched into another monologue about the 20-year history of corruption at the
university, the President's failure to change things, and the administration's "lying with bold face."
He brought up the workload policy again, and the Dean, saying, "the Dean of the college is the Dean
of these administrators who don't do their jobs."
Again, this was precisely the kind of outburst of personal recrimination, unrelated to his
academic duties, that Dr. Sadid had been warned against. It was not invited by either the Dean or the
Provost, both of whom had specifically cautioned Dr. Sadid against raising such personnel issues in
public meetings.
At the 1:00:30 mark of the recording, Dr. Sadid again questioned the Provost about
fundraising. He asked in effect whether the Provost agreed that Deans should be involved in raising
money, and the Provost agreed. Dr. Sadid then said, "1 have been at the College of Engineering for
22 years. In the past 14 years there have been two Deans. They haven't raised any money. How can
you [survive?] in this environment with Deans not raising funds?"
Again, this was the kind of inappropriate attack on the integrity of another faculty member that
Dr. Sadid was expressly warned not to make in open meetings. He was also returning to the kind of
backward-looking recriminations that were out of place in the meeting, and that neither the Dean not
the Provost were seeking. The Dean had previously told Dr. Sadid the purpose of the meeting was not
to ascribe blame for the bad policies of the past, but to look forward.
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The Dean did not indicate his thanks for Dr. Sadid's comments. At 1:03:00 in the recording,
after the Provost had left, the Dean said, "Let's go back to the agenda. One of the things I have to say
is, this is the first time I've ever heard the Dean's performance discussed in a meeting with the
Provost in a public setting. I don't know whether that's usual at Idaho State or not. That's a rather
interesting phenomenon." Dr. Sadid responded with an accusation about the lack of communication
between faculty and the administration.
Beginning at 1: 11 :30, Dr. Sadid made another senes of allegations regarding past
mismanagement of the College by the last two Deans.
At the 1: 18 :00 mark, at the end of a lengthy discussion about the bad effects on the College
of the conflicts among facility members, Dr, Jacobson suggested to Dr. Sadid that his complaints,
specifically his allegations that everyone he disagreed with was "bad" in some way, were not helpful
to the process of improving matters in the College. Dr. Sadid cut him off:
Sadid: "I have documented from [former 1SU President] Bowen all the way down, I
have documented that these people are unethical, these people are just power-hungers,
they are working for their own interests ... "
This continued for another two minutes. At the 1:20: 17 mark, Dr. Jacobson again stated he
would not discuss certain issues in that forum, and Dr. Sadid again persisted.
The comments that Dr. Sadid points out in his Brief on Reconsideration are not germane to
the issues before the Commission. The Dean's general comment that he was not offended by anything
said during the meeting is irrelevant. The Dean is not the Employer, and the standard of behavior
expected of facility members is not measured by whether a Dean is offended. In any event, specific
comments, referenced above, by the Dean to Dr. Sadid advising him against raising issues at the
meeting are more determinative of this issue than his general comments to the facility as a whole.
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Nor did the Provost ever indicate that he was "not offended" (Claimant's Brief on Exhibit
10F, p. 11) by Dr. Sadid's comments about the current administration's "lying with bold face."[sic]
Rather, the Provost brushed off his complaints and moved on to other issues. The Provost had
previously warned Dr. Sadid that personnel issues were not appropriate for open meetings.
Nor are statements made by other persons relevant before this tribunal. The question is not
whether Dr. Sadid was critical of the Dean, the Administration or anyone else, but whether his
behavior comported with the standards established in the warnings he received on April 9 and April
15. Dr. Sadid was specifically advised, as the Commission found, that "in the future, you are directed
to follow proper protocol in expressing your concerns (first to the Chair of the Department of Civil
and Environmental Engineering, the to the Dean of the College of Engineering, then to Idaho State
University's upper administration)." (Exhibit 3, p. 28) Dr. Sadid was later advised, "You should not
use such channels as campus-wide meetings, engineering facutly meetings, and widely-distributed
email communications to make negative comments about the performance and! or character of current
and former university staff and employees .... Communications intended to expose another individual
to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to impeach his or her integrity or reputation are not
appropriate. ... Continuing failure to follow these guidelines will be cause for disciplinary action."
(Exhibit 4, p. 32)
Dr. Sadid repeatedly violated these standards of behavior in the April 21, 2009 faculty
meeting. The recording makes that fact abundantly clear. His statements were not invited, as he
claims, and the recording makes it clear he was repeatedly cautioned not to raise certain SUbjects. His
comments clearly were not appreciated, either. As this, the sole issue on reconsideration, can be
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answered in the negative, the Employer respectfully suggests that the Claimant's motion to reconsider
should be denied, and the Commission should affirm its decision in this matter.
2. Academic Freedom. The second half of Dr. Sadid' s brief attempts to argue that anything

he might happen to say, at any time and in any forum, dealing with Idaho State University, falls under
the banner of "academic freedom" and is therefore constitutionally privileged. As an initial matter,
this argument is irrelevant to the question before the Commission. As the Commission previously
held, the question in a claim for unemployment benefits is not whether the employer had 'just cause"
for terminating the claimant, but whether the reasons for discharge constitute "misconduct" connected
with employment within the meaning ofIdaho Code § 72-1366. (Decision and Order of March 24,
2010, p. 5) As the Commission noted, whether the employer had reasonable grounds for dismissing
a claimant is irrelevant; the only issue is whether the true reasons for discharge constituted workrelated misconduct.
Misconduct is defined as n(1) a willful, intentional disregard of the employer's interest; (2) a
deliberate violation of the employer's rules; or (3) a disregard of standards of behavior which the
employer has aright to expect of its employees." Quinn v. JR. Simplot Co., 131 Idaho 318, 321, 955
P.2d 1097, 1100 (1998). This Commission found that Dr. Sadid disregarded reasonable standards of
behavior.
Dr. Sadid is now claiming a privilege to engage in the misconduct identified above, on the
ground that "academic freedom" requires that he be permitted to disrupt meetings, slander colleagues
and otherwise ignore standards of behavior applicable to others. However, as his own arguments
make clear, no court has ever established such a privilege. Dr. Sadid relies primarily on Kerr v. Hurd,
2010 WL 890638 (S.D. Ohio 2010), but that decision declined to establish an academic freedom
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exception to the employer's right to control employee conduct. Dr. Sadid cannot cite a single case in
which a court has done so. It is not the place of the Industrial Commission to create such an exception
where courts have refused.
Second, the academic concerns raised by Dr. Sadid are simply missing from this case. Nothing
in the grounds for termination cited by the University has anything to do with scholarship or teaching.
All of the comments discussed above were related to issues of internal management of an institution
and its employees, not to academic issues. Dr. Sadid' s position is clearly expressed (at page 19 ofms
Brief) that because ISU is a university and he is an "academic," he therefore gets to be disruptive and
violate reasonable standards of behavior. This carries the concept of academic freedom far beyond
the realm of "scholarship or teaching," which the U.S. Supreme Court noted as an area of concern in

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410,425, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (2006).
The offending comments identified above are not related to "scholarship or teaching," but
merely have to do with Dr. Sadid's disagreements with the proper authorities over the management
ofhis employer, Idaho State University. He offers no reasons why "academic freedom" should protect
such comments. He can cite no legal precedent for his position except a resolution by the faculty
senate of the University of Wisconsin, which is not a precedent which the Industrial Commission
needs to consider.

CONCLUSION
The Commission noted in its Order granting reconsideration that Claimant is entitled to a
review of the complete record, including the recording of the April 21, 2009 faculty meeting. The
review reveals nothing that changes the Commission's analysis that Dr. Sadid' s behavior violated the
Employer's expressly-stated, reasonable standards. For this reason, Dr. Sadid's additional evidence
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and new issues should be disregarded, and the Commission's Decision and Order of March 24,2010
should be affirmed.
SUBMITTED this 1st day of September, 2010.
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Camacho Mendoza Coulter Law Group, PLLC
Attorney at Law
776 E. Riverside Drive, Suite 200
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 672 6112
Facsimile: (208) 672 6114
Idaho State Bar No.3850
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Attorneys for Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
HABIB SADID
SSN:
Claimant,
vs.
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY
EmployerlRespondent

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Respondent

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

IDOL# 1777-2010

MOTION TO PERMIT
FILING OF A BRIEF IN
EXCESS OF 20 PAGES OR
IN THE ALTERNATVE
SUBSTITUTE WITH BRIEF
OF 20 PAGES

COMES NOW, The Claimant Habib Sadid (Professor Sadid), by and through his
attorney of record, Ronaldo A. Coulter, and hereby moves the Industrial Commission pursuant to
R.A.P.P. 5(c) to permit the filing of a brief in excess of 20 pages in the above entitled case or in
the alternative, substitute the brief that has been timely filed with Exhibit B of the affidavit of
Counsel for Claimant which is identical to the one that is 23 pages in length. This motion is
supported by the affidavit of the undersigned attorney. Said affidavit is attached hereto and
MOTION TO PERMIT FILING OF BRIEF IN EXCESS OF 20 PAGES
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE SUBSTITUTE WITH BRIEF OF 20 PAGES
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incorporated by reference herein.
DATED this 2nd day of September 2010.
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Attorney for Claimant
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JOHN A. BAILEY, JR
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE & BAILEY
CHTD.
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(x) U.S. Mail
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Certified Mail, Return Receipt
Requested
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
( ) Statehouse Mail

TRACEY K. ROLFSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
STATE HOUSE MAIL
317 WEST MAIN STREET
BOISE, ID 83735

( ) U.S. Mail
(x) Hand Delivery
( ) Certified Mail, Return Receipt
Requested
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
( ) Statehouse Mail

4l~
MOTION TO PERMIT FILING OF BRIEF IN EXCESS OF 20 PAGES
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE SUBSTITUTE WITH BRIEF OF 20 PAGES

2

RONALDO A. COULTER
Camacho Mendoza Coulter Law Group, PLLC
Attorney at Law
776 E. Riverside Drive, Suite 200
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 672 6112
Facsimile: (208) 6726114
Idaho State Bar No.3850
ron@cmclawgroup.com
Attorneys for Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
HABIB SADID
SSN:
Claimant,
vs.
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY
EmployerlRespondent

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Respondent

State of Idaho
County of Ada

)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

IDOL# 1777-2010

MOTION TO PERMIT
FILING OF A BRIEF IN
EXCESS OF 20 PAGES OR
IN THE ALTERNATVE
SUBSTITUTE WITH BRIEF
OF 20 PAGES AFFIDAVIT
OF COUNSEL FOR
CLAIMANT

ss.

I, RONALDO A. COULTER, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
MOTION TO PERMIT FILING OF BRIEF IN EXCESS OF 20 PAGES OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE SUBSTIUTE WITH BRIEF OF 20 PAGES AFFIDAVIT OF
COUNSEL

1

1.

On August 26,2010, the subject brief was timely filed by the Claimant in this matter.

2.

That the brief that was timely submitted on August 26, 2010 on behalf of Claimant was

23 pages in length.
3.

That it has been my experience in filing appeals before the Idaho Supreme Court that

briefs that are only one to three pages over the 50-page limit are routinely accepted.
4.

That on any appeal filed before the Idaho Supreme Court, that a brief timely filed is

considered accepted as to being timely filed; and, unless specifically rejected by the court, with
instructions to shorten the brief to comply with LA.R. 34, a brief slightly over 50 pages is
considered accepted.
5.

That I am familiar with the procedures in filing motions for the filing of briefs in excess

of 50 pages before the Idaho Supreme Court. (Exhibit A)
6.

That on August 27,2010, I filed a motion to file a brief in excess of 50 pages with the

Idaho Supreme Court in support of the appellate brief filed on behalf of Claimant; and
permission was granted by the court. (Exhibit A)
7.

That on September 1, 2010, I was timely served with the Employer's Brief on

Reconsideration wherein the Employer noted that the brief submitted by Claimant was
"overlength", and not in compliance with R.A.P.P. 5( c).
8.

That in an abundance of caution, even though Claimant's brief was timely filed, there

has been no indication from the Industrial Commission that the brief had been rejected due to
length, and my experience with the Appellate courts leads me to conclude that though it is not
necessary, I file the subject motion on behalf of Claimant asking that the Industrial Commission
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accept the brief presently filed that is 23 pages in length or substitute the briefwith one that is 20
pages in length.
9.

That Exhibit B is 20 pages in length and is the exact same brief (i.e. word for word) that

was timely filed on August 26,2010.

FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
CAMACHO MENDOZA COULTER LAW GROUP, PLLC

~Cu~
Attorney for Claimant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2nd day of September 2010, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy ofthe foregoing by the following method to:

IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
700 S. CLEARWATER LANE
BOISE, ID 83712
P.O. BOX 83720
BOISE, ID 83720-0041

( ) U.S. Mail
(x) Hand Delivery
( ) Certified Mail, Return Receipt
Requested
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
( ) Statehouse Mail

(x) U.S. Mail
JOHN A. BAILEY, JR
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE & BAILEY ( ) Hand Delivery
CHTD.
( ) Certified Mail, Return Receipt
PO BOX 1391
Requested
POCATELLO, ID 83204-1391
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
( ) Statehouse Mail

TRACEY K. ROLFSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

STATE HOUSE MAIL
317 WEST MAIN STREET
BOISE, ID 83735

( ) U.S. Mail
(x) Hand Delivery
( ) Certified Mail, Return Receipt
Requested
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
( ) Statehouse Mail

R.A. (Ron) Coulter
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RONALDO A. COULTER
Camacho Mendoza Coulter Law Group, PLLC
Attorney at Law
LS.B. # 3850
776 E. Riverside Drive, Suite 200
Eagle, ID 83616
Tel: (208) 672-6112
Facsimile: (208) 672-6114
Email: ron@cmclawgroup.com

Attorneys for Appellant
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

HABID SADID, an individual,
Plaintiff!Appellant

)
)
)
)

SUPREME COURT

)

vs.

IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY,
ROBERT WHARTON, JACK KUNZE,
MICHAEL JAY LINEBERRY,
MANOOCHEHR ZOGID, RICHARD
JACOBSEN, GARY OLSON, ARTHUR
VAlLAS and JOHN!JANE DOES I
through X, whose true identities are
presently unknown,
DefendantIRespondents.

No. 37563-2010
)
)
) MOTION TO PERMIT FILING OF
) A BRIEF IN EXCESS OF 50 PAGES
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)

COMES NOW, plaintiff-appellant, Professor Habib Sadid, by and through his counsel,
Ronaldo A. Coulter, Attomey at Law, and moves this Court pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules
(LA.R.) 32 (d) and 34(b) to pennit the filing of a brief in excess of 50 pages in the above-

EXHIBIT

A
MOTION TO PERMIT FILING OF BRIEF IN EXCESS OF 50 PAGES

PAGE 1

entitled case. The filing of a brief in excess of the usual limit has been found to be necessary for
the following reasons:

•

This appeal involves Constitutional issues which the District Court below specifically felt
needed to be resolved at the Appellate Court level.

•

This case is a case of first impression within Idaho and will require the court to interpret a
U.S. Supreme Court case as it applies to academia in Idaho. Therefore, the appeal
submitted required extensive briefmg and citations to law in several federal circuits
outside of and including the 9th Circuit as well as Idaho. The brief was revised and
reduced to its present size and has the least amount of pages to make the arguments
essential to the case.

•

The actual appeal is 51 pages which includes the Certificate of Service. The remainder of
the brief which had to be counted by I.A.R. 34(b) includes the Table of Contents, Table
of Authorities and the both covers for a total of 60 pages by rule.

Counsel for the respondent has not been contacted in regard to the instant motion.

DATED this 27th day of August, 2010.

d~OULTERLAW GROUP, PLLC
R. A. (RON) COULTER
Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 27th day of August, 2010, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to:

(x) U.S. Mail
JOHN A. BAILEY, JR
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE & BAILEY ( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Certified Mail, Return Receipt
CHID.
Requested
P.O. BOX 1391
( ) Ovemight Mail
POCATELLO, IDAHO 83701
( ) Facsimile
( ) Statehouse Mail

CAMACHO MENDOZA COULTER LAW GROUP, PLLC
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Clerk of the Courts

P.O. Box 83720

(208) 334-2210

BoiseJ Idaho 83720-0101

RONALDO ARTHUR COULTER
776 E RIVERSIDE DR STE 200
EAGLE, ill 83616

ORDER GRANTING BRIEF IN EXCESS OF 50 PAGES
Docket No. 37563-2010

HABIB SADID v. IDAHO
STATE UNIVERSITY

Bannock County District Court
#2008-3942
.

A Motion to Pemlit Filing of a Brief in Excess of 50 Pages having been filed; therefore,
good cause appearing, ,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that APPELLANT/CROSS-RESPONDENTS Motion to
Pemlit Filing of a Brief in Excess of 50 pages, b\lt not to exceed 60 pages, be, and hereby is,
GRANTED.
FOR THE SUPREME COURT
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
cc: All Counsel

For the Court:
Stephen W. Kenyon
Clerk of the Courts
08/2712010 KML

RONALDO A. COULTER
Camacho Mendoza Coulter Law Group, PLLC
Attorney at Law
776 E. Riverside Drive, Suite 200
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 672 6112
Facsimile: (208) 672 6114
Idaho State Bar No.3850
ron@cmclawgroup.com

Attorneys for Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
)

HABIB SADID
SSN:

)
)
)

Claimant,
vs.
IDAHO STATE UNNERSITY
EmployerlRespondent

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Respondent

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

IDOL# 1777-2010

CLAIMANT'S BRIEF ON
EXlllBIT 10F PERMITTED
BY ORDER GRANTING
RECONSIDERATION OF
AUGUST 5, 2010

COMES NOW, The Claimant Habib Sadid (professor Sadid), by and through his
attorney of record, Ronaldo A. Coulter, and hereby submits his BRIEF ON EXHIBIT lOF
PERMITTED BY ORDER GRANTING RECONSIDERATION OF AUGUST 5,2010.

EXHIBIT

B
CLAIMANT'S BRIEF ON EXHIBIT lOF
SUBMITTED PER ORDER GRANTING RECONSIDERA TION
OF AUGUST 5, 2010
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I
PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 30, 2009, Claimant was discharged from his position at Idaho State
University and subsequently applied for unemployment benefits for which he was initially found
ineligible on December 3,2009. On December 16, 2009, Claimant appealed the original
determination. On January 5, 2010, a telephonic hearing was held to consider the appeal of
Claimant. On January 6, 2010, the Appeals Examiner reversed the original decision of
ineligibility of December 3, 2009 and found that the Employer failed to meet its burden of
proving by a preponderance of evidence that the Claimant had engaged in inappropriate conduct.
On or about January 13,2010, the Employer through counsel requested that the hearing be reopened as through no fault of the Employer, the Employer did not receive adequate notice of the
telephonic hearing and therefore was unable to participate. On or about the January 14,2010, the
Appeals Bureau denied the request to re-open the hearing.
On or about January 18,2010, the Employer through counsel filed an appeal to the
Industrial Commission requesting that the Commission hold a hearing that would allow the
Employer to provide evidence which it could not previously provide at the telephonic hearing or
remand the case to the Appeals Examiner for an additional hearing and decision. On February 9,
2010, the Employer's request for a hearing before the Idaho Industrial Commission was denied.
Additionally, the Employer's request that the matter be remanded to the Appeals Bureau for a
new hearing was denied. However, The Industrial Commission ruled that the Employer's timely
appeal of the Appeals Examiner's decision denying a rehearing was also an appeal of the
decision of the Appeals Examiner's decision awarding unemployment benefits to Claimant.
Wherefore, the Industrial Commission informed the parties that it would review de novo the
evidentiary record established during the Appeals Examiner's hearing of January 5, 2010,
CLAIMANT'S BRIEF ON EXHIBIT 10F
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established a briefing schedule for both the Claimant and the Employer, and informed both
parties that it would then issue a new decision upon completion of its review.
On March 24, 2010, the Industrial Commission issued its Decision and Order wherein it
reversed the decision of the Appeals Examiner awarding unemployment benefits to Claimant and
declared that Claimant was discharged for employment-related misconduct and therefore
ineligible for unemployment benefits. On April 12, 2010, Claimant through counsel filed a
Motion for Reconsideration with the Industrial Commission. On or about April 20, 2010, the
Employer filed an Employer's Objection to the Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration.
On August 5, 2010, the Industrial Commission issued an Order Granting
Reconsideration. It further ordered the Claimant to serve a duplicate CD, Exhibit lOF on the
Commission and all interested parties within ten (l0) days ofthe date of the Order. It further
ordered that Claimant would be afforded the opportunity to submit a brief arguing its position

based on 10F; said brief to be submitted ten (l0) days from the date of service of Exhibit 10F.
Lastly, the order called for the Employer and IDOL, if they desired, to submit briefs within seven
(7) days of the date Claimant's briefwas filed with the Industrial Commission. On August 16,
2010, Exhibit 10F was filed with the Industrial Commission, mailed to the IDOL and mailed to
the Employer.
II
THE APPLICABLE LAW

In reviewing Exhibit 10F, the Industrial Commission must decide whether the speech and
conduct of Professor Sadid at the April 21, 2009, Idaho State University, College of Engineering
Faculty Staff meeting constituted "misconduct" connected with the Claimant's employment such
that the Claimant can be denied unemployment benefits. Beaty v. City of Idaho Falls, 110 Idaho
CLAIMANT'S BRIEF ON EXHIBIT 10F
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891,892, 719 P.2d 1151, 1152 (1986)." See March 24,2010 Decision and Order of the
Industrial Commission pages 5 and 6:

The burden of proving misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence falls strictly on
the employer. Appeals Examiner of Idaho Dept. of Labor v. JR .. Simplot Co., 131 Idaho
318, 320, 955 P.2d 1097, 1099 (1998) The Idaho Supreme Court has defined misconduct
as a willful, intentional disregard of the employer's interest; a deliberate violation of the
employer's rules; or a disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has a right
to expect of its employees. Gunter v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 143 Idaho
63, 137 P.3d 450 (2006) (citing Johns v. S. H Kress & Company, 78 Idaho 544, 548, 307
P.2d 217,219 (1957)).

See March 24, 2010 Decision and Order of the Industrial Commission pages 5 and 6

III

ANALYSIS

A. Professor Sadid Did Not Engage In Any Conduct Sufficient to Disqualify Him From
Receiving Unemployment Benefits As His Conduct was not a Willful, Intentional
Disregard Of His Employer's Interest; A Deliberate Violation Of The Employer's
Rules; Nor A Disregard Of Standards Of Behavior Which The Employer Had A
Right To Expect Of Him

1.

During the April 21, 2009 College of Engineering Faculty Staff Meeting, Professor
Sadid's Conduct Was Not In Disregard of the Standards of Behavior that His
Employer Had a Right to Expect. His Employer Expressed Satisfaction With The
Meeting, The Employer Expressed That the Employer Valued the Discussion, And
the Employer Publicly Expressed That the Employer Was Not Offended By Any
Remarks Made During the Meeting

The Notice of Contemplated Action (NOCA) (Exhibit 5., pp. 22-23) specifically alleges
that during the April 21, 2009 College of Engineering Faculty/Staffmeeting (hereinafter referred
to as "the Meeting" or Meeting), Professor Sadid was unprofessional, non-collegial, disruptive
and insubordinate. The NOCA also alleged that Professor Sadid disrupted the meeting in
complete disregard of an established agenda by "revisiting personnel issues" that had previously
CLAIMANT'S BRIEF ON EXHIBIT 10F
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been discussed in an appropriate forum and by labeling some Idaho State University personnel as
corrupt and untruthful. Lastly, the NOCA alleged that Professor Sadid falsely asserted that for
the past fourteen years that the Deans of the College of Engineering had failed in their fund
raising responsibilities, as the Deans were deficient in their duties to raise funds for College of
Engineering.
An analysis of the 2 hour, 17 minute 21 second Meeting reveals that Professor Sadid's

behavior was that which could be expected of an academic fully engaged in discussions of
significant importance in a precise, forceful, professional and appropriate manner. A recording
of this meeting is captured on Exhibit 1OF. A review of this recording reveals that Professor
Sadid was candid but in no way was Professor Sadid engaged in behavior that could be described
as misconduct especially in light of the academic setting in which the meeting took place.
Preliminarily, it must be noted that the first part of the published agenda was a Call to Order and
Introduction and Comments by the Provost, Gary Olson. (Exhibit A) Rather than following the
established agenda, it is clear from listening to Exhibit 1OF that Professor Sadid did not disregard
the established agenda; rather, it was Dean Jacobsen who departed from the agenda and began an
earnest discussion of the Faculty Workload Policy. What follows is an analysis of relevant
sections of the recording where Professor Sadid and others are engaged in discussions in the
meeting. For ease of identification, the specific place on the recording is marked in bold: l
Recording: 3:20 -13:34 sec.
In a discussion prior to the arrival of Provost Olson, Dr. Jacobsen initiates a discourse
regarding the Faculty Workload Policy and how it must be addressed throughout the
University and specifically within the College of Engineering. At a point during this

1 The annotations used to mark segments of the recording are as follows: 3:20 -13:34 would indicate that the
relevant segment of the recording begins at 3 minutes and 20 seconds into the recording and ends at 13 minutes and
34 seconds into the recording; 1: 12:59 - 1:21 :26 would indicate that the relevant segment of the recording begins at
1 hour, 12 minutes, and 59 seconds into the recording and ends at 1 hour, 21 minutes, and 26 seconds into the
recording.
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discourse, Professor Sadid, in a very civil tone, questioned the metrics that would be
involved in determining the faculty workload specifically, what metrics would be used to
determine the research value of faculty members. It is clear that Dr. Jacobsen was
somewhat frustrated by Professor Sadid's question and follow-up question and he
specifically asks other Chairs present in the meeting to join in the discussion. At this
point, Dr. George Imel, Chair of the Department of Nuclear Engineering joins in the
discussion with Professor Sadid. It is clear from listening to the recording that this issue
was important to both parties. However, both parties were engaged, Dr. George Imel
being louder, more argumentative, and more aggressive than Professor Sadid. It is
important to note that Dean Jacobsen actually agreed that the present ad hoc method
needed to be addressed and metrics established; thus agreeing with the argument set forth
by Professor Sadid.

Recording: 13:59 -17:50
In a continuation of the discussion of Faculty Workload Policy specifically in the College
of Engineering, Dr. Sadid tries to discuss the specifics of an evaluation that he received
from Dr. Zoghi. Professor Sadid's point was that without the establishment of a
standardized metrics based system, there did not exist an accurate way to judge a faculty
member's performance. Dr. Jacobsen informs Professor Sadid that a discussion of a
specific faculty member's evaluation is not a proper subject for an open discussion.
However, Professor Sadid disagrees with Dr. Jacobsen but does so in a civil tone and
provides his rationale. From the recording, one can hear an attendee ask that the
discussion move toward a general discussion of a topic of common import to the college
and not dwell on a single person's issue, Professor Sadid remarked that it is a concern of
everyone especially in light of the lack of communication between the College of
Engineering Chair and the faculty. At one point, Professor Sadid asked for a show of
hands as to who in the room believed they had effective communications with the Chair
of the College of Engineering. From the recording, it can be surmised that Professor
Sadid only saw two people raise their hands. At all times, Professor Sadid's speech was
appropriate and there is nothing to indicate that his behavior was a disruption to the
meeting.
Recording: 23:24 - 25:17
Professor Sadid questions the workload criteria and mentions that this has been a problem
for the last three years. Professor Sadid again questions the metrics especially, when an
administrator tells the faculty that they have exceeded the expectations but there are no
metrics. Professor Sadid asked what is the administration doing and questions the
commitment of the Dean and the Chairs especially in light of his raising questions for
three years.
Recording: 28:50 - 29:40
Provost Olson opens the floor for questions. A faculty member other than Professor Sadid
prefaces a question to Provost Olson openly calling into question the performance of
Dean Jacobsen and raising the issue of whether or not a dean, especially a part-time dean
is really needed in the College of Engineering. Indeed, this faculty member said to
Provost Olson, "I have some major issues with the performance of our Dean." Provost
Olson jokingly said that he thought that when he carne in he heard Professor Sadid say
CLAIMANT'S BRIEF ON EXHIBIT lOF
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that they could do away with deans. Professor Sadid points out that this is true. He states
that in two years he has not noticed that the Dean had taken responsibility for anything.
Therefore, and based on that history, the necessity of a dean should be questioned.

Recording: 34:50 - 38:09
Professor Sadid in an exchange with Provost Olson asked ifthere would be
communications with the faculty from his office. Provost Olson responded that he had
just said that there would be. Professor Sadid then states that Idaho State University had a
long corrupt history prior to the arrival of Dr. Vailas. Professor Sadid stated that with Dr.
Vailas' arrival that he expected change. However, Professor Sadid commented that the
present administration would lie with bold face and was not honest with faculty. Dr.
Olson was not offended by the question and cited his experience at the University of
South Florida. It was Dr. Olson's opinion that Dr. Vailas has instituted measures to
address issues raised by Professor Sadid to make them viable and more transparent.
Recording: 41:28 - 44:06 Discussion on the Budget Process Provost Disparages
Idaho State Board of Education
An unidentified faculty member (first name Ken) questioned the budget process and
insinuated that Dean Jacobsen had kept the process a secret. Dean Jacobsen wanted to
address the question but Dr. Olson stepped in and informed the faculty member that Dean
Jacobsen did not have access to the budget. The Provost went on to explain how the
process worked. The Provost expressed his dismay with the entire budget process.
Provost Olson then went on to disparage the members of the Idaho State Board of
Education. He remarked that he thought that he had already been in the state with the
"wackiest" state government with Blagojevich but this really takes the cake; and, if you
think that this is really something, you ought to go to the State Board of Education
meeting. That is really like going to the circus. "I don't think any of those people have
ever gone to college much less getting a degree in one."

Recording: 59: 16 -1:01:24
There was a discussion regarding investment in education that the university needed to
do. Dr. Olson brought up the government of Thailand's commitment to education and
what that country has done to improve its academic infrastructure. Professor Sadid
commented that no government would provide funds through a grant if the government
did not see that the institution was already committed to the investment. Professor Sadid
then asked Dr. Olson if Dr. Olson would hold his Deans responsible for raising funds.
Dr. Olson replied, "I will yep". Professor Sadid said that in the past fourteen years, there
have been two deans neither of which raised any funds. Professor Sadid then rhetorically
asked how can we survive in this economy? Dr. Olson replied to Professor Sadid by
saying "You are right" and then remarked that we all have a role to play.
Recording: 1:12:59 -1:21:26
An Administrative Assistant becomes very emotional, almost to the point of tears in
describing the treatment that she has received at the College of Engineering by its faculty.
She says she would leave if she could. Professor Sadid comments that her problem is a
CLAIMANT'S BRIEF ON EXHIBIT 10F
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result of poor leadership. The Administrative Assistant does not agree with Professor
Sadid that it is all leadership. This exchange provokes a response from Dean Jacobsen in
which Dean Jacobsen questions the basis of why Professor Sadid maintains that
everything that is wrong at the College of Education is based on the failure of leadership.
Professor Sadid, without being disrespectful replies to the Dean's inquiry and several
times in his reply stated that he had proof to back up his position. Dean Jacobsen
comments that he is not interested in any of Professor Sadid's proof. Dean Jacobsen
suggests that they [faculty and administration] had to work together if they were going to
be successful. Professor Sadid asks of Dean Jacobsen if the Dean was working with them.
Dean Jacobsen replied that he was and Professor Sadid responded that he was not. Dean
Jacobsen responded that he did not agree with Professor Sadid's assessment.

Recording: 1:45:50 -1:46:45 Dean Jacobsen Not Offended by Comments and
Desires an Open Dialogue
In speaking to his belief that the members of the College of Engineering had to work
together, Dr. Jacobsen stated, "I'm not offended by anything you have said" in speaking
to the whole group. Dr. Jacobsen goes on to say that "I have never learned to properly
have the ability to hold a grudge" Further Dean Jacobsen said, "I like it when people
open up and say what they think." At that point Professor Sadid chimed in and mentioned
two words: "Honesty" and "Integrity" to which Dr. Jacobsen replied "that goes without
saying Habib."
Recording: 1:54:50 -1:55:00 Dr. Jacobsen Expresses that the Meeting was Good
"Don't Hate This Type of Discussion."
A faculty member "Bruce" asked to speak on a topic and in so doing remarked that the
meeting had been contentious. Dr. Jacobsen responded. "Its been a good meeting. Don't
hate this kind of discussion. It is not a bad idea to do this."

In summary, an analysis of Exhibit lOF reveals the following:
•

That Professor Sadid was engaged in the discussions during the meeting where he felt
that he had input. In addressing Dean Jacobsen, Provost Dr. Gary Olson and others,
Professor Sadid was very direct, very professional and not intimidated by others during
this discourse.

•

That other faculty members beside Professor Sadid questioned the performance of the
administration and specifically questioned the performance of Dean Jacobsen. Indeed,
one faculty member suggested that given the part-time status of the Dean Jacobsen,
perhaps the College of Engineering would be better offwithout a Dean. Still another
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faculty member, relying on false information, questioned Dean Jacobsen's honesty and
the lack of transparency in the budget process.
•

That Provost Dr. Gary Olson was not offended by Professor Sadid's descriptive words
used to underscore Professor Sadid's observation that the present administration of Dr.
Vailas' lacked in integrity and was not truthfuL

•

That Provost Dr. Gary Olson in this public forum, in language that would be considered
insubordinate and disrespectful in a non-academic forum, lambasted the Idaho State
Board of Education and its members and in very strong and disparaging remarks likened
the members to uneducated circus performers.

•

That a member of the faculty was very upset with how she had been personally treated
and expressed a strong personal desire to leave the employ of the Employer.

•

That Dean Jacobsen publicly maintained that he was not offended by anything anyone
had said at the Meeting; and of significant importance Dean Jacobsen states publicly that
"Its been a good meeting. Don't hate this kind of discussion. It is not a bad idea to do
this."

2.

Professor Sadid's Speech Is Constitutionally Protected And Therefore Must Fall
Within the Standards Of Behavior Which The Employer Had A Right To Expect Of
Him

In the Employer's claim for review, the Employer relied heavily upon the grant of
Summary Judgment issued in litigation involving the Employer and Professor on December 18,
2009. In that case, the Sixth District Court, Judge David C. Nye, presiding, held that as a matter
of law that there was no First Amendment protection for Claimant who was speaking not on
matters of public concern, nor was Claimant speaking as private citizen on matters of public

CLAIMANT'S BRIEF ON EXHIBIT 10F
SUBMITTED PER ORDER GRANTING RECONSIDERAnON
OF AUGUST 5, 2010

Page 9 of20

concern. Further, even if the Claimant was speaking on a matter of public concern as a private
citizen, the speech of Claimant was not a motivating factor for the decision to take any action
complained of in Claimant's complaint. The Employer represented to the Industrial Commission
that:
"Accordingly, it has already been determined in a court of law that Dr. Sadid had no
"right" to make statements for which he has suffered retaliation, and that it was not a
cause for the adverse employment actions, including his termination." (Emphasis added)
(Employer's Brief on Claim for Review., p. 4)

The above quote is a misstatement of fact. It is clear from Exhibit B herein that the court
considered the original complaint and the amended complaint. The amended complaint also
added new factual allegations but retained the same three counts: "(1) count one - claim under
§I983; (2) count two - breach of employment contact and implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing; and (3) count three - defamation." (Exhibit B., p. 3 of25) An examination of Exhibit C,
the amended complaint, reveals that the complaint was not amended to include an additional
count of wrongful termination. Such a claim would have been an impossibility as Claimant was
discharged October 30,2009 and Exhibit C was filed on October 15,2009. Further, the Court's
decision was narrowly tailored to the allegations made in the complaint and concluded that the
"Defendants [Employer] are entitled to summary judgment on each count in the Amended
Complaint." (Exhibit B., p. 24 of25) Claimant has yet to file a wrongful termination claim.
Therefore, the Industrial Commission cannot rely on a decision made by the Court where the
decision is not applicable to a cause of action that may be filed in the future. The Employer's
brief failed to inform the Industrial Commission that on January 19,2010, the Court specifically
refused to address the fact that the District Court failed to address a critical component of
Claimant's case specifically leaving the decision in the hands of the Appellate Courts. This
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critical component is that all of Claimant's speech was done within the confines of academic
freedom and therefore is protected speech as guaranteed by the 1st and 14th Amendments of the
U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Sections 9 and 10 of the Constitution of the State ofIdaho.
In the case of Garcetti v Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (2006), the court held that
when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, they are not speaking
as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their
communications from employer discipline. In response to a concern expressed by Justice Souter
in his dissenting opinion regarding the impact of the majority's holding on teachings of "public
university professors" and academic freedoms found in "public colleges and universities," the
majority qualified its holding, adding the following caveat:
Justice Souter suggests today's decision may have important ramifications for academic
freedom at least as a constitutional value ... There is some argument that expressions
related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional
constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court's customary
employee speech jurisprudence. We need not, and for that reason do not, decide whether
the analysis we conduct today would apply in the same manner to a case involving
speech related to scholarship or teaching. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. at 425
(Emphasis added)
In writing this caveat, the Court reserved for later resolution the intricate and complex question
of the First Amendment protections applied to academic speech.
Although aware of the Supreme Court's caveat concerning the academic freedom
exception to the Garcetti analysis, the District Court deliberately chose not to address the issue
of academic freedom and how Professors Sadid's speech was either protected or not protected by
the First Amendment's application to academic freedom. Instead, the trial judge abdicated this
responsibility to the Idaho Appellate Courts:

THE COURT: What I hear you telling me basically
14 is -- if I pare it all down on that first issue - is
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15 that I should not apply Garcetti to the facts of this
16 case because that case was not intended to extend to the
17 academic world. If that's true, isn't that a decision
18 better left to the appellate courts if we're going to
19 carve out an exception there?
20 MR. JOHNSON: Well, perhaps, your Honor. But I
21 believe the way that we would ask the Court to review
22 that and analyze that is at least give us a ruling on
23 it. Let us know where this Court stands on that
24 particular issue.
25 THE COURT: So you have something to appeal. (Tr. p. 112)2
10 THE COURT: And I understand that. Had they said11 if they were clear enough to say that this case does not
12 extend to the academic situation, then we've got the
13 exception. I'm not sure that I read their language as
14 being clear enough for me as a district judge. (Tr. p. 113)

In Kerr v. Hurd, 694 F.Supp.2d 817, 2010 WL 890638 (S.D.Ohio, March 15,2010), the
trial court at the federal level did not hesitate to let the parties know where it stood on a question
of significant importance to the academic community. Dr. Elton Kerr (Kerr) was a medical
professor hired by the entity, University Medical Services (UMSA). As an employee ofUSMA,
Dr. Kerr also taught at Wright State School of Medicine (WS-SOM). His immediate supervisor
was Dr. William W. Hurd (Hurd). Kerr was eventually terminated from his contract with USMA,
which had the effect of terminating his employment with the medical school. Kerr brought a
cause of action alleging, among other claims, a violation of his First Amendment rights in that he
had been retaliated against for advocating the use of "vaginal delivery over unnecessary cesarian
procedures, and lecturing WS-SOM residents on the proper and appropriate use of forceps" Id.
at 10. Hurd argued that Garcetti was applicable to this case, as Kerr was not speaking as a
private citizen as the speech concerning vaginal delivery was made in Kerr's role as an employee

The relevant pages of the transcript on ClaimantIPlaintiff's Motion For Reconsideration heard on January 19, 2010
is included herein as Exhibit D.

2
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instructing students at WS-SOM; therefore, the school had a right to regulate Kerr's speech.
Acknowledging Hurd's assertion that the United States Supreme Court did not decide whether

Garcetti applied to speech cases arising in an academic environment, in the absence of a United
States Supreme Court, or Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision to the contrary, the court was
bound by precedent3 • However the court, in performing its duty at the federal trial level, went
on to state the following:
Even without the binding precedent, this Court would find an academic exception to

Garcetti. Recognizing an academic freedom exception to the Garcetti analysis is
important to protecting First Amendment values. Universities should be the active
trading floors in the marketplace of ideas. Public universities should be no different from
private universities in that respect. At least where, as here, the expressed views are well
within the range of accepted medical opinion, they should certainly receive First
Amendment protection, particularly at the university level. See Justice Souter's dissent in
Garcetti, citing Keyishian v. Bd of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 87 S.Ct. 675, 17 L.Ed.2d 629
(1967). The disastrous impact on Soviet agriculture from Stalin's enforcement of Lysenko
biology orthodoxy stand as a strong counterexample to those who would discipline
university professors for not following the "party line." Dr. Hurd suggests that any
academic freedom exception to Garcetti must be construed narrowly and limited to
classroom teaching, relying on Gorum v. Sessions, 561 F.3d 179 (3rd Cir.2009)(Motion,
Doc. No. 84, at 14). The Court finds no suggestion in the motion papers that Dr. Kerr's
advocacy for forceps deliveries was outside either the classroom or the clinical context in
which medical professors are expected to teach. (Emphasis added)
Kerr v. Hurd, 2010 WL 890638 at 20.
Thus, the court found that Kerr's advocacy could not be excluded from the protection of the First
Amendment. The court based its decision on the fact that the speech was made within his role as
an employee and instructor of the school. Therefore, protecting First Amendment values
warranted an academic freedom exception to the rule that public employees making statements
3 The precedent the court was referring to was the unreported case of Evans-Marshall v. Ed ofEd ofTipp City
Exempted Village Sch. Dist., 2008 WL 2987174 (S.D.Ohio) which considered Garcetti rejecting the Seventh
Circuit's position and adopting the Fourth Circuit's position applying the traditional Pickering-Connick approach to
cases involving in-class speech by primary and secondary public school teachers. Applying the precedent the court
sustained the Defendant's motion for summary judgment.
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pursuant to their official duties were not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes.
Public and private universities are supposed to be active trading floors in the marketplace of
ideas. Aware of the fact that the Supreme Court expressly left undecided in Garcetti the extent to
which its analysis would apply in an academic setting, the Sixth Circuit, granted constitutional
protection to teacher in-class speech; or as stated in Garcetti, speech related to scholarship or

teaching. 4 It may be expressly inferred from the position taken by the Sixth Circuit, that because
of the critical role that the academic community plays in educating the public and expanding the
scope of human knowledge, the boundaries around protected speech must be broad so as not to
chill the public discourse. See Amici Curiae Brieffor the American Association of University

Professors, the Foundationfor Individual Rights in Education (Fire), and the Thomas Jeffirson
Center for the Protection ofFree Expression in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant, 2010 WL
2642629 at 23 (July 2010)
Academic speech under the First Amendment is neither governed by Garcetti nor
susceptible to the "official duties" analysis reflected in Garcetti. Therefore, the scope of First
Amendment protection for academic speech (i.e. scholarship or teaching) must be governed by
more than a half-century of decisions, beginning with Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,
77 S.Ct.1203, (1957), which recognizes the vital role that academic speech by college and
university professors plays in our society and the First Amendment interest in that speech:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is almost selfevident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is played by those
who guide and train our youth. To impose any straitjacket upon the intellectual leaders in
our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation. No field of
education is so thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be
made. Particularly is that true in the social sciences, where few, if any, principles are
See also Sheldon v. Dhillon, 2009 WL 4282086, pp.*3 -*4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2009) acknowledging that Garcetti
by its express terms does not address the context squarely presented here; and acknowledging that the Ninth Circuit
has not determined the scope of the First Amendment's application to the classroom.
4
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accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannotflourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and
distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to
evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise, our civilization will
stagnate and die. (Emphasis added)

Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1211 - 1212 (U.S. 1957)

More recently, and one year prior to Garcetti, the Tenth Circuit, in Schrier v. University

of Colorado , 427 F.3d 1253 recognized that academic freedom was of particular concern of the
First Amendment:
Courts have conspicuously recognized that academic freedom is a "special concern" of
the First Amendment:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of
transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is
therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that
cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents ofUniv. ofState
o/NY., 385 U.S. 589, 603, 87 S.Ct. 675, 17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967); Vanderhurst v. Colo.
Mountain Col!. Dist., 208 F.3d 908, 913 (lOth Cir.2000) (academic freedom is "a special
concern of the First Amendment"); see also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487,81
S.Ct. 247, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (l960) ("The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is
nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools."). We have also noted
that a greater degree of conflict is to be expected in a university setting due to the
autonomy afforded members of the university community. Hulen, 322 F.3d at 1239
(recognizing that "conflict is not unknown in the university setting given the inherent
autonomy of tenured professors and the academic freedom they enjoy,,). 5

Schrier v. University of Co. 427 F.3d 1253, 1265 -1266 (C.A.lO (Colo.),2005) (Emphasis added)

Through a review of Exhibit 1OF, it can be seen that Professor Sadid' s speech in the April
5

Hulen v. Yates, 322 F.3d 1229, 1239 (lOth Cir. 2003) reads in pertinent part as follows:

At the same time, conflict is not unknown in the university setting given the inherent autonomy of tenured
professors and the academic freedom they enjoy. See Sweezy, 354 U,S. at 250, 77 S.Ct. 1203 (plurality opinion); id
at 262. 77 S,Ct. 1203 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result); American Ass'n ofUniv, Professors, 1940 Statement of
Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure with 1970 Interpretive Comments, available at http://
www.aaup.orgistatementslRedbookl1940stat.htm (last updated June 2002).
The actual website has changed to http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/policydocs/contentsI1940statement.htm and
the relevant quote is that "Controversy is at the heart of the free academic inquiry which the entire statement is
designed to foster" (Emphasis added)
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21, 2009 Meeting addressed issues critical to scholarship at Idaho State University. Professor
Sadid engaged Dr. Jacobsen in a discourse regarding the Faculty Workload Policy and how it
must be addressed throughout the University and specifically within the College of Engineering.
U sing his own circumstance by way of example, Professor Sadid made the point that without a
standardized metrics based system, the College of Engineering did not have an accurate way to
measure and therefore correctly and precisely judge the performance of its faculty. Professor
Sadid voiced his disappointment in the lack of honesty and integrity exhibited by the past and
present administrations. Professor Sadid addressed the need for the Employer to invest in the
infrastructure of the university commenting that it would be difficult for the university to receive
grant funding if the grantor did not see a commitment by the university. Professor Sadid openly
expressed his displeasure with what he perceived as the non-existent fund raising efforts of the
past fourteen years by the Deans of the College of Engineering. Exhibit 10F lays bare the robust
atmosphere in which Professor Sadid, as well as others, criticized the administration. Indeed,
there is no doubt that Professor Sadid's and other's comments were the spark of controversy;
however, controversy is to be expected and is the heart of free academic inquiry. See

tn. 5.

On March 24, 2010, the Industrial Commission issued its Decision and Order wherein it reversed
the decision of the Appeals Examiner awarding unemployment benefits to Claimant and declared
that the Claimant was discharged for employment-related misconduct and therefore ineligible for
unemployment benefits. In this case, the Industrial Commission stated:
... This case is analogous to an Idaho Supreme Court case were a claimant continued to
criticize employer and its polices despite the employer's clear directive to express those
criticism in private. Gatherer v. Doyles Wholesale, 111 Idaho 470, 725 P.2d 175
(1986) ... Claimant may argue that his actions did not constitute misconduct and were for
the benefit of the College and faculty. However, Claimant's subjective state of mind for
making the comments is irrelevant. Mattews v. Bucyru- Erie Co., 101 Idaho 657, 659,
619 P.2d 1110, 1112 (1980.).
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March 24,2010 Decision and Order of the Industrial Commission pages 10 andll

Contrary to the position taken in the Industrial Commission's March 24,2010 Decision
and Order, it would be a mistake to simply equate Claimant's, administrator's (i.e., Provost etc.)
professor's, teacher's and other academic's standard of behavior with non-similarly situated
private or public employee's for purposes of First Amendment protection related to academic
freedom. Academic Freedom provides considerable protection to academics who from time to
time, or consistently as the situation dictates, criticize or face criticism of their academy peers or
superiors. Thus, the comparison of the Industrial Commission of this matter to that of the
Claimants in Gatherer v. Doyles Wholesale, and Matthews v. Bucyrus Erie Co is inappropriate.
In Gatherer, the Claimant was a warehouse supervisor of a candy and tobacco wholesaler.
Claimant's family had previously owned the business and Claimant constantly criticized and
took issue with the new owner's policies. Claimant was instructed not to raise his voice where
other employees could hear the criticisms. When asked to work overtime one day, Claimant
'''created a scene' in front of the other employees in the office." Gatherer at 471, 176. The
Claimant was subsequently discharged. In Matthews, the Claimant was terminated for obtaining
a leave of absence under false pretenses not for expressing his legitimated concerns in an
appropriate forum. In both cases, the Employers were not public entities, nor were the
Claimant's distinguished tenured professors with more than twenty-two years seniority.6 The
latter comparison would chill an academic's ability to speak without fear on controversial
subjects, where the opinion of the academic ran counter to the administration's party line. The
current decision of the Industrial Commission is known throughout Idaho State University, the
6 The Bucyrus-Erie Company is a maker of heavy machinery used in heavy construction. See
http://www.bucyruseriemodels.com/home.aspx.This company is not a public university and its employees are not
public employees engaged in academic pursuit.
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Employer. The Industrial Commission's decision at present mirrors that ofthe District Court and
has thus far failed to take into consideration the fact that Professor Sadid's speech enjoys
constitutional protection. As could be predicted, the District Court's decision has brought
significant apprehension to academics within Idaho. (Exhibit E) As most recently argued in the
Fourth Circuit:

Both in practice and in constitutional law, the actual duties of state university
professors implicate - indeed, demand - a broad range of discretion and autonomy that
find no parallel elsewhere in public service. Much of the controlling language of
Garcetti implicitly recognizes the profound differences between academic speech by
professors and other public employees, something that the court below declined to do.
For example, the Garcetli majority's suggestion that most public employees are subject
to "managerial discipline" on the basis of statements contrary to agency policy would
be anathema in the academic setting; indeed, academic speech usually does not
represent the official policy or view of the university. Further, although the Garcetti
majority comfortingly referred to "whistle-blower protection laws and labor codes" as a
parallel source of protection for public workers, such alternate recourses are unlikely to
avail most state university professors. (Emphasis added)

Amici Curiae Brieffor the American Association of University Professors, the Foundation for
Individual Rights in Education (Fire), and the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of
Free Expression in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant, 2010 WL 2642629 pp. 21-22 (July 2010)

Academic Freedom if it is to mean anything must encompass the ability of faculty members of a
public university:
" to speak or write-as a private citizen or within the context of one's activities as an employee
of the university-without institutional discipline or restraint on matters of public concern as well
as on matters related to professional duties, the functioning of the university, and university
positions and policies." (Emphasis added)

University of Wisconsin Madison, Recommendation to Amend Faculty Policies and Procedures
as adopted by the Faculty Senate, April 12, 2010 (Exhibit F)
In light of the facts of this case, the historical and special concern given to academic
freedom and the lead set in the judicial districts mentioned herein, it is imperative that the
Industrial Commission conclude that the academic freedom exception to Garcetti must apply to
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this case.
IV
CONCLUSION

It has been shown herein, through a complete and thorough examination of Exhibit 10F, that

Professor Sadid's speech in the April 21, 2009 meeting was very direct, forceful yet professional
and of a character that one would expect to encounter in an academic setting among tenured
faculty members. As noted herein, contention and controversy are at the heart of a vibrant
academic community. In this case, the Employer's representative refused to characterize the
Meeting as contentious. Instead, the employer characterized the Meeting as "being a good
meeting" and implored the faculty to refrain from disdaining such meetings. The Employer's
representative further commented that he enjoyed it when faculty members "open[ed] up and say
[said] what they think [thought]". Given the content, context, and academic setting in which
Professor Sadid engaged in discussion, his actions were not only within the standard of behavior
an Employer could expect of its employees, Professor Sadid's speech and participation by the
Employer's own admission, did not offend the Employer. Lastly but of significant importance,
Professor Sadid's speech during the Meeting was protected under academic freedom, which is a
"special concern" of the First Amendment. Therefore, Professor Sadid's speech was sheltered
by the 1st and 14th Amendments of the

u.s. Constitution and Article 1, Sections 9 and 10 of the

Constitution of the State of Idaho. An examination of Exhibit 10F demands that the Industrial
Commission conclude that its Decision and Order of March 24,2010 must be reversed thereby
securing unemployment benefits for the Claimant in this matter.
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Dated this 26th day of August 2010.

R.A. (Ron) Coulter
Attorney for Claimant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 26th day of August, 2010, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy ofthe foregoing by the following method to:

IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
700 S. CLEARWATER LANE
BOISE, ID 83712
P.O. BOX 83720
BOISE, ID 83720-0041

( ) U.S. Mail
(x) Hand Delivery
( ) Certified Mail, Return Receipt
Requested
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
( ) Statehouse Mail

(x) U.S. Mail
JOHN A. BAILEY, JR
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE & BAILEY ( ) Hand Delivery
CHTD.
( ) Certified Mail, Return Receipt
PO BOX 1391
Requested
POCATELLO, ID 83204-1391
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
( ) Statehouse Mail

DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
STATE HOUSE MAIL
317 WEST MAIN STREET
BOISE, ID 83735

( ) U.S. Mail
(x) Hand Delivery
( ) Certified Mail, Return Receipt
Requested
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
( ) Statehouse Mail
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

HABIB SADID,
Claimant,
v.

IDAHO STATE UNNERSITY,
Employer,
and
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

IDOL # 1777-2010

DECISION AND ORDER
ON RECONSIDERATION

FiLE

JAN 2 0 2011
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

Appeal of a Decision granting Claimant unemployment insurance benefits and an
Order denying Employer's request to reopen issued by an Idaho Department of Labor
Appeals Examiner. Denial of request to reopen is AFFIRMED, and Decision granting benefits
REVERSED.
This matter originally came before the Idaho Industrial Commission on appeal and
a Decision and Order was issued.

Thereafter, Claimant filed a Motion for Reconsideration

which argued the importance of what was said at the April 21, 2009 faculty meeting.
A recording of the April 21, 2009 faculty meeting was admitted into evidence before the
Appeals Examiner, but no recording appeared in the Commission's file.

Accordingly, the

Commission requested the Claimant resubmit the April 21, 2009 faculty meeting recording
as Exhibit 10F. The parties were also given an opportunity to brief their positions based on
Exhibit 10F. With the complete record, the Commission now issues its Decision and Order
with Exhibit 10F on the above entitled matter.
Employer, Idaho State University, appeals the Idaho Department of Labor's (IDOL
or Department) Decision fmding Claimant eligible for benefits as well as IDOL's Order
denying Employer's request to reopen the hearing. The Appeals Examiner found in her Decision
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that Employer discharged Claimant, but not for misconduct.

Employer failed to appear for

the hearing. On August 8, 2008, Employer submitted a request to re-open the hearing. The
Appeals Examiner denied that request because Employer failed to provide sufficient facts to
warrant re-opening.
The Commission will briefly address a few procedural issues. First, Employer's request
for a new hearing or remand is denied per the Commission's February 9, 2010 Order. Second,
as discussed in the prior Decision and Order and in the Order Granting Reconsideration,
Employer's original brief filed February 22, 2010, is untimely.

Third, Claimant's Motion

to Strike is granted, since the Commission's rules do not allow reply briefs; Employer's reply
brief will not be considered. Finally, the Commission will grant Claimant permission to file a
22 page brief, but will not consider the attached exhibits.
The undersigned Commissioners have conducted a de novo review of the record in
accordance with Idaho Code § 72-1368(7). Super Grade, Inc. v. Idaho Depart. of Commerce
and Labor, 144 Idaho 386, 390, 162 P.3d 765, 769 (2007). The Commission has relied on the
audio recording of the hearing held before the Appeals Examiner on January 5, 2010, along
with the Exhibits [1 through 10, including 10F] admitted into the record during that proceeding.
FINDINGS OF FACT

The Commission concurs with and adopts the Findings of Fact set forth in the
Appeals Examiner's Order to Deny Re-Opening. The Commission sets forth additional findings
of fact as follows:
1.

Claimant worked for Employer on two occasions. During his last period
of employment, Claimant worked as a full professor from August 1991
until he was discharged on October 23,2009. Claimant was suspended on
August 4, 2009 pending the University President's ruling on the
recommended termination notice.
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2.

Claimant had a history of voicing concerns via emails and at faculty
meetings. On April 6, 2009, Claimant received a warning letter from the
Chair of the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering
informing Claimant to raise his concerns via the proper procedure.
Claimant was to first discuss the matter with the Chair of the Department,
then to the Dean of the College of Engineering, then to Employer's upper
administration.

3.

Employer sent another letter on April 15, 2009, again warning Claimant
that voicing his concerns at faculty and campus-wide meetings and
through widely disbursed emails and communication intended to expose
another individual to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to impeach
his or her integrity or reputation was not appropriate. The letter, again,
reminded Claimant to utilize proper procedures raising his concerns.

4.

At an April 21, 2009 faculty meeting, Claimant again raised concerns
about work and personal matters, and expressed criticism of the
administration.

5.

Dean Jacobsen issued a Notice of Contemplated Action due to Claimant's
continued pattern of behavior.

6.

After further review, the University President, Dr. Vailas, discharged
Claimant.
DISCUSSION

Claimant worked as a full professor for Employer from August, 1991 until October 23,
2009.

Employer discharged Claimant for a myriad of reasons, including insubordination

and for being disruptive and unprofessional.

(Exhibit 5, pp. 19-20).

Due to Claimant's

ongoing behavior, Employer believed that it had adequate cause to discharge Claimant.
Employer points to several emails and letters Claimant sent showing criticism to the
administration, as well as statements made by Claimant at faculty meetings and an
awards banquet that Employer contends were unprofessional and disruptive.

Employer's

decision to discharge Claimant was based on its policies which state that discipline is warranted
if acts or omissions directly and substantially affect or impair an employee's performance of his
or her profession or assigned duties or the interest of the Board; or constitutes conduct that is
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seriously prejudicial to the University. (Exhibit 5, p. 15). In April, 2009, Employer supplied
Claimant with two letters, each stating to use the proper protocol in expressing his concerns, and
that failure to follow the protocol could lead to discipline. (Exhibit 3, p. 28; Exhibit 4, p. 32).
Employer contends that Claimant again expressed previously raised personal concerns during
a staff meeting that had a designated agenda.
Claimant does not dispute that he authored the emails and letters found in the record
or that he made the comments in the staff meeting. Instead, Claimant denies that his actions
constitute misconduct and maintains that his actions were not disruptive or unprofessional.
(Audio Recording).
Idaho Code § 72-1366(5) provides that a claimant is ineligible for unemployment
insurance benefits if that individual's unemployment resulted from the claimant's discharge
for employment-related misconduct. What constitutes ')ust cause" in the mind of an employer
for dismissing an employee is not necessarily the legal equivalent of "misconduct" under Idaho's
Employment Security Law. The two issues are separate and distinct. In a discharge, whether
the employer had reasonable grounds for dismissing a claimant is irrelevant. The only concern
is whether the reasons for discharge constituted "misconduct" connected with the claimant's
employment such that the claimant can be denied unemployment benefits.

Beaty v. City

ofIdaho Falls, 110 Idaho 891, 892, 719 P.2d 1151, 1152 (1986).
The burden of proving misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence falls strictly
on the employer. Appeals Examiner ofIdaho Dept. of Labor v. J.R. Simplot Co., 131 Idaho 318,
320, 955 P.2d 1097, 1099 (1998).

A "preponderance of the evidence" simply means that

when weighing all of the evidence in the record, the evidence on which the finder of fact relies is
more probably true than not. Edwards v. Independence Services, Inc., 140 Idaho 912, 915, 104
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P.3d 954,957 (2004).
The Idaho Supreme Court has defined misconduct as a willful, intentional disregard of
the employer's interest; a deliberate violation of the employer's rules; or a disregard of standards
of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of its employees. Gunter v. Magic Valley
Regional Medical Center, 143 Idaho 63, 137 P.3d 450 (2006) (citing Johns v. S. H. Kress &
Company, 78 Idaho 544, 548, 307 P.2d 217, 219 (1957)). In addition, the Court requires the
Commission to consider all three grounds in determining whether misconduct exists. Dietz v.
Minidoka County Highway Dist., 127 Idaho 246, 248, 899 P.2d 956, 958 (1995). We have
carefully considered all three grounds for determining misconduct.
Before analyzing each of the following grounds, the Commission must clarify the
hearsay evidence found in the record.

Employer did not appear at the hearing.

Instead,

Employer supplied a significant amount of correspondence from individuals regarding the
alleged adverse affects of Claimant's criticisms. The written statements made by those other
than Claimant are considered hearsay. "Hearsay is defined as testimony in court, or written
evidence, of a statement made out of court, the statement being offered as an assertion of the
truth of the matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the outof-court asserter." State v. Woodbury, 127 Idaho 757,759, 905 P.2d 1066, 1068 (Ct.App. 1995).
The Commission holds discretionary power to admit or exclude hearsay evidence.
As stated by the Idaho Supreme Court:
The Commission has the discretionary power to consider any type of reliable
evidence having probative value, even if that evidence is not admissible in a court
of law. Stolle v. Bennett, 144 Idaho 44, 49-50 (2007). The Commission has the
discretion to admit evidence if "it is a type commonly relied upon by prudent
persons in the conduct of their affairs." Id.; I.C. § 67-5251. This does not mean,
however, that the Commission is required to admit such evidence. Rather, the
Commission is given latitude to exclude hearsay evidence.
Higgins v. Larry Miller Subaru-Mitsubishi, 145 Idaho 1, 175 P.3d 163 (2007).
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However, hearsay evidence, alone, is insufficient to support findings of fact. Application
of Citizen Utilities Company, 82 Idaho 208, 214, 351 P.2d 487,493 (1960). The Commission's
findings must be supported by substantial and competent evidence. Id. at 213, 351 P.2d at 492.
Substantial and competent evidence is defined as "relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept to support a conclusion." Henderson v. Ecc1ipse Traffic Control and Flaggin Inc.,
147 Idaho 628, 213 P.3 718, 722 (2009).
Employer's hearsay evidence is admitted into the record based on its probative value and
is afforded appropriate weight. Since Employer was absent from the hearing, the infonnation
contained therein provides insights into Employer's arguments. However, because the authors of
the statements and those allegedly adversely affected by Claimant's emails/letters/public
statements did not testify, that evidence is afforded a lesser degree of weight and persuasion
in the face of sworn testimony provided during the proceeding in direct contradiction to it.
The hearing examiner, as the trier of fact, is entitled to place greater or less weight on any
partiCUlar piece of evidence according to its relative credibility. Morgan v. Idaho Dept. of Health
and Welfare, 120 Idaho 6, 8, 813 P.2d 345, 347 (1991). Therefore, to the extent that Employer
relies on written assertions of individuals other than Claimant, those written statements are
considered hearsay and carry less weight than Claimant's assertions.
The analysis proceeds to detennine whether Claimant's conduct constitutes misconduct.
Under the "standards-of-behavior" test, the employer must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the claimant's conduct fell below the standard of behavior it expected and that
the employer's expectation was objectively reasonable under the particular circumstances.
Harris, 141 Idaho at 4, 105 P.3d at 270. As the Idaho Supreme Court has pointed out, an
"employer's expectations are ordinarily reasonable only where they have been communicated to
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the employee." Folks v. Moscow School District No. 281, 129 Idaho 833, 838, 933 P.2d 642,
647 (1997). Therefore, the employer must communicate expectations and duties that do not
naturally flow from the employment relationship. Pimley v. Best Values, Inc., 132 Idaho 432,
974 P.2d 78 (1999).

Notably, there is no requirement that the employer must demonstrate

that the employee's behavior was subjectively willful, intentional, or deliberate in his or her
disregard of the employer's expectations. Welch v. Cowles Publishing Co., 127 Idaho 361, 364,
900 P.2d 1372, 1375 (1995).
Employer contends that Claimant's conduct of openly criticizing the administration
in widely dispersed emails, faculty meetings, and social functions constitutes misconduct.
Employer informed Claimant of the proper protocol to raise his concerns. In an April 6, 2009
letter to Claimant, Employer wrote "In the future, you are directed to follow proper protocol
in expressing your concerns (first to the Chair of the Department of Civil and Environmental
Engineering, then to the Dean of the College of Engineering, then to Idaho State University's
upper administration)." (Exhibit 3, p. 28). Again, in an April 15, 2009 letter, Employer stated
"You should not use such channels as campus-wide meetings, engineering faculty meetings, and
widely-distributed email communications to make negative comments about the performance
and/or character of current and former university staff and employees ... Communications
intended to expose another individual to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to impeach his
or her integrity or reputation are not appropriate.

You have previously been counseled to

observe collegiality in the workplace and to follow the protocol of meeting first with your
department chair, next with the dean of engineering, and then, if necessary, with other
ISU administrators regarding your concerns.

Continuing failure to follow these guidelines

will be cause for disciplinary action." (Exhibit 4, p. 32.).
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Claimant did not rebut that he received the letters at hearing, and referred to receiving the
letters in his correspondence with Employer. (Exhibit 4, pp. 29-33, Exhibit 10, p. 146). This
information clearly shows that Employer informed Claimant of the proper procedure to express
his concerns and that making statements that "expose another individual to public hatred,
contempt or ridicule, or to impeach his or her integrity or reputation are not appropriate" and
should not be made in faculty or campus-wide meetings or in widely distributed emails.
Employer's expectation is objectively reasonable under these circumstances. Employer
contends that actions, such as Claimant's, impair or affect the interest of the college and
university by creating a negative and disruptive atmosphere in the college, and that fundraising
efforts are hampered by negative publicity generated by Claimant's criticisms. (Exhibit 7, p. 3).
Employer's concerns are well taken and the adverse affect of openly criticizing administration
can have the above effect.

It is important to note that Employer did not forbid Claimant

from raising his concerns.

Rather, Employer required Claimant to raise his issues through

a certain procedure. There is also nothing inherently inappropriate about the procedure required
by Employer, nor does Claimant directly attack the validity of the procedure at hearing.
Therefore, Employer's expectation is reasonable.
Therefore, the analysis turns to whether Claimant's conduct at an April 21, 2009 staff
meeting violated the "standard-of-behavior" expressed and warned of in Employer's previous
letters. After a review of the audio recording of the April 21, 2009, the Commission finds
that Claimant did violate the standard of behavior which Employer expected.
With the resubmission of Exhibit 10F, the Commission had the benefit of listening to
the entire meeting, not merely reviewing the transcribed notes.
conclusion remains unchanged.

Even so, the Commission's

While it is true that some of Claimant's concerns at the
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faculty meeting were genuinely related to the workload policy and the business of the faculty
meeting, the other portion of Claimant's comments were not.

At the meeting Claimant

stated that the University was corrupt for 20 years, that the administration is absolutely corrupt,
and that nothing has changed since the new University president arrived.

(Exhibit 10F).

Further, Claimant told the members of the meeting that the administrators are lying
with bold face, that they have isolated the faculty and done nothing except when needed.
Claimant further stated that the administration refuses to communicate with faculty at all
levels and that it is doing whatever it wants. When discussing leadership of the administration,
Claimant said that he had documents to show that those people are unethical and are just
"power hungers." (Exhibit 10F). They were working to protect their own interest and not
the public.

Claimant stated that he truly questioned the integrity and honesty of the

administration in the College and the University.
Dean Jacobsen did conclude with statements about the meeting being a good meeting
and that it was not a bad idea to hold the meeting. The Dean also stated that he believed that
the College has the ability to move ahead "but not sniping at each other, and working
against each other, and undermining each other." (Exhibit lOF). The Dean's general statements
were directed to the meeting as a whole, which included many comments and discussions in
addition to those by Claimant, but the Dean's general statements do not negate the numerous
previous warnings that Claimant had received.
The Commission concludes that the statements made by Claimant in the faculty
meeting represent the type of conduct that Employer warned Claimant of in the April 6 and
15,2009 letters.

Claimant's statements raised personal concerns and attack members of

the administration in a faculty meeting.

Employer contends that the faculty meeting had a
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set agenda, which did not include Claimant's statements or the subject matter. Employer's
expectation was clear that such matters should be raised through proper channels and not at
faculty meetings, the record demonstrates that Claimant's conduct during the April 21, 2009,
faculty meeting fell below Employer's reasonable and communicated expectation.
As noted in the prior Decision and Order, this case is similar to Gatherer v. Doyles
Wholesale, III Idaho 470, 725 P.2d 175 (1986). In that case, Gatherer had been repeatedly
instructed to privately approach management with his disagreements with the employer's
policies. The Court found that Gatherer's outbursts, which resulted in Gatherer's discharge,
can only be viewed as showing a disregard for the standards that his employer had a right
to expect of its employees.
Claimant's long history of disagreement with Employer does not negate Employer's
ability to request Claimant raise his concerns via the proper procedures.

Claimant was to

first discuss the matter with the Chair of the Department, then to the Dean of the College
of Engineering, then to Employer's upper administration.

Employer's warning letters to

Claimant on April 6 and April 15 communicated the standard of behavior which Employer
expected Claimant uphold.

While the record also demonstrates that Claimant is a highly

accomplished professor, those facts do not negate the expectation that Claimant raise
volatile concerns through the proper procedure.
Claimant raises First Amendment freedom of speech arguments in his brief on
reconsideration. Claimant alleges that his speech is constitutionally protected and, therefore,
must fall within the standards of behavior which Employer had a right to expect.
Claimant's arguments are duly noted, but they are separate from the issue of whether
Employer discharged Claimant for misconduct.

Misconduct and Claimant's eligibility for
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unemployment benefits are determined by the standards set forth above.

In particular, the

current discussion is focused on whether Claimant's conduct fell below a standard of behavior
which Employer had a right to expect, which in this case is substantially more restrictive
than what is granted by the First Amendment.
Claimant's motion for reconsideration reminds the Commission that the gnevance
process at Idaho State University is extensive and after the hearings regarding Claimant's
allegations were held, a recommendation to restore Claimant to his position was issued by
the Faculty Senate. Regardless, President Vailas terminated Claimant. Claimant points out
that that Employer's grievance process requires proof of adequate cause to terminate an
employee. The law and process for receiving unemployment benefits does not vary depending
on the particular grievance procedure an employer may have established.

In this case,

Employer has the burden of proving Claimant was discharged for employment related reasons.
Claimant may argue that his actions did not constitute misconduct and were for the
benefit of the College and faculty. However, Claimant's subjective state of mind for making
the comments is irrelevant. Matthews v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 101 Idaho 657, 659, 619 P.2d 1110,
1112 (1980).

Employer clearly informed Claimant that his critical comments should not

be raised at the faculty meetings.

Because Claimant is ineligible for benefits under the

"standards-of-behavior" test, it is unnecessary to analyze this matter under the other
two grounds. Claimant is ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits.
CONCLUSION OF LAW

Employer discharged Claimant for employment-related misconduct.
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ORDER
Based on the forgoing analysis, the Decision ofthe Appeals Examiner is REVERSED.
Employer discharged Claimant for employment-related misconduct. The Appeals Examiner's
Decision Denying Employer's Request to Re-Open is AFFIRMED. This is a final order under
Idaho Code § 72-1368(7).
DATED this
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
ATTN: UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS
317 WEST MAIN STREET 2ND FLOOR
P.O. BOX 83720-0041
BOISE IDAHO 83720
)
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HABIB SADID
SSN:
Appellant,

~

vs.

)
)

IDOL# 1777-2010

) NOTICE OF APPEAL
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY
Employer/Respondent

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Respondent

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

TO THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY AND THE
EMPLOYER/RESPONDENT ATTORNEY OF RECORD JOHN A. BAILEY, Racine, Olson
Nye, Budge & Bailey, Chtd., P.O.Box 1391, Pocatello, Idaho, 83204, e-mail: jab@racinelaw.net.
and THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION AND ITS ATTORNEYS.
NOTICE OF APPEAL
DOCKET No. 1777-2010

Page 1

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named appellant appeals against the above-named respondents to the

Idaho Supreme Court for the Decision and Order entered in the above-entitled action on the
20th day of January, 2011, rendered by the Idaho Industrial Commission which was a final
order under Idaho Code (LC.) § 72-1368(7).

2.

That the appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

decision and order described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable decision and order under
and pursuant to LC. 72-1368(9) and Idaho Appellate Rule (LA.R.) 1I(d).

3.

A preliminary statement of issues which the appellant asks the Court to review at

a minimum; and, which shall not prevent the appellant from timely asserting other issues for
review are:

(a) The Industrial Commission erred when it concluded that appellant's behavior at
the April 21, 2009 faculty meeting fell below a standard of behavior reasonably to
be expected by the employer.

(b) In finding that the appellant engaged in misconduct, the Industrial Commission
erred in concluding that the concept of academic freedom as recognized and
protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I,
and Sections 9 and IO ofthe Constitution of the State ofIdaho have no bearing in
determining whether or not appellant's speech was misconduct.
NOTICE OF APPEAL
DOCKET No. 1777-2010

Page 2

4.

As this appeal involves questions of fact established by the record, the appellant

requests that full transcripts of the proceeding before the Appeals Examiner be produced and
included in the record on appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. The appellant also requests
that the following be made a part of the record if not included in the standard record
submitted to the Court from the Industrial Commission:
(a) All briefs submitted by the appellant and employer in this action;
(b) All exhibits submitted by the appellant and employer to this action; and
(c) All decisions and orders made in this action by any government agency.

1. I certify that:
(a) A copy of this appeal has been filed with the Idaho Industrial Commission;
(b) That the appellant filing fee to the Idaho Supreme Court has been paid;
(c) That the appellant filing fee to the Idaho Industrial Commission has been paid;
and
(d) That service has been made upon all parties pursuant to LA.R. 20.
DATED this 17th day of February, 2011

CAMACHO MENDOZA COULTER LAW GROUP, PLLC

Attorney for Appellant

NOTICE OF APPEAL
DOCKET No. 1777-2010
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1i

h

day of February 2011, I caused to be served a true

and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to:

JOHN A. BAILEY, JR
(x) U.S. Mail
( ) Hand Delivery
CAROL TIPPI VOL YN
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE & BAILEY ( ) Certified Mail, Return Receipt
CHTD.
Requested
PO BOX 1391/CENTER PLAZA
( ) Overnight Mail
POCATELLO, IDAHO 83204-1391
( ) Facsimile
( ) Statehouse Mail
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO
700 W. STATE STREET
P.O. BOX 83720
BOISE, IDAHO 83720-0010

DATED this 1i

h

(x) U.S. Mail
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Certified Mail, Return Receipt
Requested
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
( ) Statehouse Mail

day of February, 2011

CAMACHO MENDOZA COULTER LAW GROUP, PLLC

R.A. (RON) COULTER
Attorney for Appellant

NOTICE OF APPEAL
DOCKET No. 1777-2010
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BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

HABID SADID,

Appellant/Claimant,

)
)
)
vs.
)
)
IDAHO STATE UNNERSITY,
)
)
Respondent/Employer,
)
)
and
)
)
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Respondent.)
)

SUPREME COURT #

395.tjQ

CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL
OF CLAIMANT HABID SADID

Appeal From:

Industrial Commission Chairman Thomas E. Limbaugh,
presiding

Case Number:

IDOL # 1777-2010

Order Appealed from:

DECISION AND ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION
FILED JANUARY 20, 2011

Representative for Claimant:

R.A. COULTER
776 E. Riverside Drive, Ste. 200
Eagle, ID 83615

Representative for Employers:

JOHN A. BAILEY, JR.
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391
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Representative for IDOL:

TRACEY K. ROLFSEN,
Deputy Attorney General
317 W. Main Street
Boise ID 83735

Appealed By:

HABIB SADID, Claimant/Appellant

Appealed Against:

CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL OF CLAIMANT HABIB SADID - 1

r

Notice of Appeal Filed:

February 18, 2011

Appellate Fee Paid:

$86.00 to Supreme Court and
$50.00 to Industrial Commission
Checks were received.

Transcript:

Transcript will be ordered

Dated:

February 18, 2011

CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL OF CLAIMANT HABIB SADID - 2

CERTIFICATION

I, DENA K. BURKE ,the undersigned Assistant Commission Secretary of the Industrial
Commission of the State of Idaho, hereby CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct
photocopy of the NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED FEBRUARY 17. 2011; AND THE DECISION
AND ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION FILED JANUARY 20, 2011; and the whole thereof,
Docket Number 1777-2010 for Habib Sadid.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the official seal of
said Commission this 18th day of

FEBRUARY

,2011.
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De~a K. Burke . .;; - 'C:.
ASSIstant COmmISSlO]1 S~cretary
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BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
HABID SADID,

Claimant/Appellant,
vs.
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY,
EmployerlRespondent,
and
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
Respondent.

)
) SUPREME COURT NO# 38549-2011
)
)
)
)
NOTICE OF COMPLETION
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

TO: STEPHEN W. KENYON, CLERK OF THE COURTS; AND
CHARLES D. COULTER, ESQ., FOR CLAIMANT HABID SADID; AND
JOHN A. BAILEY, JR., ESQ., FOR EMPLOYER IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY;
AND IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the Agency's Record was completed on this date,
and, pursuant to Rule 24(a) and Rule 27(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, copies of the same have been
served by regular U.S. mail upon each of the following:

CHARL~D. COULTER

P.O. B ~39
BOI ,ID ~701-0239

JOHN A. BAILEY, JR.
P.O. BOX 1391
POCATELLO, ID 83204-1391

TRACEY K. ROLFSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
317 W. MAIN ST.
BOISE, ID 83735

You are further notified that, pursuant to Rule 29( a), Idaho Appellate Rules, all parties
have twenty-eight days from this date in which to file objections to the Record, including
requests for corrections, additions or deletions. In the event no objections to the Agency's
Record are filed within the twenty-eight day period, the Record shall be deemed settled.
DATED at Boise, Idaho this

13 TH

day of

JUNE

,2011.
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BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
BABID SADID,

)

) SUPREME COURT NO# 38549-2011
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Claimant/Appellant,
vs.
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY,
Employer/Respondent,
and
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
Respondent.

AMENDED
NOTICE OF COMPLETION

TO: STEPHEN W. KENYON, CLERK OF THE COURTS; AND
R.A. COULTER, ESQ., FOR CLAIMANT HABID SADID; AND
JOHN A. BAILEY, JR., ESQ., FOR EMPLOYER IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY;
AND IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the Agency's Record was completed on this date,
and, pursuant to Rule 24(a) and Rule 27(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, copies of the same have been
served by regular U.S. mail upon each of the following:
R.A. COULTER
JOHN A. BAILEY, JR.
776 E. RIVERSIDE DR STE 200 P.O. BOX 1391
EAGLE, ID 83616
POCATELLO, ID 83204-1391

TRACEY K. ROLFSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
317 W. MAIN ST.
BOISE, ID 83735

You are further notified that, pursuant to Rule 29(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, all parties have

twenty-eight days from this date in which to file objections to the Record, including requests for
corrections, additions or deletions. In the event no objections to the Agency's Record are filed

within the twenty-eight day period, the Record shall be deemed settled.
DATED at Boise, Idaho this

14TH

day of

JUNE

,2011.
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RONALDO A. COULTER
Camacho Mendoza Coulter Law Group, PLLC
Attorney at Law
776 E. Riverside Drive, Suite 240
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 6726112
Facsimile: (208) 672 6114
Idaho State Bar No.3850
ron@cmclawgroup.com
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Attorneys for Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
)

HABIB SADID,

) SUPREME COURT NO# 38549-2011
Claimant!Appellant,

vs.
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY,
EmployerlRespondent,
and
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

IDOL # 1777-2010

MOTION TO CORRECT AGENCY'S
RECORD TO INCLUDE EXHIBIT 10F
AUDIO CD FILED AUGUST 16,2010

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

COMES NOW, Claimant!Appellant, Habib Sadid, through his counsel of record, R.A.
(Ron) Coulter, of the law firm of Camacho Mendoza Coulter Law Group, PLLC, and submits
this Motion to Correct Agency's Record to Include Exhibit 10F Audio CD Filed August 16,
2010. This Motion is made pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 29(a) and 31 (a)(4).
Claimant!Appellant requests that the audio CD, Exhibit 1OF, previously served on the Idaho
Industrial Commission on August 16,2010 pursuant to the Agency's order granting
reconsideration on August 5,2010, be incorporated into the Agency's Record following

MOTION TO CORRECT AGENCY'S RECORD TO INCLUDE EXHIBIT
10F AUDIO CD FILED AUGUST 16,2010

1

Claimant's Notice of Service of Duplicate CD, Exhibit 10F, found at page 166 of the Agency's
Record served June 14,2011. This Motion is supported by the Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Correct Agency's Record to Include Exhibit 10F Audio CD Filed August 16,2010.
For the convenience of the Agency, Claimant/Appellant is also attaching two copies of the audio
CD, Exhibit 10F, previously submitted to the Agency, so that upon the granting of this Motion,
the Agency need only attach the CD(s) to the settled Agency's Record to be filed with the Idaho
Supreme Court. Copies of the audio CD, Exhibit 10F, will be served by mail on the parties
along with the service of this Motion and its supporting documents.

Dated this 27 th day of June, 2011.
R.A. (Ron) Coulter
Attorney for Claimant/Appellant

MOTION TO CORRECT AGENCY'S RECORD TO INCLUDE EXHIBIT
10F AUDIO CD FILED AUGUST 16,2010
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 27th day ofJune, 2011, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to:

IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
700 S. CLEARWATER LANE
BOISE, ID 83712
P.O. BOX 83720
BOISE, ID 83720-0041

( ) U.S. Mail
(x) Hand Delivery
( ) Certified Mail, Return Receipt
Requested
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
( ) Statehouse Mail

(x) U.S. Mail
JOHN A. BAILEY, JR
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE & BAILEY ( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Certified Mail, Return Receipt
CHTD.
Requested
PO BOX 1391
( ) Overnight Mail
POCATELLO, ID 83204-1391
( ) Facsimile
( ) Statehouse Mail

TRACEY K. ROLFSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
317 WEST MAIN STREET
BOISE, ID 83735

(x) U.S. Mail
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Certified Mail, Return Receipt
Requested
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
( ) Statehouse Mail

R.A. (Ron) Coulter

MOTION TO CORRECT AGENCY'S RECORD TO INCLUDE EXHIBIT
10F AUDIO CD FILED AUGUST 16,2010
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RONALDO A. COULTER
Camacho Mendoza Coulter Law Group, PLLC
Attorney at Law
776 E. Riverside Drive, Suite 240
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 672 6112
Facsimile: (208) 672 6114
Idaho State Bar No.3850
ron@cmclawgroup.com
Attorneys for Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
)
) SUPREME COURT NO# 38549-2011

HABIB SADID,
Claimant!Appellant,
vs.
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY,
Employer/Respondent,
and
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

IDOL # 1777-2010

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO CORRECT AGENCY'S
RECORD TO INCLUDE EXHIBIT lOF
AUDIO CD FILED AUGUST 16,2010

COMES NOW, Claimant!Appellant, Habib Sadid, through his counsel of record, R.A.
(Ron) Coulter, of the law firm of Camacho Mendoza Coulter Law Group, PLLC, and submits
this Memorandum in Support of Motion to Correct Agency's Record to Include Exhibit 10F
Audio CD Filed August 16,2010.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 17, 2011, Claimant filed a Notice of Appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court of
the Decision and Order entered in the above-entitled action on January 20,2011 and rendered by

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CORRECT AGENCY'S RECORD
TO INCLUDE EXHIBIT 10F AUDIO CD FILED AUGUST 16,2010

the Idaho Industrial Commission. In his Notice of Appeal, Claimant requested a full transcript of
the proceedings before the Industrial Commission, including among other items, all briefs
submitted, all exhibits submitted, and all decisions and orders made in this action. On June 14,
2011, the Agency served an Amended Notice of Completion and the Agency's Record on the
Claimant!Appellant, the Employer/Respondent, and the Idaho Department of LaborlRespondent.

ARGUMENT
On August 5, 2010, the Industrial Commission issued an Order Granting
Reconsideration. In that Order, the Commission noted that its files were missing an audio CD
entitled Exhibit 10F, being a recording ofthe April 21, 2009 Idaho State University College of
Engineering Faculty Staff Meeting. In the August 5th Order the Commission stated, "To further
the interests of justice, Claimant is entitled to a review of the complete evidentiary record. The
Commission will review a duplicate CD as was designated by Exhibit 10F by the Appeals
Examiner ."
Pursuant to the August 5th Order, Claimant filed a Notice of Service of Duplicate CD,
Exhibit 10F, with the Commission on August 16,2010. The Notice and a duplicate copy of the
CD were served on the Employer and the Department of Labor by U.S. Mail. Claimant and
Employer were also allowed to argue their positions based on Exhibit 10F via a brief and
responding brief respectively. The audio CD, Exhibit 10F, was part of the Record at the
Commission. Importantly, the audio file should remain in its audible form because a simple
transcript would not convey the tone or demeanor of the speakers at the meeting.
In his Notice of Appeal, Claimant requested that copies of all briefs and exhibits be
included in the Agency's Record on appeal. The audio CD, Exhibit 1OF, was one such exhibit,
and for that reason, the audio CD, Exhibit 10F, should be included in the Agency's Record.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CORRECT AGENCY'S RECORD
TO INCLUDE EXHIBIT 10F AUDIO CD FILED AUGUST 16,2010

Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 29(a), Claimant requests the addition of audio CD, Exhibit 10F
to the Agency's Record. Further, pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 31 (a)(4) the clerk ofthe
Agency shall lodge all "audio and audio-visual recordings offered or played during the
proceedings" with the Supreme Court. Transcription of the CD is not requested or required.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, Claimant respectfully requests that the Commission
correct the Agency's Record to include a copy of the audio CD, Exhibit 1OF, after the Notice of
Service of Duplicate CD (See Agency's Record, p. 166), and before Claimant's Brief on Exhibit
10F at page 173 of the Agency's Record.

Dated this 2ih day of June, 2011.
R.A. (Ron) Coulter
Attorney for Claimant!Appellant

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CORRECT AGENCY'S RECORD
TO INCLUDE EXHIBIT 10F AUDIO CD FILED AUGUST 16,2010

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 27th day of June, 2011, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to:

IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
700 S. CLEARWATER LANE
BOISE, ID 83712
P.O. BOX 83720
BOISE, ID 83720-0041

( ) U.S. Mail
(x) Hand Delivery
( ) Certified Mail, Return Receipt
Requested
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
( ) Statehouse Mail

JOHN A. BAILEY, JR
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE & BAILEY
CHTD.
PO BOX 1391
POCATELLO, ID 83204-1391

(x) U.S. Mail
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Certified Mail, Return Receipt
Requested
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
( ) Statehouse Mail

TRACEY K. ROLFSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
317 WEST MAIN STREET
BOISE, ID 83735

(x) U.S. Mail
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Certified Mail, Return Receipt
Requested
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
( ) Statehouse Mail

R.A. (Ron) Coulter

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CORRECT AGENCY'S RECORD
TO INCLUDE EXHIBIT 10F AUDIO CD FILED AUGUST 16,2010

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
)

HABID SADID,

Claimant/Appellant,

) SUPREME COURT NO# 38549-2011
)
)

vs.

)

IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY,
EmployerlRespondent,
and
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
Respondent.

ORDER AUGMENTING RECORD

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

On June 27, 2011, Claimant filed a motion to augment the Clerk's Record on appeal.
Claimant requests that Exhibit lOF be made part of the record for this appeal, and Defendants
have submitted no objection to the motion.
Accordingly, the motion to augment is hereby GRANTED. The Agency's Record shall
include the Exhibit lOF and it shall be added to the List of Exhibits.
IT IS SO ORDERE-&\..
DATED this

/5-

dayofJuly,20ll.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
/

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

/s-rf::.

I hereby certify that on the
day of July, 2011 a true and correct copy of the ORDER
AUGMENTING RECORD was served by regular Unite States Mail upon the following:
R.A. COULTER
776 E. RIVERSIDE DRIVE, STE 200
EAGLE, ID 83616

JOHN A. BAILEY, JR.
P.O. BOX 1391
POCATELLO, ID 83204-1391

TRACEY K. ROLFSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
317 W. MAIN ST.
BOISE, ID 83735

CLERK OF THE COURTS
SUPREME COURT-JUDICIAL BRANCH
STATEHOUSE MAIL

db

ORDER AUGMENTING RECORD - 1

BOISE, ID 83720-01~

~f{.
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